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Abstract 	  	  
This thesis examines the masochistic persona in literature. Beginning with the 
Marquis de Sade’s representation of masochism in Justine, it identifies three key 
tropes that make up the masochistic character: control, choice, and responsibility. 
These tropes are then applied to three classical texts: the Satyricon, the Lesbia poems 
of Catullus, and Seneca’s Thyestes. The first section of this dissertation establishes the 
masochistic identities of these three characters: Encolpius is the masochistic victim of 
his own passive and submissive nature; Catullus’ masochism manifests out of a 
distortion of his love for Lesbia; and Thyestes labours under masochistic delusion, as 
he is lured home to Argos by his desire for wealth.  
 After establishing the masochistic identity of these three characters, the second 
section analyses the impact that masochists have upon narrative. Both Justine and 
Encolpius are first-person, intradiegetic narrators, and as such their masochism 
directly affects the narrative. They interpret and relay information in an unreliable 
way, which is coloured by their individual masochistic characteristics. Catullus’ 
narrative is similarly biased as a result of his masochism. His perception of his 
relationship with Lesbia is that she holds all the power, and that he is powerless; the 
reader has no access to Lesbia’s voice, or to any other information that may mediate 
Catullus’ perspective. Finally, Thyestes’ masochism means that his narrative – framed 
as it is in a mimetic, dramatic form – does not have the power to become unreliable, 
because his passivity and masochistic delusion make him an unpersuasive character. 
Ultimately, this thesis illustrates that masochistic characters have a pervasive impact 
on the development of a text’s narrative: by their nature masochists vacillate, and so 
they effectively prolong narratives, move them laterally, and, by their self-reflexive  
victimisation bring about critical shifts in the narrative. 
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Introduction 
 
The Marquis de Sade is (in)famous for his depiction of the paraphilia to which 
his name is given, sadism. In portraying his sadists, Sade utilises their obverse, the 
masochist. These masochistic characters facilitate the exposition of sadism, and at the 
same time show the essential characteristics of prototype masochism. In this thesis, 
I use Sade’s classic literary depiction of the masochist as a means of interpreting 
characterisation and narrative dynamics in three classical texts: Petronius’ Satyricon, 
the Lesbia poems of Catullus, and Seneca’s Thyestes. In the first section of this thesis, 
I identify three central tropes that Sade uses to characterise the masochist: control, 
choice, and responsibility. I use these tropes to frame subsequent discussion of 
characterisation in my chosen classical texts; here we will see that each of these texts 
features a central character – Encolpius, “Catullus” himself, and Thyestes – 
that displays significant masochistic traits. In the second section of this thesis, I 
consider the effect that these ‘masochistic’ characters have in shaping the texts 
containing them. We will see here that adopting a Sadean approach unifies narrative 
characterisation across a broad range of classical genres; that is, recognising 
characters as masochists makes explicit the effect that they have – or try to have – on 
the narrative, whether that be the classical novel, love poetry, or tragic drama. The 
transmission of the narrative varies, but a masochistic reading exposes both the way 
and the reason why these characters deny responsibility, submit to other characters, 
and make choices that perpetuate their suffering.  
Masochism and sadism as labelled concepts are a relatively new idea, having 
only been so named by Richard von Krafft-Ebing in his 1886 Psychopathia Sexualis. 
The symptoms or commonalities of behaviour that make up these paraphilias, 
however, existed long before this point. Sade and Sacher-Masoch feature 
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sadomasochistic behaviour, which allows a reader to more readily appreciate the 
psychical structure of a sadist or a masochist. These texts feature many of the 
‘symptoms’ that are part of being a sadist or a masochist, rather than characters only 
exhibiting one or two of the symptoms in isolation (Deleuze 1989, 15-16). Thus an 
examination of masochism that begins with Sade is helpful, to create a clear picture of 
a masochistic characterisation, and to clearly identify the boundaries of reading 
masochism in literature. This characterisation can then be used as a condign lens 
through which to examine classical texts, where masochistic characteristics may not 
be so readily identifiable. That is, where Sacher-Masoch and Sade have crafted 
narratives that hone in specifically on a binary representation of sadism and 
masochism, the classical texts have a wider focus, and transverse a greater range of 
subjects and characterisations. 
In choosing Justine as my text, my reading is directed through a Sadean lens, 
that is as if I were Sade’s ideal reader. I see Justine as masochistic because she refuses 
to see the sense of Sade’s reasoning. That is, while today’s reader may find it 
abhorrent, and see Justine as a pure victim, Sade created her for a different purpose. 
Embracing the position of ideal reader reveals Justine’s masochism, and it reveals it 
in a way which provides a blueprint for reading masochism more broadly. Justine is 
essentially an empty vessel; she is a characterised veneer, through which Sade can 
channel only as much as he needs her to represent in order to tell his story. This thesis 
does not undertake a critical examination of the merits of Justine, but rather it takes 
the blueprint that Sade offers up and applies this to the classical texts, in order to 
identify points of masochistic commonality. 
 Krafft-Ebing’s definition of masochism is coloured by both fictional and 
clinical information. As Schaffner (2011, 170-171) points out, Krafft-Ebing uses the 
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frequency of behaviours appearing in fiction as evidence of their existence. While this 
may be unsatisfactory from a psychological standpoint, from a literary viewpoint it 
makes clear that masochistic traits can be extracted from texts without characters 
showing all the relevant symptoms. Krafft-Ebing (1965, 86) defines masochism as the 
opposite of sadism: 
 
While the latter [sadism] is the desire to cause pain and use force, the 
former is the wish to suffer pain and be subjected to force. By 
masochism I understand a peculiar perversion of the physical sexual 
life in which the individual affected in sexual feeling and thought, is 
controlled by the idea of being completely and unconditionally 
subject to the will of a person of the opposite sex; of being treated by 
this person as by a master, humiliated and abused. This idea is 
coloured by lustful feeling; the masochist lives in fantasies, in which 
he creates situations of this kind and often attempts to realise them.  
 
In this thesis I am focusing on the masochistic character, which stems from the same 
behavioural tropes that Krafft-Ebing defines here – which is commonly called 
masochistic perversion – but does not always carry an overt sexual component with it 
(Brenner 1995, 364).1 Reik (2002, p. 198) likewise observes that masochism is no 
longer limited to a sexual sphere: ‘The word [masochism] has outgrown its narrower, 
sexual meaning and has become dexualised.’ The first section of Krafft-Ebing’s 
definition here goes to the idea of possession, of allowing or wishing to be entirely 
possessed and subjugated by another person. The final sentence concerning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Stoller (1991) similarly notes that masochistic pain can be ‘psychic rather than physical’. 
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masochistic fantasy marries with Baumeister’s theory of masochism as escape from 
self (1988, 36): that the act of fantasising, particularly fantasising about surrendering 
control, allows a masochist to escape from the realities of everyday life, and thus 
cede control to a third party. The masochist can then seek to turn this fantasy into a 
reality, by giving control over to that third party, to do as they wish. The poetic lover 
is a useful example of this: by making his woman cruel and his lover subjugated, the 
poet engages in a masochistic fantasy. Through the lover he realises a fantasy that is 
so very far removed from the real world (Conte 1994, 38), and as such is his 
realisation of a masochistic fantasy. The unwillingness of the lover, perhaps most 
prominent in the case of Catullus, is the dissonance between the lover’s fantasy and 
his typical socio-cultural idealisation. This idea of realising a masochistic fantasy can 
be appreciated to varying levels. In the case of Tibullus, for example, it is a very 
potently realised fantasy, and there is a far sharper degree of complicity between the 
lover and state of servitude (Lyne 1979, 129); in Catullus there is disharmony 
between the two (cf. odi et amo, 85.1); and in Ovid the fantasy plays out as more of 
an exhibition of a fantasy, which parodies his contemporaries (Lyne 1979, 128). This 
idea will be returned to in the context of the interaction between masochism and the 
poetic trope of servitium amoris.2 
 Similarly, Reik (2002, 221), observes the importance of masochistic fantasy 
in both the sphere of sexual masochism and what he describes as ‘social masochism’, 
the latter being the primary concern of this thesis. Reik notes that in the social 
masochist, ‘Phantasy… has spread over the whole life and fate of the person 
concerned, assigning him a certain role… The place of the sexual partner has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Copley (1947, 291) and Lyne (1979, 120-121) both dismiss the notion that servitium amoris is present 
in Catullus. I examine this idea in my first Catullus chapter, arguing that the trope is present in some 
form, though not as expressly as one sees it in Tibullus or Propertius. Catullus may not glorify servility 
in the same way as the latter poets do, but he is in a state of pseudo-servility, which he perceives as 
actual servility, and he perpetuates his own suffering by refusing to walk away from Lesbia.    
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occupied by higher forces; erotically tinged torment has been replaced by blows of 
destiny, which yet grant secret satisfaction.’ Encolpius provides an excellent example 
of how this operates in the social masochist: Encolpius often becomes consumed 
with theatrical and melodramatic fantasies, turning everyday scenarios into the 
fantastic; in this way, he plays out his masochistic suffering, and gets enjoyment 
from it, even as he suffers. 
 Stoller (1985, 31) also addresses the point of masochistic performance, 
noting, ‘Perversion is theatre, the production of a scenario, for which characters – in 
the form of people, parts of people, and nonhuman (including inanimate) objects – 
are cast. The performance is played before an audience, the crucial member of which 
is the perverse person viewing… himself or herself performing.’ Again, this is 
something that we will return to when examining Encolpius, and it also applies to 
Thyestes, as he takes on the role of a Stoic Sage to feed his own masochistic 
delusions.  
 The idea of control is central to Sacher-Masoch’s portrayal of the masochistic 
Severin in Venus in Furs, the text for which masochism was named, where Severin is 
singularly obsessed with enslaving himself to Wanda. Masochism here is equated 
with slavery, debasement and humiliation (Felski 1991, 1096). These are all facets of 
one way in which masochism manifests in Severin, one particular individual. Slavery 
in the case of Severin is illusory; he may be emotionally enslaved, and he may feel 
enslaved, but this is to a great extent self-imposed slavery.3 It is this illusory slavery 
that needs to be focused on as a state of mind of the masochist, not as an actual state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Wilke (1998, 250) discusses the contract that Severin drew up between himself and Wanda, which he 
never anticipated she would actually follow. We can conclude from this that the idea of entering into 
this contract of servility was Severin’s preoccupation, over and above the actual state of servility to 
which he would eventually be subjected. I examine the notion of the masochistic contract in the second 
Catullus chapter, particularly by reference to the power dynamic that this creates between the 
masochist and their partner. 
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of servility, which anticipates Krafft-Ebing’s identification of fantasy as a component 
of masochism. It is because of this perceived slavery that control is fundamental to the 
construction of masochism: masochists may seek control, are controlled, or lose 
control.  
Choice is bound up in this theme of control, because a masochist may blame 
an external source, be that an individual, individuals, or a more ambiguous source, 
such as fate. The actual choice which they have made is de-individualised, as it were, 
perhaps because they do not want to accept the action or take responsibility for it, and 
therefore they place blame, control or responsibility elsewhere, alleviating their guilt 
and allowing them to repress their actual role in their situation. In Justine’s case, what 
often separates her from the other victims of the libertines that she encounters is that 
they become consumed with debating their philosophical ideas with her. Justine 
continually makes the choice to argue with the libertines, putting forward her 
religious beliefs time and time again, despite that the same result occurs each time: 
she endures more torture and more pain because of this choice. She seals her fate with 
this choice, but she does not take responsibility for it, because she feels a compulsion 
to try to convert the libertines to Catholicism; she chooses victimisation over silence.  
This idea of surrendering control is referential to Baumeister’s discussion of 
masochism as a form of escape. Baumeister posits that awareness of self and one’s 
responsibilities can become burdensome, and thus masochists may seek to separate 
themselves from their self-awareness in order to alleviate negative thoughts and 
feelings (Baumeister 1988, 29). Surrendering control, or feeling as if control has been 
taken from them, is a form of escapism, and important to the masochistic persona. A 
lack of proactivity for a masochist is a natural extension of this self-exclusion, 
because when a masochist deliberately surrenders their agency, they cease to take 
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initiative and are reactive rather than proactive (Baumeister 1988, 34). This is clear in 
Sade, particularly in Justine, where you see Justine’s masochism juxtaposed with the 
sadistic nature of the libertines that she encounters (Pastoureau 1965, 49). Justine 
rarely acts proactively, and thus is trapped in a repetitive cycle of abuse and eventual 
escape; the sadists she encounters, by contrast, are meticulously organised, self-
aware, and hence are comparatively proactive.  
This introduces the other key facet of choice and control, responsibility. This 
is where victimisation enters the masochistic vocabulary, when a masochist chooses 
to make themselves the victim of a perceived injustice. Feeling aggrieved by 
something they have willingly committed, they lay blame elsewhere, allowing 
themselves to feel victimised and also allay any responsibility that they may bear. 
Repression is processed by the ego, when an action has been committed (or even 
imagined, as the id and superego (primarily) are both primary processes, and thus 
unconscious 4 ) with which the conscious mind cannot cope (Kahn 2002, 22). 
Committing an action that has abrogated one’s morality and belief system would be 
such an action; unable to cope with the associated guilt or distress from this action – 
coming from the critical super-ego – the ego can repress the action, or repress the 
facts of the action, thereby lessening the guilt that a person feels, particularly if 
responsibility can be placed on another, thereby allowing the individual to feel 
aggrieved at what has happened to them, rather than feeling culpable or remorseful 
(Freud 1995, 280). 
 It may be that this repression happens subconsciously, meaning that a 
masochist constructs a narrative that displaces responsibility, without consciously 
recognising that that is what they are doing. From that point they become so invested 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Kahn observes that: ‘In the realm of primary process there is no distinction between fantasy and 
reality, between wish and action… should I long for a pleasure I believe is bad, I might be as guilty as 
if I had actually experienced it.’  
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in this externally placed blame that they cannot recognise the initial role that they 
played in it, or continue to play in perpetuating it. This can establish a repetitive 
pattern of behaviour, where a similar action is perpetuated, following the same arc as 
previous behaviours because the masochist is unable to realise that they are falling 
into the same trap, or believes that they are powerless to break the pattern. The 
monotony of Justine’s encounters with the various libertines is an example of this: she 
steadfastly remains virtuous, and therefore inescapably behaves in the same way, 
because she cannot recognise a different pattern of behaviour that will free her from 
the cycle (Carter 1979, 51). Though she is not culpable for the tortures she endures, 
she cannot break the cycle of behaviour that leads her into these situations, and indeed 
on occasion chooses not to break the cycle. She represses the pain and the suffering 
she endures; she is constantly aware that she is a victim, and embraces this status, yet 
is not willing to jeopardise her morality in order to change it.  
To anchor this discussion of control, choice, and responsibility, and to 
illustrate these characteristics at work in the masochist, an examination of Sade’s 
story Eugénie de Franval is useful, as within this story the character of Franval 
transforms from a sadist to a masochist. A key element in Sade’s construction of this 
transition is choice. It is a common misconception that masochists are entirely without 
choice; that they are victims, or slaves, or entirely submissive to the point where they 
have no free will. As Jones (2000, 204) points out: ‘Masochism demands, as a 
precondition, a certain amount of agency that can be relinquished.’ The very fact that 
something can be relinquished means that the masochist possessed it to begin with, 
and chooses to give it over. Sade chooses to emphasise the role that choice plays in 
the actions of a masochist. Eugénie de Franval provides a useful example of the role 
that choice and control play in the masochistic psyche. In reading Eugénie, I apply 
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Freud’s structural model of the psyche, which is useful to bear in mind as we 
approach Justine and the other texts. 
The basis of Freud’s well-known theory is that the human psyche is made up 
of the id, the ego, and the superego, which all work to determine our actions. As 
Freud notes (1957, 15), ‘The ego represents what may be called reason and common 
sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions.’ Freud compares the id to a 
horse, and the ego to a rider, noting that, ‘Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from 
his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go.’ That is, sometimes the ego must 
give in to the pleasure principle, and allow the id to think that it is getting what it 
wants. The superego exists to criticise the actions of the id, and, by extension, the ego 
(Freud 1957, 49). Freud theorises (1957, 49-50) that in a sadist the superego exerts a 
greater level of control over the ego, a point which I will return to in greater detail.  
Boothby (2005, 71) argues that, ‘The ego functions to categorise things and 
persons in the outside world (those with whom I identify versus those with whom I 
conflict, but even more importantly the ego discriminates between contending forces 
of my own desires (those of my impulses on which I will act versus those that I will 
refuse and repress.’ In a masochist, the overriding (conscious or unconscious) desires 
of the id can make this discriminatory process somewhat latent, so that desires which 
should be repressed or refused are instead acted upon. Further to this, the critical 
element of the superego can be overridden by this impulsive action, so that externally 
unsanctioned or socially determined immoral acts can be rationalised and committed.  
 Part of Freud’s argument on his psychic structures is that many elements of 
these three facets are unconscious or preconscious (1957, 3-5), referring to ideas or 
impulses that are unrealised or unformed, and also to ingrained ideas and themes that 
are so institutionalised that they are not consciously thought, but nonetheless exist. 
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Incest falls into this latter category: social taboos and social niceties or normalities, 
even, are so established that they are not necessarily given active thought or attention 
(Harari 1973, 1218). This is, in fact, something that Sade recognises and rebels 
against, finding it somewhat absurd and illogical that society willingly conforms to 
structures and strictures without consciously considering why and to what end they do 
so (Martin 1998, 105).  
 Nonetheless, incest is an understood cultural taboo, something which is 
unconsciously recognised and that which then arguably becomes a conscious 
realisation, should someone wish to commit it (Homer 2004, 43). This conscious 
realisation will result in one of two things: either the person will be revolted and/or 
ashamed and will reject the impulse (superego criticism being enacted by the ego); or 
they will willingly embrace it and in turn commit it (the id overriding the superego 
and forcing the ego to commit it). Sade’s short story Florville et Courval is an 
example of the former, while his Eugénie de Franval is an example of the latter. In 
the latter story, Franval fastidiously and meticulously plans his seduction of Eugénie. 
It is initially a very cerebral seduction, but as the tale progresses and Franval’s 
transition between sadist and masochist occurs, his actions become more impulsive 
and unplanned and ultimately, of course, prove disastrous. 
 Given that the superego processes social taboos and other social ‘normalities’ 
in order to criticise a person’s adherence to a particular standard, it arguably follows 
logically that the superego also processes social hierarchies (Harding 2018, 34-35). 
For the most part this would be an unconscious process. For example, an aristocratic 
person does not consciously spend time thinking of how they can order a slave or 
mistreat a slave, nor does a slave, in fact, spend time thinking that they could or 
should obey orders; it is simply an active awareness that is processed unconsciously. 
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Thus, it also arguably follows that the only time the superego will actively criticise 
concerning social hierarchy is when these unconscious boundaries are about to be or 
are being transgressed.  
 If we accept that the Sadean sadist’s superego operates on a different code to 
that of a non-sadist (taking this as ‘normal’, meaning the template by which Freud 
defined his system)5 then it stands to reason that Franval’s superego is regulated by a 
different moral code to that of his wife’s, for example. Thus no internal objection is 
raised when he concocts his plan to raise Eugénie for the express purpose of her 
eventual seduction. (The obverse of this is interesting to consider: were Franval not to 
carry out this seduction, then how would his superego react, perhaps it would be 
critical of his decision not to behave in a way that it has sanctioned.) 
 In Franval’s mind this course of action is entirely natural. He carefully plans 
his actions and these plans are meticulously carried out throughout Eugénie’s youth. 
There is no impulsivity or unplanned action, which is critical to the success of his 
plan. One consequence of Franval’s plan is that Eugénie is imbued with the same 
qualities. Like anyone, she has an embedded set of moral standards, which shape her 
superego; hers, however, are adopted from Franval. Thus she has no concerns about 
incest, because she has never been taught that it is wrong, or raised in an environment 
where it is recognised to be wrong, thereby forming the preconscious knowledge. 
There are no alarm bells that are set off within Eugénie’s mind when incest is 
mentioned or considered, because there’s no recognition of a societal boundary being 
transgressed. In fact, she has been taught that social boundaries or social 
transgressions are good, because they exist only to constrain and to hold back 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Meissner (2012, 245) argues that unregulated criticism, whether inward or outward, can affect 
superego morality, leading to the eventual remoulding of an individual’s system of morals. Sadism is 
one type of criticism that the superego can engage in, which can then be turned inwards, or practised 
outwardly. 
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happiness from those who deserve it. In this way, she has both preconscious and 
conscious recognition that boundaries exist to be crossed, and that if crossing such a 
boundary will be pleasurable then it is essential that it should be done.  
 Pleasure, for a Sadean sadist, is cerebral before it is physical. The Sadean 
sadist plans, vocalises said plan and then carries out the plan, extracting as much 
pleasure from the former stages as the latter (Harari 1984, 1057). There is not so 
much pleasure in unplanned and unvoiced actions. This is why Franval’s 
transformation from sadist to masochist begins when his id begins to play a larger and 
more dominant role. When his plans all come perfectly together and he fully 
possesses Eugénie, he begins (unplanned) to fall in love with her. He becomes 
obsessed with Eugénie, believes that he is in love with her, and can only think of her 
and how she makes him feel. 
 His actions become more unplanned and more unpredictable as time 
progresses, because he can only think of Eugénie and his desire for her. Franval needs 
Eugénie; she is no longer his victim but rather his equal, and they are entirely 
codependent. Franval’s desires, his id, are controlling all his actions. When obstacles 
are placed in his way he reacts impulsively; all the proactive elements of his though 
process are disbanded, overridden by his desperate desire to have and to keep 
Eugénie. This is why he makes so many fatal mistakes, constantly revealing their 
relationship to people when he is overcome by a desire to brag or to shock, or is in 
need of assistance to continue his illicit relationship.  
 When his wife, Madame de Franval, becomes ‘problematic’, Franval and 
Eugénie concoct a plan that they think, mistakenly, will be fool-proof. They believe 
that Franval’s friend, Valmont, will be able to seduce Madame de Franval, and thus, 
through this abrogation of her virtue, allow them some freedom, as she will be unable 
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to fault them because of her own hypocrisy (225). There are two mistakes made by 
Franval here. The first is to assume that the plan will work. Madame de Franval is a 
virtuous woman, and has no interest in Valmont’s advances (263). The second critical 
mistake that Franval makes is to take Valmont into his confidence. This is something 
he does as a necessity to his plan, a plan which has not been cogently constructed, but 
rather based on a projection of his own inclinations onto the potential actions of his 
wife. Valmont becomes enamoured with Eugénie, and hatches a plan, with the 
support of Madame de Franval and her mother, Madame de Farneille, to abduct 
Eugénie from Franval and to bring her to Madame de Farneille’s estate, with the 
eventual reward being that he will be allowed to marry Eugénie: 
 
 Franval, fully absorbed in his never-ending round of pleasures, fully counting 
on Valmont, fearing nothing more from Clervil, walked into the trap which had been 
set for him, displaying the same unsuspecting confidence that he so often hoped to 
find in others when he in turn schemed to make them stumble into his snares. (283) 
 
  Valmont kidnaps Eugénie after she leaves the Comedie Française, and they set 
off for Madame de Farneille’s estate. Franval catches wind of the abduction and 
hastens after the carriage. When he arrives he is so enraged over Valmont’s betrayal, 
and so unsettled by almost losing Eugénie, that he kills Valmont without a second 
thought. The consequence of this is that he must go into hiding to avoid being 
arrested. He retreats with Eugénie and Madame de Franval to Alsace, where he and 
Eugénie continue to concoct their plans to ruin Madame de Franval and to be 
together. When Franval receives word that Valmont’s family and Madame de 
Farneille are intent on him being tried for Valmont’s murder, Franval retreats to 
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Switzerland to avoid being arrested. Before he leaves he pleads with Eugénie to take a 
drastic course of action if the need arises, and to kill her mother (292-293). 
 Eugénie pledges her loyalty to Franval and he supplies her with poison to 
murder Madame de Franval. Franval departs for Switzerland; however, he soon 
becomes worried, when he stops receiving letters from Eugénie: 
 
 Franval grew concerned. And no more satisfied by the posts which followed, 
he grew desperate and, his impulsive nature making it impossible for him to wait, he 
immediately formulated a plan to return to Valmor himself to discover the reason for 
the delays which made him worry so cruelly. (296) 
 
 This is an explicit recognition of how uncontrolled Franval’s behaviour has 
become. He is no longer the calculating, cruel, and cunning character that he was at 
the beginning of the text; he is irrational, impulsive, and paranoid. The cerebral power 
that is the marker of the successful Sadean sadist has vanished, and he is controlled 
entirely by  his desires and by his impulses. He panics that he has lost Eugénie and so 
he dashes off into the night, with no plan and little thought of the dangers that might 
await him. Unsurprisingly, this plan also comes undone for Franval; he and his single 
valet are set upon by a band of thieves near the boundary of his estate. Franval’s valet 
is killed and Franval is robbed of everything except his sword.  
 This misfortune, coupled with the wild weather and Franval’s sense of 
foreboding as to what might be awaiting him at Valmor, conspires to bring about a 
complete change in Franval’s attitude. He feels immense remorse for what he has 
done to his wife and Eugénie, the steps that he has taken to satisfy his desires, and 
rues everything that has brought him to his current situation. This remorse is another 
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emotional indulgence. Franval’s superego is not programmed to induce feelings of 
remorse or guilt. It criticises him when he takes inappropriate action that does not 
necessarily serve a positive purpose, but it does not induce remorse. This reaction is a 
combination of realising that his plans – once so carefully made and actioned – have 
fallen apart and that there is nothing left for him of the prosperity he once had. This 
realisation combines with his newly discovered irrational emotions to project this 
misery onto his actions against others, and therefore feel remorse for what he has 
done to them and to himself. Eventually, Franval, overcome with grief and remorse, 
kills himself (303).  
 The transformation of Franval from sadist to masochist is extremely useful for 
appreciating what qualities are central to the construction of masochistic personalities 
in texts. The role of the id, of rationality and impulse control are integral to a 
masochist’s behaviour. An inability to stop oneself from committing a particular 
action is key: there is a particular obsession which a masochist has that makes it 
difficult for them to stop behaving in a particular way. Reik (2002, 235) refers to this 
as the demonstrative element of the masochist’s personality. Submission is central to 
this perspective, but does not necessarily mean that a masochist is submissive in a 
literal sense: it is more like a submission to an obsession of which they cannot rid 
themselves. They can be cognisant of the obsession, cognisant of the way that that 
obsession makes them behave, and yet still submit to that obsession when it is once 
again offered. Justine’s commitment to her religion, no matter the difficulties it causes 
her, is an example of this, particularly her need to actively speak of her religious 
views, when it may be better to remain silent. 
 In the case of Franval, he begins the text with a particular set of plans in mind. 
He wants to raise his daughter with the same values that he holds, and he wants to 
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seduce her. This plan, however, does not account for the fact that he is going to 
become obsessed with Eugénie, fall in love with her, and that he will be unable to 
stop himself from committing any action he deems necessary to have Eugénie. This is 
where he moves from sadist to masochist. A sadist does not need or become 
infatuated; they are entirely insulated and self-sufficient. Franval can no longer 
survive or exist without Eugénie; he is entirely reliant on her and his desires for her.  
 Thus his plans and processes lose all cogency and rationality. He does not 
spend enough time thinking of possible outcomes and possible behaviours; he simply 
reacts to the moment and acts accordingly from there. His id takes over, leading to 
consistently irrational and impulsive actions that ultimately lead to the murder of 
Valmont, and the unravelling of the entire story. Returning to the tropes of control, 
choice, and responsibility, we can see how these play out in Franval. He surrenders 
control to Eugénie and to his desire for her; he is compelled to do whatever it takes to 
please Eugénie and to keep Eugénie for himself. In surrendering this control, he 
continually makes choices that his former sadistic self would not have made, choices 
that ultimately will have irrevocable consequences because they are made on impulse, 
not made after careful consideration and planning. Finally, he denies responsibility 
right up until the very end of the text, because he believes that he has no choice but to 
behave in the way that he does. Rather, the responsibility rests with the people who 
have ‘forced’ him into these actions, such as his wife and his former confidant, 
Valmont.  
 Thus, bearing these things in mind, I now outline the structure of this thesis. I 
begin in section 1 with Justine. The character of Justine is a fruitful starting point, 
because, as discussed earlier, her primary purpose is to be a masochist, and to 
facilitate Sade’s exploration of his sadistic libertines. As Pastoureau (1965, 49) 
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identifies, ‘Sade’s Justine is a prototype of pure masochism, a prototype more 
meaningful than any of the self-observations Sacher-Masoch projected into his 
imaginative works… Sade, a finer psychologist than Sacher-Masoch, created his 
Justine only to offset the sadism of the characters who are associated with her.’6 This 
makes Justine a text from which a clear picture of masochism can be garnered, as 
Sade uses Justine as a methodological tool that gives primacy to his libertines. As 
Fromm (1941, 144) points out, one facet of a sadistic personality is to wield absolute 
power over their victim, ‘to make them nothing but instruments, “clay in the potter’s 
hand”.’ Justine’s masochism, which stems predominantly from her Catholic beliefs, 
makes her the ideal victim.  
 Religious masochism accounts for much of Justine’s behaviour, and taps into 
the wider symbolism of her character within the novel. Justine is a novel to which 
Sade returned twice in his life, with each version becoming longer, more violent, and 
Justine’s adventures becoming ever-more harrowing. Sade used Justine as a 
representation of French society, and inscribed the social issues, as Sade perceived 
them, onto her body (Dipiero 1995, 248). Originally identified by Freud in his 1924 
essay ‘The economic problem of masochism’, moral masochism is the root of 
religious masochism, and stems from an overtly critical superego (1995, 282). As 
Charme (1983, 225) discusses: ‘Christianity also gives dramatic expression to the 
tendency of masochists to identify themselves with the body of the all-powerful 
object of their love… The individual Christian, moreover, sacrifices his individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 My reading of Justine is strongly influenced by Pastoureau’s work on Sade, which addresses the 
prototype nature of Justine’s masochism, and, more importantly, identifies that sadomasochism is not a 
uniform paraphilia: ‘in the spectrum of human behaviour, sadomasochism does not appear as a single 
vertical ray clearly differentiated from its neighbours, but rather as a horizontal ray which crosses 
through all the vertical rays’ (1965, 51) The multiplicity of manifestations of sadomasochistic 
behaviours is a critical starting point for my reading of masochism in antiquity, because I do not seek 
to argue that masochism looks identical in each character, or that each author deliberately set about to 
create a masochistic character, but rather that the nuances of the masochistic persona are wide and 
varied, and can be grouped under several key ideas.   
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self in order to become part of the body of Jesus.’ Linked closely with this idea of 
self-sacrifice is the notion of delayed reward: that the masochist endures suffering on 
earth because they see it as a sign that God loves them more (Charme 1983, 223).  
 This commitment to an external force – here religion – is what Fromm (1941, 
155 ff.) terms a secondary bond, where one surrenders a part of oneself to a greater 
power. This surrendering alleviates the masochist’s need to make decisions purely by 
themselves: ‘The masochist… is saved from making decisions, saved from the final 
responsibility for the fate of his self, and thereby saved from the doubt of what the 
meaning of his life is or who “he” is’ (Fromm 1941, 156.). The central way this 
manifests in Justine’s persona is that her behaviour is entirely dictated by her Catholic 
beliefs. Examining Justine’s interactions with the libertines broadly, and the inherent 
differences in Sade’s representation of sadism and masochism, clearly shows how 
Justine’s secondary bonds cause her a variety of problems. Examining specifically her 
interactions with two libertines, Clément and Roland, illustrates how Justine’s 
stubborn adherence to her Catholic virtues means that she does not listen to the 
libertines, and in turn cannot learn, thus facilitating the cyclical nature of the novel. 
 Justine illustrates the three primary characteristics of control, choice, and 
responsibility that I have discussed. While Justine exercises great self-control of her 
body, she is compelled to be not only guided by her religious principles, but to 
constantly vocalise them. She makes the active choice to try consistently to persuade 
the libertines of her views, which often earns her additional attention and additional 
punishment. Often there is a moment where Sade gives Justine an opportunity to 
escape her tortures, or to give up her victim status, but she repeatedly makes the 
choice to continue to stand by her religious tenets, and thus continues her torture. 
Finally, Justine denies responsibility for her choices and her actions because she 
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cannot see that she could behave in any other way; she frequently laments that there 
was only one path open to her, when in fact this is not the case.    
In the following chapter I examine the Satyricon, taking the inherent 
masochistic characteristics that I have extracted from Justine and identifying 
similarities in Encolpius’ behaviour. The central difference in how Encolpius’ 
masochism manifests is that his is not religious masochism, as it is with Justine, but is 
tied more generally to Encolpius’ continual surrendering of his agency. This chapter 
examines Encolpius’ behaviour and mood during the Quartilla episode (16-25), and 
his relationship with Giton. From this examination we can conclude several key 
things concerning Encolpius’ masochism: particular emotions, such as fear, love and 
lust, agitate him, and encroach on his ability to make cogent decisions and have 
control over his emotions. When Encolpius becomes particularly agitated, be that 
through being fearful, lustful or broken-hearted, his ability to think and act sensibly 
becomes (further) impaired. In this impaired state, he surrenders his agency, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, and allows himself to be controlled by others. He will 
choose to defer to another over making any proactive decisions himself, being unable 
to realise what the proactive course would actually be, or incapable of carrying it 
through even if he is aware of it. Finally, when Encolpius is in an agitated emotional 
state it is easy to take advantage of him, which we see occurring in many different 
ways throughout the text: Quartilla takes advantage of him in manipulating him into 
her strange ritual (17-25); Ascyltus takes advantage of him to run off with Giton (79-
80); Eumolpus takes advantage of him when they meet in the gallery (83-90), 
amongst other occasions; and Giton, of course, constantly plays on Encolpius’ 
emotional state to get what he wants. Encolpius accedes to these various 
manipulations with varying degrees of happiness, but he does accede to them. Even 
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when he is being abused at the hands of Quartilla and her cohorts, or Giton is taken 
away from him, he lets it happen. He is incapable of not allowing these actions to 
happen. 
 Taking up Conte’s argument that Encolpius is a ‘mythomaniac’ (1996, 5), I 
argue that Encolpius deliberately styles himself as a victim or hero to displace his 
mundane existence, which in turn relates to Baumeister’s theory that masochists 
surrender both control and self-awareness as a form of escapism (1988, 35-36). A 
useful example of this is when Ascyltus, Encolpius and Giton part ways, and the 
scene moves through various parodies of, inter alia, elegy and tragedy (Barchiesi 
1999, 129), and Encolpius takes on the roles of Theseus, Achilles, and Aeneas. After 
losing Ascyltus and Giton, Encolpius takes refuge in a gallery, where he meets 
Eumolpus. Eumolpus is another character who easily controls and manipulates 
Encolpius, by taking advantage of his discombobulated state; in this way, a 
comparison of the two men clearly reveals Encolpius’ masochism. 
 My primary goal in the first Satyricon chapter is to illustrate the behavioural 
commonalities across the separate scenarios that I examine. Identifying masochistic 
consistency in Encolpius’ behaviour promotes Encolpius as the link between the 
disparate episodes of the text, rather than a forward-moving plot. I will discuss the 
structure of the text further shortly. A masochist is an ideal character to direct a plot 
that does not move forwards, but rather moves sideways, because the masochist, by 
their very nature, tends to vacillate, and to become stuck in a kind of stasis. If 
Encolpius were not a masochist, scenes like the Quartilla episode may very well be 
over before they really began. His masochistic nature is what facilitates the 
meandering nature of the text. 
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 Next, I examine Catullus, and my approach within this thesis is entirely based 
on a reading of the Catullan character. By buying into the character that the poet 
creates, I read the Lesbia poems as a cycle from which one can reconstruct a narrative 
of masochistic dependency and denial. This allows greater linear movement through 
the poems, not necessarily reading them in their current arrangement, but through the 
development of the Catullan character’s mood and attitude towards Lesbia. It is for 
that reason that I begin my analysis with poem 51, which is notionally the first time 
that Catullus encounters Lesbia. It is this poem that establishes the qualities that mark 
Catullus as a masochist, which then guides my reading of the subsequent Lesbia 
poems.  
 For the Catullan character, masochism is a distortion of love. In this regard, 
Fenichel (1945, 352) argues that masochistic love is an amplification of infatuation, 
and that the masochist surrenders their autonomy to the object of their love. Poem 51 
shows this amplification of infatuation clearly. Taking the sense of powerlessness that 
Catullus expresses in poem 51, I then examine poems 5 and 7, in which Catullus 
defines his love for Lesbia. This gives substance to why Catullus finds himself 
powerless against Lesbia, because he defines his love for her in a way that hands over 
all control to Lesbia herself. I use as my starting point for this Conte’s insightful 
examination of the love poet’s construction of the erotic world (1994, 35 ff.). Here 
Conte (1994, 37) argues that the world is reduced to a ‘partial field of vision’, which 
theoretically contains in microcosm all that the lovers need, but that this ‘precarious 
equilibrium’ (42) can be ruptured by the outside world impinging on this microcosm, 
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forcing the lover to reintegrate outside values into their world.7 I utilise this reading to 
analyse some of the later Lesbia poems, and read Catullus’ reintroduction of Roman 
concepts, such as fides, in the light of this ‘precarious equilibrium’. The more that 
Catullus becomes disillusioned with Lesbia, the more Roman concepts he tries to 
reintroduce into their relationship, in an attempt to regain the power that he feels he 
has lost. 
 Charme (1983, 222) outlines the sacrifices a masochist will make to prove 
their love, most relevantly here: ‘The more suffering he is willing to endure, the 
greater his love must be.’ This idea is integral to my reading of Catullus’ masochism: 
because he suffers, and sees his suffering as directly linked to Lesbia’s faults, then his 
love is greater for it. This notion is succinctly captured in poem 75, where Catullus 
reflects on what Lesbia has reduced him to (huc est mens deducta tua, mea Lesbia, 
culpa, 75.1), and yet how he cannot stop loving her (nec desistere amare, 75.4).8   
 Catullus’ masochism also perpetuates the Lesbia narrative. Were Catullus not 
a masochist, had he not surrendered his patriarchal agency to Lesbia, then arguably 
the obstinacy he tries to show in poem 8 would have actually been realised, and the 
narrative might have come to an end much earlier.9 Thus, in reading the Lesbia 
poems, I seek to draw out how Catullus’ masochism enables the length and power of 
the narrative, pulling Catullus between love and hate alternately, and that ultimately it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Conte’s work on the construction of the elegiac world of the love poet is central to my reading of 
Catullus, which focuses in on the exclusive amatory world that Catullus designs for himself and Lesbia. 
My reading diverges from Conte’s in that I focus primarily on that construction being one of the poetic 
persona, rather than the poet Catullus. I approach “Catullus” as a masochist in the same way as one 
would approach an analysis of servitium amoris in love poetry, by focusing exclusively on the poetic 
persona. 
8 Fromm (1941, 157) discusses that a basic antagonism remains for the masochist, when he tries to 
submerge himself in the masochistic bond, that is to surrender his autonomy to another person. In 
Catullus we see this antagonism emerge as a consequence of his frustration with Lesbia, because she is 
not confirming to the idealisation that he designed for the two of them. 
9 As Stoller (1985, 31) notes, a feature of masochism is that things are often not resolved and thus 
cannot be given up, ‘The pain and frustration of earlier times live on unresolved, carried within, always 
a potential threatening force motivating one to resolutions that never quite work, to an undoing never 
quite done.’ Poem 8 is a clear example of this, where Catullus tries so hard but cannot ultimately 
compel himself to give up on Lesbia. 
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is this prolonging of the masochistic Lesbia narrative that reveals the arc itself to be a 
literary device, and hence why my reading is based entirely around the character of 
Catullus.  
 The final chapter of section 1 examines Seneca’s Thyestes. Primarily, I draw 
out Thyestes’ masochism by comparing his characterisation with Atreus’. Atreus 
shows a focused determination to take his revenge on Thyestes, and he harnesses his 
furor to control his behaviour and actions. My reading of Atreus’ behaviour and 
convictions is in line with Davis’ discussion of Atreus as a paradoxical embodiment 
of the Stoic Sage (2003, 66). This reading of Atreus hones in on his single-
mindedness, allowing me to draw out a comparison between Atreus and Sadean 
sadists. Atreus, like Sadean sadists, displaces a more ‘traditional’ moral system and 
replaces it with one of his own making, which serves his own benefits. As Davis 
(2003, 65-66) remarks: ‘He is indifferent to the trappings of power: his concern is for 
power itself, not the accompanying glitter (211f.). He is indifferent to the concerns for 
life and personal safety, since he rates his own life at nought if he can obtain revenge 
against his brother (190f.).’ Atreus prioritises his revenge above all else; his 
behaviour is methodical, meticulous, and regimented, much like the behaviour of 
Sade’s libertines. 
 In contrast, Thyestes demonstrates a vacillating mindset, and allows others to 
determine his own fate. I argue that his temperament is an intrinsic part of his 
masochistic persona, and stems predominantly from paranoia and masochistic 
delusion. Paranoia works differently in masochists than in others. Bak’s theory of 
paranoia (1995, 182 ff.) directs my analysis in this regard, where I take the central 
clinical concepts and apply them in a literary context. Bak argues (1995, 191) that the 
masochist seeks to suppress paranoia by means of masochistic delusion, where the 
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masochist refuses to address the cause of their paranoia and instead retreats into 
masochistic passivity. In examining Thyestes, I combine my reading of Bak with 
Schiesaro’s analysis of engaging with irrational dimensions of the self in Thyestes 
(2003, 221). Schiesaro argues that a refusal ‘to engage with the irrational dimension 
of the self… ultimately results in a mutilation, if an outright denial, of the self.’ While 
Atreus addresses his doubts and fears about his plan, and subsequently overcomes that 
paranoia (cf. 283-286), Thyestes ignores his fears, and cedes agency and control to 
Tantalus. 
 Thyestes’ conversation with Tantalus clearly evinces his masochistic persona. 
He initially recognises his unwillingness and uncertainty about returning home (423-
428), and admits to Tantalus that he does not know exactly what he fears, but yet he 
does (nihil timendum video, sed timeo tamen/ I see nothing to be feared, but still I am 
afraid, 435).10 It is here that Thyestes’ masochistic delusion begins to manifest, as he 
retreats into a quasi-Stoic dialogue, where he speaks as a man who has no desire to 
reclaim former power, but is instead satisfied by the tranquil life that comes from 
living with nature (446-470). Instead of facing his doubts and addressing them, 
Thyestes retreats into masochistic delusion, which conceals the real reason that he is 
returning home: because he desires the wealth and power that goes along with the 
throne.  
 The second masochistic element to Thyestes’ persona that I address is his 
subconscious need for punishment, stemming from his guilt complex. In this vein, my 
interpretation is informed by Nacht’s work on the guilt complex within the 
masochistic persona, which focuses on the inward turn of aggression (1995, 18-34). 
Thyestes readily admits to Atreus that he is guilty of all that Atreus thinks of him 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 All Latin translations in this thesis are my own, except where otherwise stated. 
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(512-516). This confession of guilt is largely unprompted; indeed, as Boyle (2017, 
281) observes, Thyestes’ language prior to this suggests he has come ready to defend 
himself, but instead he hands himself over to Atreus for punishment. Finally, I argue 
that these two forms of masochism explain the recurring theme of nolle that is 
associated with Thyestes (cf. 420; 950; 965; 985). 
These two elements of his masochistic persona pull him in different directions, 
so that eventually Thyestes chooses to cede control firstly to Tantalus, and then to 
Atreus. Ultimately, this chapter engages in a binary reading of Atreus and Thyestes, 
showing the similarities of the two brothers (kings, exiles, power-hungry), and how 
their individual personas are critical to the success that they enjoy. Because Thyestes 
is a masochist, he will never succeed; he does not have the psychological awareness 
or skill to defend himself against Atreus. A masochistic reading of Thyestes also 
unites the disparate elements of his personality under one behavioural trope. Thyestes 
is a failed Stoic, a failed exile, and a failed king because of his masochism. 
At the conclusion of the first section we will have a clear picture of the 
parameters of masochism, and how each character fits within these parameters. The 
first section identifies three particular traits that are intrinsic to reading masochism: 
control, passivity, and responsibility. Masochistic characters surrender their agency, 
choosing to submit to the will of another person, or a situation, rather than trying to 
assert themselves; they may choose to be controlled, and are unable to extricate 
themselves from that control; and, finally, they refuse or are unwilling to accept 
responsibility for any consequences that may come about as a result of when they 
surrender their agency. 
 In the second section I show the link between a masochist and the narrative. 
The actual impact that the masochist has on the narrative can vary, depending on how 
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the narrative is transmitted, that is, the generic degree of narrative control held by the 
masochist. Where Justine and Encolpius hold the position of first person, diegetic 
narrators, and thus their masochistic narration is directly conveyed to the reader, a 
character such as Thyestes is just one part of a larger mimetic narrative, and thus his 
impact on the development of the narrative is more complex and nuanced. It is for 
that reason that I approach the final Seneca chapter in a different way, using it to 
show that because he is a masochist, he cannot take a prominent role within the 
drama, as Atreus does, and thus he cannot mislead the viewer or reader. He may be 
akin to an unreliable narrator, in that his words are an inaccurate representation of his 
genuine feelings and beliefs, but he does not have the power to lead the reader astray 
with these inaccuracies.  
In the first two chapters particularly, my understanding of unreliability is 
directed by employing Phelan and Martin’s theory of unreliable narration. This theory 
marries well with reading a character who is unreliable because they are a masochist. 
The six types of unreliable narration that Phelan and Martin identify are misreporting, 
misreading, misevaluating (misregarding), underreporting, underreading, and 
underregarding (Phelan and Martin 1999, 95). I outline them here by reference to 
examples from the Satyricon, as Encolpius embodies essentially all of these forms of 
unreliability. Misreporting occurs because the narrator has misunderstood, has been 
confused, or lacks the requisite knowledge to understand. Misreporting typically 
occurs with misreading and/or misevaluating, as they all stem from the same 
comprehension difficulties. Misreading occurs when a narrator lacks the knowledge 
and perception to make a particular claim; this could be because a narrator has limited 
experience, and cannot truly understand what is happening, or when a narrator 
imposes their own prejudices in stating their views and opinions. Misregarding 
	   27	  
involves a failure of ethics and evaluation; a narrator may make an ethical evaluation, 
or perceives something about another character that does not seem genuine. Taking 
Encolpius as an exemplar for these types of unreliability, at the Cena Trimalchionis 
Encolpius misreports, misreads, and misevaluates because he does not understand; he 
is confused; he is overwhelmed. An example of both misreporting and misreading is 
when Encolpius first arrives at Trimalchio’s house, and is confused by the caue 
canem (29). Encolpius gives a detailed account of his surroundings, only to then be 
entirely taken in by the sight of the mural. He misreads the mural, thinking that it is a 
real dog, and he misreports the sighting. Instances of misreading, along with 
misregarding and misreporting, are peppered throughout the Cena, as Encolpius is 
unable to judge correctly the behaviour of Trimalchio and his cohort.  
 The other three types of unreliable narration – underreporting, underreading, 
and underregarding – relate to the quality and quantity of information that a narrator 
transmits to the reader. Underreporting is when a narrator provides less information 
than they possibly could. An example of this in the Satyricon is the Quartilla episode. 
Encolpius, Ascyltus, and Giton, apparently at some point earlier in the text, have 
interrupted Quartilla conducting secret Priapean rites. We know this because 
Quartilla’s maid states that they have interrupted Quartilla’s mystic rites (16), and 
because Quartilla herself states that she’s concerned that they will make public that 
which they observed in the shrine of Priapus (17). This is the only information that we 
are offered; we do not know when these events happened in the context of the very 
murky timeline we have, nor do we know even approximately where it took place. 
Encolpius himself does not fill in this additional information for the reader, despite 
having the ability to do so. Underreading means that a character lacks the knowledge, 
perception, or sophistication to facilitate an accurate interpretation of a character or 
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their actions (Phelan and Martin 1999, 96). This is a difficulty Encolpius frequently 
encounters, including in his encounters with Quartilla, Trimalchio, and Eumolpus.11 
Finally, underregarding means that a narrator tries to make an ethical judgment, but 
does not push it far enough to be entirely correct (Phelan and Martin 1999, 96). In the 
Satyricon, Encolpius frequently fails to have an accurate understanding of people’s 
characters; the convoluted love triangle between him, Ascyltus, and Giton is a 
relevant example of this.12  
There are several layers of narration in Justine, and this adds to the text’s 
interpretive complexity. Firstly, there is Sade’s opening dedication, which appears to 
steer the reader towards a sympathetic reading of Justine’s misadventures. There is 
then the opening and concluding remarks to the text, made by an extradiegetic reader, 
who introduces the reader to Justine and her sister Juliette, and sets up Justine’s 
external and internal narration. The extradiegetic narrator likewise seems to urge a 
sympathetic reading of what befalls Justine. Justine’s own narration operates on two 
levels: the ‘interior’ Justine, who is experiencing her misfortunes directly, and the 
‘exterior’ Justine, who is retelling her misfortunes to Madame de Lorsange (in fact 
her sister Juliette) whilst awaiting execution. Behind all this is the implied author, 
Sade, and what we know now, from arguably a more privileged point of view than his 
contemporaries, of his own vices and predilections.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Slater (1990, 55-56), in examining Encolpius’ early interaction with Trimalchio, identifies Encolpius’ 
struggle in this regard: ‘We see Trimalchio in pieces: his bald head, red tunic, green ball, silver 
chamber pot, and large entourage of slaves. Encolpius does not supply up with any synthesis of these 
details other than to marvel at them (miremur, 27.4) and conclude what he already knows, that 
Trimalchio is rich. Any further synthesis, if one is possible, is left to the reader.’ Encolpius frequently 
makes a variety of observations about what is happening around him, but lacks that extra cognitive step, 
in which he brings these observations together and makes an evaluation. 
12 In the first chapter I examine Encolpius’ relationship with Giton, and his failure to appreciate Giton’ 
character. As Arrowsmith (1966, 327) explores: ‘Encolpius’ deepest trait is innocence; he is either 
beyond or below good and evil. His love for Giton is, true, pederasty, but it is also love… If we 
recognise Encolpius’ deformity and pathos, we are almost meant to recognise that he is not a monster, 
but pathetic.’ Here I would say that Encolpius’ deepest trait is gullibility, which is perhaps a more 
pointed form of innocence, and it accounts in many ways of Encolpius’ repeated failures to make 
judgments about people. 
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I begin by examining Sade’s dedication, and how that relates to the 
philosophical nature of the sublime. I then examine the implied author, and how 
ultimately Sade’s views, which we can access from his personal writings, and 
pamphlets such as Français, encore un effort si vous voulez être républicains, show 
that his views are more in line with those of his libertines than of the staunchly 
Catholic Justine. I then build on Edmiston’s point that ‘if there is a communication 
between the implied author of a text and the reader, at the expense of the unknowing 
narrator, we can say that the implied author is ironic and that the narrator is 
unreliable’ (1987, p.148). This establishes one level of unreliability in Justine, that 
her perspective is so at odds with that of the implied author, and thus theoretically at 
odds with the message that he seeks to convey.  
I illustrate these layers of narration through examining the Bressac episode, 
which also shows the levels of unreliable narration between the two versions of 
Justine. Justine is frequently guilty of underreading, underregarding and 
underreporting, which links back to her masochistic nature. Her lack of 
comprehension, which I explored in the first Sadean chapter, plays a prominent role in 
this unreliability, and stems directly from Justine’s masochism. Justine cannot 
understand the perspective of the libertines because it is outside the bounds of her 
religious beliefs, and often is in direct contravention of them. This lack of 
comprehension is evident in not only the interior Justine, who immediately hears 
these diatribes, but the exterior Justine, who still will not comprehend them, nor see 
any advantage in trying to comprehend them. This means that Justine is 
underregarding, because she does not interpret events in the same way as the implied 
author arguably wants them to be interpreted. Justine also frequently withholds 
information, because she deems it too shocking to relay to the reader. This is a clear 
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example of underreporting, because she makes a deliberate decision to withhold 
information from the reader, and thus denies the reader the opportunity to interpret 
that information for themselves. 
Finally, I look at the concluding remarks of the extradiegetic narrator, who 
urges the reader to take away the message that virtue is the source of true happiness. 
This message, like the opening, is at odds with the body of the text. Justine’s virtue is 
the locus of her masochism, and thus the source of her suffering. Thus, the dedication, 
and the opening and closing remarks of the extradiegetic narrator, are geared towards 
supporting Justine’s narration, but it is ultimately her own masochism that 
undermines the course of the text, bringing it more in line with the views of the 
implied author. Sade characterises Justine in a way that equates masochism with 
unreliability – that is, if she were not a masochist then she would not withhold 
information, impress on the reader her own ethical judgments, and misread situations 
because of her religious faith – thereby impressing on the reader the comparative 
‘virtue’ of the philosophy that he expounds.  
Next, I turn to the Satyricon once again. Here I use Encolpius’ masochism to 
bind a character-based reading of the text. Encolpius, as a masochistic narrator, is our 
constant throughout the text; though his behaviour may be impulsive and chaotic, it 
focuses the text in the moment, which I argue was Petronius’ overall purpose. 
Building on Schmeling’s theory that Petronius wrote episodes of the Satyricon for 
group recitation (1991, 371), and that each episode parodied a particular genre, I 
argue that each episode is self-contained, rather than each episode building towards 
some final point of plot resolution, like a homecoming. I argue that Encolpius is the 
link between these self-contained stories, and that Encolpius, as a masochist, is ideally 
suited to the genre-hopping that Petronius would have him do. Because of the 
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passivity and malleability that his masochism causes, Encolpius can be shunted from 
genre to genre, place to place, and situation to situation, and he will follow the lead of 
whoever controls him there.  
 To test this proposed reading, I examine the Cena Trimalchionis, the only 
near-complete episode that we have in the extant text. This episode brings Encolpius’ 
unreliability as a narrator into focus, as he struggles to comprehend what is happening 
around him, and repeatedly misreports his observations, imposing his own (often 
incorrect) interpretations onto the (often suspecting) reader. As the Cena continues, 
Encolpius makes repeated errors, until eventually he decides to stop asking questions 
entirely. It is at this point that Encolpius takes almost a backseat as a primary narrator, 
and starts to report directly the speech of Trimalchio and company. This allows the 
quasi-sympotic genre to be exploited fully, as Trimalchio and the other storytellers to 
step into the limelight. My analysis here complements other scholarship on unreliable 
narration in the Cena, namely Rimell (2002), Slater (1990), and Knight (1989), inter 
alios, but my reading diverges by asserting that it is Encolpius’ masochism that is the 
cause of his unreliability. It is within the Cena that Encolpius’ masochism, 
particularly his passivity and overawed nature, coalesces with his narrative 
difficulties, clearly illustrating the causal link between the two. 
 In the final Catullus chapter, I examine Catullus’ relationship with Lesbia via 
the masochistic contract. Catullus’ relationship with Lesbia lends itself to this kind of 
contractual reading in a way that the other texts do not, because the masochistic 
contract typically applies to a monogamous, sexual relationship. While technically 
Encolpius may fall under this umbrella, the same exclusivity does not arise between 
Giton and Encolpius as that which exists between Catullus and Lesbia. This is 
coupled with Catullus’ propensity to introduce contractual language himself (cf. 
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aeternum sanctae foedus amicitiae, 109.6). Smirnoff’s work on the masochistic 
contract (1995, 65ff.) is integral to my understanding of the clinical workings of the 
contract, and the literary examinations of Deleuze (1989) and Kazarian (2010) have 
both informed my reading of Catullus. While current psychological theory on the 
contract argues that there must be an actual contract, not a figurative one, my purpose 
in using this theory is to interrogate the mechanism behind the contract, and to see 
how this reveals the tautological nature of Catullus’ suffering. The masochistic 
contract works on two levels: the way it is perceived by the masochist themselves, 
and the way that the outsider perceives it. The masochistic contract refers to the terms 
upon which a relationship between a masochist and an executioner – as Smirnoff 
(1995, 65) terms the other party – operates. As the masochist sees the relationship, 
they surrender all their rights to the executioner, and thus the executioner holds all the 
power. When the masochist suffers, he feels that he is powerless to alter his suffering, 
because he has surrendered all his powers to the other party.  
The outside perspective of the masochistic contract illustrates that the power 
structure is not as the masochist would have us believe. From the outside we can 
perceive that the masochist is seeking to make the executioner’s task much harder. As 
Smirnoff (1995, 65) outlines: ‘The whole setting tends to harness the victim’s delight, 
not to be simply defined as the agonising pain of the masochist, but to define, and 
refine, the respective positions of the parties.’ That is, ultimately it is Catullus who is 
responsible for defining his relationship with Lesbia, and it is he who demands certain 
behaviour from her. He is the architect of his own suffering, though he does not 
perceive it, nor consciously present it in this way. Again in this chapter I focus my 
reading on Catullus the masochistic character, and thus I read the Lesbia poems as 
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Catullus’ ‘ideal reader’. I buy into the picture of Lesbia that Catullus creates as if it 
were genuine, and use this picture to expose it as a deluded fiction.  
Moving through several of the later Lesbia poems, I examine the masochistic 
dynamic from both perspectives: the perspective that the Catullan character believes 
himself, and wants the reader to believe as well, and the outside perspective, which 
reveals that ultimately the powerless character is Lesbia herself. Poems 83 and 92 
illustrate the understanding of Lesbia that Catullus thinks that he possesses, which is 
integral to his genuine belief elsewhere that he is Lesbia’s victim. I conclude my 
examination with poem 76, in which Catullus begs the gods to remove his love for 
Lesbia from him. I see this poem as the epicentre of Catullus’ expression of his 
masochistic characteristics. It is his perceived powerlessness that causes him to ask 
for someone else to take his love from him, rather than doing it himself; secondly, he 
will not do it himself because he does not want to. Catullus has structured their 
relationship in such a way that he has perpetuated his own suffering. The failed 
concept of foedus in 76 illustrates the lack of equality between Catullus and Lesbia. 
While Catullus believes that the power is held by Lesbia, it is really he himself who 
holds all the power.  
This reading of Catullus proposes that Catullus’ masochistic desire for 
suffering is at the root of his relationship with Lesbia. It reveals that Catullus does not 
embody the notion of pietas as successfully as he perceives that he does, because he 
manipulates and uses Lesbia for his own gain – that is, for his own suffering. Though 
this is done unconsciously, Catullus’ victimisation of Lesbia nevertheless occurs. For 
as long as Catullus needs to suffer, Lesbia must embody the role of the wrongdoer in 
his mind, and he must portray her as such. This reading takes the notion of servitium 
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amoris a step further: not only is Catullus emotionally enslaved to Lesbia, but he feels 
wretched in that suffering, even as he unconsciously perpetuates it.  
Finally, I return to Thyestes. This final Senecan chapter thus serves as a litmus 
test for what the section as a whole illustrates: how masochism can coalesce with 
unreliable narration, through the way in which the character’s masochistic persona 
skews their perception of the world. For example, Justine’s narrative is heavily 
coloured by her religious masochism. The sadists’ perspective comes through via 
Justine reporting their direct speech, and is often quite removed from the opinions that 
Justine herself expresses. Similarly, much of what we understand about Trimalchio 
and his guests is revealed through their direct speech; Encolpius’ observations are 
often incorrect or misguided. Here narration works differently, which serves to 
highlight the difference between a diegetic masochistic narrator, and a masochistic 
character within a mimetic narrative. Chatman (1990, 117 ff.) acknowledges that 
mimetic forms do possess narrativity, broadly; building on this, Nünning and Sommer 
(2008, 339) point out that ‘diegetic narrativity foregrounds the act of narration… 
Mimetic narrativity foregrounds “the story frame” rather than “the telling frame”. 
This is an important point in reading Thyestes as a masochistic character: because we 
encounter him as part of the ‘story frame’, it is easier to separate his words from the 
rest of the story, and to find his version wanting.  
 Thyestes’ masochistic delusion, which compels him to labour under the 
disguise of a pseudo-Stoic, has the potential to mislead, were it not for the 
information we already know about him from Atreus, the words of the Fury in the 
prologue, which set the course for the development of the drama, the speech of 
Thyestes himself at times, which betrays his anti-Stoic sentiments, and the 
comparatively more compelling stage presence of Atreus, which draws the reader into 
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his projected sense of the success of his plan, and thus the inevitable outcome that 
Thyestes will abandon his Stoic life of virtue in nature, and return home to Atreus. 
 This chapter is thus structured in a way that focuses firstly on the way that 
Thyestes’ masochism is thwarted in any attempt to influence the narrative. After 
discussing the presence of narrativity in drama, I examine the metatheatrical elements 
of the play, specifically the way that Atreus takes on a quasi-authorial or stage 
manager role (Schiesaro 2003, 49). Atreus’ control and consistency are key to the 
command he has over the unfolding story. Though the action of the play has been 
foretold by the Fury, it is as though Atreus assumes his identity, and Thyestes is 
inextricably consumed by his destiny. The consistency of Atreus’ behaviour once 
again invokes comparison between Atreus and the Sadean sadists, who similarly are 
more trustworthy and reliable characters than Justine. 
 I then examine the masochistic motivation for Thyestes’ pseudo-Stoicism, and 
how his veneer of Stoic virtue is an attempt to quell his paranoia about returning to 
Atreus. I adopt Loewenstein’s theory on the intersection of passivity and anxiety in 
the masochistic persona (1995, 35-61), and analyse Thyestes’ conversation with 
Tantalus in light of this. Thyestes’ decision to cede control to Tantalus illustrates his 
masochistic passivity, akin to what we have seen with Justine and Encolpius, and 
ultimately it is this passivity that causes Thyestes’ downfall, and marks him as an 
untrustworthy character, though not one powerful enough to be an unreliable narrator. 
The eventual consequence of this masochistic reading of Thyestes is to bring greater 
understanding of Thyestes’ motivation, and to make clear why Atreus is the more 
compelling and trustworthy character. 
 This thesis shows the utility and adaptability of the masochistic persona as a 
literary device. As I illustrate, though the personality and situation of the masochist 
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can widely vary, their masochistic qualities will manifest predictably, and with points 
of commonality. Reading through my three central tropes of control, choice, and 
responsibility clearly shows these points of commonality, and illustrates that they can 
manifest irrespective of genre. These masochistic characters are useful literary 
devices, prolonging a narrative – as in the case of Justine, Encolpius, or Catullus – or 
enabling a narrative, as is the case with Thyestes. Just as these characters influence 
the development of the plot, so too do they impact on the way that information is 
passed onto the reader, and thus the way that the reader perceives the development of 
the plot. The generic transmission of the narrative can vary – diegetic, poetic, or 
mimetic – but the masochistic presence will still be felt to varying degrees. This thesis 
shows that understanding the influence of masochism over the narrative brings a new 
perspective in understanding complex texts, and offers new avenues of textual 
interpretation.  
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Justine: religion and the masochistic cycle 
 
The Marquis de Sade explicates the construction of a libertine philosophy in 
his novel Justine. Though Justine is the title character, it is Sade’s libertines who 
dominate the text, and whose philosophies are the more engaging and thought 
provoking, even as they are confronting. It is in the light of this libertine domination 
that Justine’s masochistic persona can clearly be seen, as she struggles to assert 
herself against them in any way. The libertines represent and elucidate Sade’s ideas 
on the subjectivity of vice and virtue, represented through the delineation between 
their sadism and Justine’s very Catholic masochism (Pastoureau 1965, 49). Sade uses 
this dichotomy to show the subjectivity of notions of vice and virtue: the libertines in 
Justine take so much enjoyment from what Justine would call vice, that for them it is 
a virtue. Thus, they invert conventional moral perspective and use this conviction in 
their life of ‘virtue’ to maintain rigid control of their lifestyle and their circumstances. 
The libertines’ propensity to ruminate on their actions before committing them, and 
then to savour them afterwards, is central to how they exert control over their victims. 
This reluctance to hurry through actions stands in stark contrast to Justine’s 
behaviour; she shows little ability to anticipate what may happen to her, to 
dissimulate in order to shorten her tortures, or to exert any power to effect an escape. 
Thus, even when the libertines are physically inactive, they control the situation; 
likewise, as we shall see, even when they force Justine to take on the role of the 
aggressor, they maintain dominance. This clear demarcation between vice and virtue, 
sadism and masochism, means that Justine’s masochistic characteristics are readily 
identifiable, making her a useful prototype case for the behaviours this section 
explores.  
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It is this prototype case for which I primarily use Justine. This thesis’ primary 
goal is not to undertake an in-depth analysis of the Sadean oeuvre, but rather to use it 
as an explicit tool to draw out what is implicit in the classical texts. This means that 
my reading is principally concerned with extracting the central themes and ideas that 
direct my reading, as against furthering the complex scholarship around Justine itself. 
For this chapter, I engage with Justine as Sade’s ideal reader, who accepts his sadistic 
colouring of his libertines and his masochistic colouring of Justine. As I approach the 
layers of narration in Justine in the second section of this thesis, I will engage further 
with the idea of the ideal reader, the implied reader and the implied author, in order to 
outline the myriad of readings that one can take away from this text. For the moment, 
however, Justine serves as a useful reading of the mechanics of masochism, and is 
thus read in light of that. 
Justine follows the title character through a series of harrowing misadventures. 
Going under the pseudonym Thérèse, Justine finds herself continuously at the mercy 
of various libertines, who attempt to persuade her of the ‘virtue’ of their libertine 
philosophy.13 Though the novel moves as a picaresque text, it is simultaneously 
cyclical:14 Justine is unable to adapt her behaviour or her viewpoint; she experiences 
the same tortuous acts and engages in unchanged conversations, her perspective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 It is a common feature in Justine for all the people who torment and abuse Justine to share their 
motivations with her. Klossowski (1965) argues this stems from an innate feeling of guilt that causes 
the libertine to feel compelled to rationalise their actions. Henaff (1999, 70) postulates that speaking of 
their motivations adds another layer of pleasure, thereby increasing the intensity of their eventual 
sexual pleasure. I prefer the latter idea: narration both before and during sexual scenes is a common 
feature in Philosophy in the Boudoir and 120 Days of Sodom, and arguably is a feature of Sade’s 
hyperbolised sexual pleasure. Arguably, the increased need for justification that Klossowski terms as 
‘guilt’ could be Sade’s own need to rationalise his philosophies and make his contemporaries accept 
them. De Beauvoir (1953, 69) contends one of the reasons for Sade’s fluctuating and at times manic 
need to explain his philosophies was his desperation to see society appreciate and even follow his 
philosophies. 
14 Henaff (1999, 140) argues that ‘Sadean time… is totally flat and unresonant… This is why the 
Sadean narrative… is not truly picaresque.’ Similarly, Miller (1976, 226) points out that: ‘what Justine 
as narrator registered as chronology was in fact stasis and progression repetition.’ That is, while Justine 
may regularly move location, and appear to travel large distances between each captor, the central 
narrative – her movement, her capture, her abuse, her unchanged persona – plays on a continual loop. 
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entirely immovable (Giraud 1965, 41-42). These conversations between the staunchly 
Catholic Justine and the libertines allow Sade to explicate fully the philosophy of 
libertinage;15 to aggressively propound the fundamental objection libertines have to 
what they perceive as the pervasive influence of Catholicism within France; and to 
juxtapose the success of his libertines against the misery of the hapless Justine (Miller 
1976, 221). Sade posits that perception is arbitrary; he challenges the reader to adjust 
their perspective and to recognise that societal rules are simply inculcated doctrines 
designed to repress individuality and create a ‘pseudo-nature’ (Harari 1973, 1212).16 
His sadists have complete awareness of their own desires. They identify precisely 
what they want and then calculate the most efficient and pleasurable way to achieve 
this. They eschew conventional systems of morality, such as Catholicism, and instead 
define their own philosophy and moral code by reference to their own needs (Henaff 
1999, 281). 
Another point critical to the success of the libertines is isolation. Many of the 
libertines Justine encounters live a secluded existence, away from general society. 
This limits possible intrusion and disorder while maximising opportunities for 
libertinism: every action is aimed towards obtaining the utmost pleasure, and a 
contained environment both enables this and reduces any potential threat (Barthes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Cusset, Sollers & Celestin (1998) provide useful discussion on the influence of the French 
Revolution on libertinage, and the idea of liberty within libertinage. Eighteenth century libertinism was 
concerned with freedom of bodily and intellectual expression; the paradox being that this kind of 
freedom was not available to many, and only benefited a restricted number of people. We see this 
manifest in Sade as the free expression by his libertines of their libertinism, which causes a forced 
submission by the victims – i.e., Justine – of their ‘freedom’. As Kavanagh (1998, 99) argues, Sade’s 
‘works chronicle a profound redefinition of both the private and the public in relation to the challenge 
of sexuality.’ This obliteration of the demarcation between public and private is not as profound in 
Justine, because of the seclusion of libertine existence, which is something I will return to later when 
discussing the Sadean fortress.  
16 Harari articulates Sade’s argument in this way: ‘Man is the helpless beneficiary of the whole 
constellation of formative means at a culture’s disposal: God, a religion, laws, institutions brought to 
bear upon him with a view to inculcating moral principles, a conscience, a preordained philosophical 
system and a “pseudo-nature,” one which culture tries to persuade us is genuine, but, in which desire is 
actually stifled.’ Justine is an obvious product of this kind of environment, and she has clearly been 
fully persuaded of it. Sade’s sadists, on the other hand, have complete awareness of their own desires, 
and similarly are aware that their proclivities fall outside of this ‘pseudo nature’.  
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1976, 16). It also makes clear the anti-Catholic existence that Sade seeks to exploit: 
each libertine sanctuary is its own fully-functioning microcosm, that has no use for 
church and state. Arguably the most successful example of this is the Sadean fortress 
at Silling in Les Cent Vingt Journées de Sodome, as described by the Duc de Blangis:   
 
You are now outside of France, deep within an impenetrable 
forest, past rugged mountains, the paths of which have been 
destroyed soon after you came through them. You are 
imprisoned within an impenetrable citadel; nobody knows 
where you are; you are removed from all your friends, your 
parents, you are already dead to the world, and it is for nothing 
more than our pleasures that you live. (249-250)17 
 
This ‘ultimate Sadean lieu clos’, as DeJean (1984, 281) describes it, ensures the safety 
of the libertines and gives them complete control over their environment (Frappier-
Mazur 1998, 187).18 They are able to structure their entire existence around this one 
specific task, ensuring their unrelenting autocracy. Within this enclosure, everything 
is allocated to categories (food, colours, clothing),19 which forms the basis of ‘a 
diagrammatic relationship’ (Barthes 1976, 153), upon which the social autarchy is 
founded and maintained.20 This detailed classification system provides clarity and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 All translations of 120 Days are adapted from Seaver & Wainhouse’s editions of the texts. 
Translations of Justine come from John Phillips’ 2012 translation. 
18 See Deininger (2013, 1-14) for further discussion of the structure of 120 Days, particularly in terms 
of how the structure and architecture of the château mirrors the desires of the libertines themselves.  
19 For example, the four libertines give their victims different coloured ribbons, which then signify to 
which libertine the victim belongs. See Barthes (1976, 17-21) for a detailed examination of the signs 
and functions of the Sadean community. 
20 Barthes (1976, 17) notes: ‘The enclosure of the Sadian site has another function: it forms the basis of 
a social autarchy. Once shut in, the libertines, their assistants, and their subjects form a total society, 
endowed within an economy, a morality, a language, and a time articulated into schedules, labours, and 
celebrations.’  
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logic to the libertine, and removes ambiguity, which by its very nature creates anxiety 
and doubt. Confusion in Sade is a trait that belongs only to masochists: Justine 
becomes confused because of her inability to understand the libertines, and her lack of 
perception beyond her own virtues.21 This is something that we will examine in 
analysing the masochistic traits of both Encolpius and Thyestes, who similarly lack 
the interpretative abilities to understand what is happening around them.  
Before descending more fully into an examination of Sade’s characterisation 
of Justine, it is useful to canvass briefly the cultural and socio-political background to 
Justine, as this has bearing on the way in which Justine plays out, particularly 
Justine’s stubborn refusal to change or adapt to her surroundings. Justine is a 
transgressive text, and through it Sade reflects anger, violence, and the macabre, 
qualities which are identifiable with the transitional years in France between 
Robespierre and Napoleon, in which the second Justine was published (Brown 2002, 
21). These qualities arose because of the state of confusion and uncertainty, in a 
country that was no longer a monarchy, not yet an empire, and arguably neither a 
Republic (Dipiero 1994, 251).22 Sade channels increasing social tensions in the wake 
of the Revolution by making many of the dissolute characters whom Justine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Henaff (1999, 47) describes this experience as, ‘Because she understands that heaven and signs are 
being emptied out in tandem, Justine clings to signs so as not to lose heaven. The greater the emptiness, 
and the clearer it is that nothing means anything, the more she sets her will to demanding explanations, 
using them to replenish the phantom signs and stanch this haemorrhage of meaning…’ That is, Justine 
uses these lengthy conversations with the libertines to try and remind her of her own virtues, rather 
than to actually listen to what the libertines have to say. I will explore this idea more thoroughly when 
examining Justine’s interactions with the libertine Clément. 
22 Dipiero discusses the translation of social upheaval into a novel paradigm: ‘By constituting the 
female protagonist as the figure of social disruption in a narrative that contested the formal convention 
of aristocratic fiction, novelists provided prose fiction the means for negotiating new and complex 
social configurations, and translated class conflict into gender terms.’ This is certainly what Sade 
attempts to do, though not with great success. In the second chapter I will examine Sade’s own theories 
on what makes a good novel, set out in his essay Idées sur les romans, where Sade examines the 
development of the novel through time, and lists what he thinks are the particularly successful elements 
of a novel. Seeing virtue being trampled on by vice, and challenging society to hold a mirror to itself 
are two of the things Sade attempts to reproduce in Justine, and which, we will see, do not work that 
successfully. However, in Sade’s defence, Bataille (1986, 178) does comment that: ‘He [de Sade] was 
less concerned to convince than to challenge.’     
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encounters of aristocratic stock, or at least men of power.23 Sade’s libertines are the 
epitome of vice: they delight in violence and sadism in a way that invokes the 
bloodlust of the Terror and its consequences. The masochism of Justine reflects the 
vestiges of French virtue, as elements of society attempted to assuage social tensions 
through the reestablishment of familial virtues and a ‘definable civil society’ (Brown 
2002, 21). By channelling or invoking these societal ideas, Sade illustrates the 
polarisation in his contemporary society, through the opposition of vice and virtue, 
the libertines and Justine, and sadism and masochism (Pastoureau 1965, 49).  
This chapter will focus on the way that Justine interacts with the libertines, 
and how this interaction clearly shows her masochistic nature. Justine illustrates the 
three masochistic behavioural tropes that have so far been identified: control, choice 
and responsibility. Primarily, these behaviours manifest through the practice of, and 
discussion of, her religion, which is why her interactions with the sadists illuminate 
both the sadistic and masochistic character. Though much of Justine is spent narrating 
the physical tortures that are visited upon Justine, predominantly the superiority and 
dominance of the libertines is shown through their speech, which is then realised 
through physical action.  
Harari (1984, 1057) describes this progression from speech to action as a 
series of ‘methodological recipes for jouissance’. Jouissance is a difficult word to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Forrest (1995, 91) writes that the aristocracy found ‘little to attract them to the new social norms… 
from the very outset they were identified with ancien regime privilege and regarded as potential 
enemies of reform.’ On the subject of Sade’s relationship with powerful men who abuse their power, 
Phillips (2001, 94) discusses Sade’s purpose in writing Justine: ‘Justine was originally conceived as a 
satire, attacking the corruption of contemporary institutions, including the judiciary, banking, the 
bourgeois-dominated world of finances in general and, above all, the Catholic Church…’ The powerful 
positions that the libertines hold enables them to wield the incredible power that they do. As Barthes 
(1976, 130-131) points out, ‘the libertines belong to the aristocracy, or more exactly (and more 
frequently) to the class of financiers, professionals, and prevaricators, in short: the exploiters… Sade 
uses them differently, not as an image to be portrayed, but as a model to be reproduced. Where? In the 
libertine’s small society; this society is constructed like a model, a miniature; Sade transports class 
division into it; on one side, the exploiters… on the other, the ordinary people.’ This also supports the 
point I made earlier, concerning the way that the libertines exclude themselves from society, so that 
they may protect their society.  
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reproduce precisely in English,24 but within Sade it essentially denotes a state of 
intense metaphysical pleasure, which a libertine can obtain by elaborate discourse on 
how and why they feel pleasure from a particular act, before they experience the act 
itself and obtain greater physical pleasure.25 Indeed, sexual pleasure may only be a 
secondary consequence of cerebral pleasure, ‘an after-effect, a concrete indication 
that the libertine has mastered the “science” of jouissance’(Harari 1984, 1060). 
Jouissance is used to separate the libertines from a mainstream existence, and to 
instead live for their own pleasures and purpose. Exploring the process by which the 
libertines achieve jouissance, and how Justine perceives their actions, illustrates why 
Justine could never successfully persuade the libertines away from their philosophy, 
and why, in turn, her inability to recognise their intractability exposes her masochistic 
persona.  
Justine, as masochist, is indicative of what Sade perceives as blind faith to an 
imposed system of philosophical beliefs, which are stubbornly upheld not only by 
Justine but by Sade’s general public (Harari 1973, 1214). Justine’s masochism 
represents complete subservience to one particular ideology, and a complete inability 
to adapt to a new regime in order to better one’s fortunes. Justine’s masochism is 
inescapable. She is so subsumed with her faith, and her belief, because of her faith, 
that she is a superior and better person than all the libertines she encounters, means 
that she is powerless to escape her situation. Sade’s libertines attempt to persuade 
Justine that they are right and she is wrong, and are often convincing in their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Gallop (2012, 566), discusses Barthes’ interpretation of jouissance in Le plaisir du texte, arguing that 
while the simpler concept of plaisir denotes ‘comfortable, ego-assuring, recognised, and legitimated as 
culture’, jouissance is ‘shocking, ego-disruptive, and in conflict with the canons of culture’. The last 
point is particularly relevant to how Sade engages with jouissance in his texts, particularly Justine, 
Juliette, and Les cent vingt jours. For further discussion of the concept of jouissance more generally, 
see Gallop (1984), 110-115. 
25 As an example of this, Fradinger (2005, 51) comments, in relation to 120 Days: ‘The libertines 
gather for the pleasure of hearing – a most precious pleasure for the ear is the organ that communicates 
“les impressions plus vives”... Only after listening do the libertines act.’ 
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arguments; however, regardless of how persuasive their ideology might seem to be, 
Justine is unswayed. Sadean scholarship frequently discusses the timelessness of 
Justine, how she seems to be trapped in this cycle of abuse for years and years, yet 
nothing seems to change from first page to last (Miller 1976, 222-223).26 Sade marries 
her inability to change her viewpoint with her body’s inability to change: these acts of 
abuse are constantly repeated on Justine’s indestructible body, which never fails her, 
despite the many tortures visited upon her (Dipiero 1994, 249).27 
Justine’s need to constantly spar with the libertines on a philosophical level is 
what frequently causes her undoing, and perpetuates her suffering. Justine is really the 
only victim in any of Sade’s texts to have a voice; the rest are really set pieces, 
voiceless and present only to fulfil the needs of the libertines (Harari 1984, 1049). She 
uses that voice to try to persuade them that there is a better way of life, despite the 
fact that the libertines make clear to her how much they enjoy their life. Despite how 
many times she attempts this with libertine after libertine, she cannot stop herself 
from doing it each time. This is an instance of issues with both masochistic control 
and masochistic choice: Justine cannot control her need to try to convert the 
libertines; she cannot learn what has gone awry before and control this urge. She 
continually makes the same choices, and continually experiences the same outcome 
(Miller 1976, 222).  
Justine regularly ignores any alternative course of action to that which she 
deems to be ‘right’. In this way, she is not only wilfully blind to the choices that she 
actively makes, but she refuses to take any responsibility for her own situation. While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Likewise here we can recall Henaff’s point (1999, 140) that ‘Sadean time… is totally flat and 
unresonant: absolutely nonlyric. The narrative has no memory of its sequences, events, or actors.’ 
Delers (2010, 658) also refers to reading Justine as a ‘strange circular reading experience’. 
27 Dipiero writes, ‘Justine receives the marks of libertine activity, but almost as quickly allows all trace 
of them to deliquesce.’ This is, of course, a necessary paradox; Justine is simultaneously the victim and 
the protagonist, and without her longevity the text could not continue.  
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often the way that Justine is ensnared by these libertines is pure bad luck, often she 
ensures that continuation of her suffering by making certain choices once she has 
been captured. Her need to engage philosophically with the libertines is one such 
choice, as is her refusal to engage and really to anything that they have to say. Finally, 
her refusal to make any choice other than that determined by her religious precepts 
often stymies any opportunity she has to escape her torment. To examine this wilful 
self-blindness further, I am going to explore two episodes of Justine, the episode in 
the monastery of St Mary-in-the-Wood, and Justine’s encounter with the libertine 
Roland. 
In the monastery episode of Justine, Sade broaches the topic of the 
subjectivity of vice and virtue, and how a particular idea that is condemned by a 
Catholic can be exulted by a libertine, and vice versa. The episode begins when 
Justine seeks solace in the monastery St Mary-in-the-Wood after she has escaped the 
monstrous surgeon, Rodin. Expecting to find relief from her torments, instead Justine 
discovers that the monastery is run by a group of libertine monks, who kidnap and 
imprison young women to serve their every desire.28 After being forced into a series 
of orgies, Justine converses with the libertine Clément, and he takes the opportunity 
to chastise her religious beliefs and prejudices:  
 
To like what others like demonstrates conformity in the organs, 
but nothing in favour of the beloved object. Three-quarters of 
the world can find the smell of the rose delicious without this 
being a reason either to condemn that quarter who may find it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Carter (1979, 42) describes the monastery as ‘… a microcosm in which a small group of privileged 
men operate a system of government by terror upon a seraglio of kidnapped women.’ This is 
reminiscent of Barthes’ point (1976, 131) that Sadean society is like a miniature, into which a class 
system is transposed. 
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smells bad, or to show that this smell is truly agreeable. 
Therefore, if there exists beings in this world whose tastes 
shock all accepted standards, not only should we not be 
astonished by them, but we should serve their interests, make 
them happy, abolish all restraints upon them, and if we wish to 
be just, provide them with every means to satisfy themselves 
without risk, because it was no more their choice to have 
strange tastes than it was yours to be witty or stupid, to have a 
fine figure or to be a hunchback. (136) 
 
Sade argues that nature overrides everything, and is ultimately determinative 
of all behaviour; as Harari (1973, 1214) argues: ‘According to de Sade… instead of 
seeing the norm for what it truly is – an arbitrary fiction – we ascribe to it the status of 
absolute reality and adhere to it blindly.’ Strong individuals – such as Sade’s 
libertines – embrace their nature; they do not conform to expected prejudices, for that 
is the role of the weak, who are unable to recognise that they are constricted, 
overpowered and diminished by societal design (Adorno & Horkheimer 1986, 100).29  
 Clément argues that because Justine is Catholic she subscribes to a particular 
set of ideals, which label certain acts as virtuous, and certain acts as vicious. 
However, he subscribes to a libertine philosophy, and therefore particular acts are 
labelled differently (Bataille 1986, 179). Since self-satisfaction and pleasurable 
experiences are paramount to a libertine, they can adapt their behaviour or play a role 
that goes against their nature in order to further their pleasure. Indeed, Clement had 
played the role of a good-natured priest in order to lure Justine into the monastery. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Adorno & Horkheimer observe: ‘Unlike the weak, the strong individual never adopts another 
persona; he merely expresses in action what he has received from nature.’ That is, Sade’s libertines do 
not feel compelled to behave in any way other than what they believe nature has intended for them.  
	   47	  
Justine, on the other hand, is far more absolute and intractable in her beliefs, 
predominantly behaving as her religion has conditioned her to do (Gorer 1934, 120). 
Justine’s refusal to stray from her beliefs, instead choosing to see herself entirely as 
the victim, ultimately only causes her further misery, rather than seeing her triumph. 
This is something that will be picked up in chapter three, in examining Catullus: 
Catullus’ refusal to compromise his all-consuming love for Lesbia causes him misery, 
causing Catullus to feel that he is her victim.  
 If we look more closely at the discussion between Justine and Clément, her 
inability to comprehend his argument, and her inability to mount a convincing 
counter-argument, reveals her masochistic persona. Following Clément’s exposition 
on acting as nature intends, Justine responds: “these doctrines are horrendous, Father, 
they can only lead to a taste for cruelty and horror” (141), illustrating her black and 
white, Catholic view of right and wrong. Clément counters, inter alia, “If Nature 
were offended by these tastes it would not inspire them in us” (141), which is a 
central tenet of the libertine philosophy in Justine. Justine responds: 
 
Obviously, if you are the stronger one and if your atrocious 
principles of cruelty drive you to seek pleasure in pain 
alone, with a view to increasing your sensations, you will 
imperceptibly succeed in inflicting pain on the object that 
serves you to a degree of violence capable of taking her life. 
(142) 
 
This statement shows a degree of insight, and highlights a pervasive problem in the 
libertine system, which is libertine apathy. Frappier-Mazur (1998, 184) describes this 
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as the libertine association of sex and terror: ‘adducing the jaded sensitivity of the 
libertines, who must resort to ever crueller inventions in order to arouse themselves.’ 
The (il)logical consequence of this, which Justine partially touches on here, is that 
this desire to avoid apathy, and to be continually aroused, is not limitless; at some 
point the libertine, if he does not run out of imagination, will run out of potential 
victims. What Justine does not grasp here, however, is that her point would trouble 
Clément, who simply replies, “So be it”, and continues on to discuss further how he is 
simply doing what Nature intended him to do. “The doctrine of loving one’s 
neighbour is a fantasy that we owe to Christianity and not to Nature”, Clément states, 
“He is no longer afraid to make everything serve him, to possess all that surrounds 
him, and, whatever the cost of his pleasures to others, he indulges them without 
thinking and without remorse. ” (142). From this point on, Justine’s attempt to engage 
Clément in a reasoned discussion about the ‘depravity of his tastes’ (134) really falls 
away. Her counterpoints are reduced to basic aphorisms: “But the man you describe 
is a monster” (142); “Oh, you can say what you like, Father, but I shall never accept 
such destructive lusts” (143); and “You make me tremble” (143).  
This is an all too familiar pattern for Justine; her inability to duel verbally 
with the libertines is because of her inherently passive persona, and, more centrally 
perhaps, because she was never receptive to begin with. Her words above – “say what 
you will, I shall never accept this” – are telling. While Justine may listen, she does 
not comprehend. Her views are set, in much the same way as the libertines’ own 
views are, but they have the luxury of being safe and secure in their views. There is 
no advantage to the libertines in adapting or changing. Justine’s immovability secures 
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her ongoing captivity, and her repetitive misfortunes.30 Justine continually makes the 
choice not to listen, not to truly engage, but rather just to use her religion as some sort 
of impenetrable shield; Justine sees her religious beliefs as a protection, something 
that assures her virtue and defends her from the philosophies of the libertines: 
 
 
Whatever the circumstances of my life, the sentiments of 
religion had never left me. Despising the vain sophisms 
of the strong-minded, believing them all to come from 
libertinism much more than from any firm conviction, I 
preferred to follow my conscience and my heart, finding 
in both all necessary responses to them. (97) 
 
This quotation illustrates Justine’s difficulties. Grayson (1990, 91) argues that: 
‘Justine invites abusive treatment because she repudiates Sade’s utopia’; to me, it is 
the step before this that means that Justine invites abuse: she will not even 
comprehend it, and thus repudiates without regard to the libertine utopia at all. Before 
she begins to even hear what they have to say, she has consciously decided not to 
listen. Her passivity extends to not even actively listening, but instead trying to make 
“stout reply” through religious dogma alone. To elide this with Henaff’s point that 
‘the libertine is ineducable’, Justine is as uneducable and incorrigible as the libertines 
with whom she ineffectually spars.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Henaff (1999, 278) points out the similarity in the stubbornness of Justine and the libertines: ‘The 
libertine is uneducable – incorrigible, if you will… He moves within a secure destiny… His adversary 
has lost to him from the beginning – and, reciprocally, Justine is always shown, beforehand, losing to 
the libertine; she remains as immutable as he does.’  
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This also prevents her from exerting any kind of proactivity, because she 
cannot manipulate her way out of her difficulties. Rather than considering if she could 
take action herself to change her circumstances, and stop the endless cycle of being 
trapped and tortured by the libertines, Justine takes solace in her religious beliefs, and 
waits for someone likeminded to take pity on her, demonstrating masochistic 
passivity. Justine makes no attempt to change her behaviour in order to change her 
situation, and thus this illustrates both her passivity and her refusal to take 
responsibility for her situation. She denies responsibility because she cannot see that 
her choices have compounded her situation; she cannot appreciate that because she 
made a decision to be intractable and obstinate, that she has sealed her fate as a 
victim. 
Justine escapes one situation and flees to another, expecting that she will find 
somebody who is willing to come to her rescue, but always finding another torturer 
(Carpenter 1996, 47). She does not expect this to happen, and yet is not surprised 
when it does; she accepts servility because that is what her virtue bids her to do, and 
then later seizes an opportunity to escape, only to wander fruitlessly into consistently 
similar situations. Barthes (1976, 143) suggests that if a Sadean victim, such as 
Justine, were to embrace pleasure instead of feeling only pain, then their victimisation 
would cease and they would become a libertine: ‘The scream is the victim’s mark. 
She makes herself a victim because she chooses to scream. If, under the same 
vexation, she were to ejaculate, she would cease to be a victim, would be transformed 
into a libertine: to scream/to discharge, this paradigm is the beginning of choice, i.e., 
Sadian meaning.’ 
This is to a degree certainly true, though the vocalisation must be genuine, and 
must come with acceptance and ownership of the action. Justine, for example, will 
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mimic sexual pleasure where she believes it will be of assistance to her, such as when 
she is trapped in the monastery in St Mary’s Wood (Carter 1979, 49). However, this is 
only mimicry; she assures – or convinces – herself that she feels nothing; her virtue is 
not abrogated and so the transformation is not genuine. This is one of the central 
differences between Justine and her sister Juliette, who does transform into a libertine, 
and consequently has the far more successful experience (Rodmell 1990, 100).31  
Justine constantly expects people to behave according to her precepts, and is 
consistently disappointed when this does not occur. This is clearly exemplified in 
Justine’s interaction with the libertine Roland, an episode that begins after Justine 
saves Roland from a roadside beating, only to be enslaved by him. Justine feels, 
given that she saved Roland’s life, he should show her mercy. Roland’s reply 
illustrates that he subscribes to the same kind of libertine philosophy that, by this 
time, Justine has heard many times before:  
 
What were you doing when you came to my assistance? Given 
the option of going on your way and that of accompanying me, 
did you not choose the latter on an impulse straight from the 
heart? In other words, you gave in to a movement of pleasure, 
didn’t you? What the devil gives you the right to think that I 
am obliged to reward you for the pleasures you allow yourself? 
…Instead of being a vice, ingratitude is therefore the virtue of 
the proud, just as gratitude is therefore the virtue of the proud, 
just as gratitude is just as surely the virtue of the weak alone. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Miller (1976, 217) comments that: ‘Juliette’s function is crucial to the structure of the novel; not 
merely as the dark-haired vicious foil to Justine’s blond virtue, but as a point of narrative suture… 
Juliette’s dizzying rise, the author informs us, begins with the successive and successful exchange of 
her “pristine fruits.” Hyperbolic courtesan, she sleeps her way to the top.’  
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Let people do me favours as much as they want if they enjoy 
doing so, but they should expect nothing from me. (196-197) 
 
There is a precision shown here in how Roland understands the decision-
making process: that one should base a decision on the potential risk it carries, and the 
amount of pleasure it will bring. If a decision holds no risk and will bring pleasure, it 
is rational; if it poses substantial risk and little pleasure, it is irrational (Bataille 1986, 
175).32 Thus, Roland believes that Justine chose to rescue him because it would bring 
her pleasure, given that it marries with her Catholic morals, and thus he is under no 
obligation to be grateful to her, as she has already experienced a pleasurable outcome 
through the act itself. Here Roland points out to Justine the masochistic issue of 
control: Justine saves him because she is compelled to do so; she has no self-control 
to do otherwise. Her masochistic nature compels her to do what her religion requires 
of her, and she was powerless to do otherwise. This is important to bear in mind as we 
move further into the Roland episode. 
Roland then not only uses Justine as a slave in his counterfeiting business, but 
also as a sexual slave, forcing her to engage in elaborate games of sexual asphyxia. It 
is through these various strangulation-based games that Roland solidifies his status as 
the sovereign man (Foucault 1998, 149),33 and simultaneously justifies it by showing 
that his philosophy makes more sense for his own personal welfare than Justine’s 
does for her. Roland demonstrates certain intuitional abilities, which enables him to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 As Bataille states: ‘…de Sade starts from an attitude of utter irresponsibility and ends with one of 
stringent self-control.’ 
33 Foucault comments that: ‘in Sade, sex is without any norm of intrinsic rule that might be formulated 
from its own nature; but it is subject to the unrestricted law of a power which itself knows no other law 
but its own… a unique and naked sovereignty: an unlimited right of all-powerful monstrosity.’ 
Likewise Blanchot (2004, 220-221) argues that Sade’s morality ‘is founded on absolute solitude… we 
are born alone, there are no links between one man and another. The only rule of conduct is that I 
prefer those things which affect me pleasurably and set at nought the undesirable effects of my 
preferences on other people.’ It matters not to Roland whether Justine lives or dies, and he does not 
expect her to care whether he lives or dies either. 
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anticipate and predict Justine’s actions and thereby adjust his own behaviour 
accordingly, showing a foresight and comprehension that Justine herself is incapable 
of exercising. Roland is so aware of Justine’s Catholic proclivities that he is able to 
foresee her behaviour to such an extent that he can willingly put his life in her hands:  
 
“You will do everything to me that I have done to you. I shall 
strip myself naked, I shall climb onto the stool, you will tie the 
rope around me, I shall excite myself for a moment, then as 
soon as you see me getting hard, you will pull the stool away, 
and I shall be left having. You will leave me there until you see 
either the emission of my semen or symptoms of pain. In the 
latter case, you will immediately cut me loose. In the former 
case, you will let Nature take its course, and you will not cut 
me down until afterwards. So you see, Thérèse, I am placing 
my life in your hands, and your freedom and fortune will be 
the reward for your good conduct.” (213-214)  
 
Here Roland promises to gift Justine her freedom, should she assist him, and 
ensure that he is unharmed.34 Justine precisely follows Roland’s instructions, and he 
experiences an unparalleled pleasure from their experiment (Klossowski 1987, 71).35 
Afterwards, Roland continues to keep Justine imprisoned, reneging on his offer of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 It is noteworthy that in this instance Roland is not expressly admitting Justine’s worth, because 
ultimately he is ambivalent whether he lives or dies, believing that the sexual experience will trump 
any unfortunate consequences, even death. This is another instance of libertine apathy. Beauvoir (1953, 
76) posits that libertine apathy allows the libertine to dominate any situation, whether they perform a 
dominant or submissive role, because ‘…the thing that counts is the subject’s intention.’ That is why 
something that was shameful and tortuous for Justine is joyous and pleasurable for Roland. 
35 Klossowski discusses this reversal of libertine and victim, arguing ‘it is precisely the exercise of this 
right to conduct forbidden experiments which, born from the libertine conscience, will form one of the 
fundamental commitments of the Sadean conscience.’ 
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freedom. This episode reveals several critical things about the psyche of the Sadean 
libertine compared with Justine: firstly, the power of Roland’s intuitive intellect is 
fully displayed; secondly, Justine’s masochism is clearly illustrated; finally, the 
psychological prowess generally of the libertine philosophy can clearly be seen.  
In examining Justine’s behaviour in this passage, it is useful to turn briefly to a 
discussion of the theory of religion and masochism. Self-sacrifice and self-abasement 
are often linked to religious masochism (Charme 1983, 223). As Reik (1962, 78) 
points out: ‘This is the ethno-psychological analogy to the infantile idea: father beats 
me and loves me.’ That is, the notion that God is making the individual suffer out of 
some greater love overrides any more immediate instincts for self-preservation. 
Charme (1983, 225) notes that moral masochism plays a role in the decision-making 
process: ‘Moral masochism is primarily a defence against a powerful unconscious 
sense of guilt… Punishment or sacrifice is much easier to accept than unrelieved 
guilt.’ Taking these points together illuminates Justine’s actions and decisions in this 
episode. As Carter (1979, 39) observes: ‘There is no mysterious virtue in Justine’s 
suffering… She is a gratuitous victim.’ In this situation, Justine can be nothing but the 
gratuitous victim: she must save Roland to avoid the guilt she would feel if she did 
not save him. It comes back to the same principles that Roland mentioned to Justine 
when they first met: saving him is an impulse dictated by her heart.  
Indeed, the thought of letting Roland die never really occurs to Justine; 
instead, she worries that she will be committing a sin by letting him hang to begin 
with, but reasons that “it seemed to me that the evil I would do would immediately be 
compensated for by the extreme care I would take to preserve his life” (214). I return 
here to the point that I introduced at the start of this episode, that Justine is compelled 
to help Roland because it is what her religion demands that she does. She surrenders 
	   55	  
control to the tenets of her religion, rather than thinking of what would actually be 
best for her. She makes a choice to save him, a choice that will only further her 
suffering. Finally, of course, she denies responsibility for what she does, because it is 
what her religion bids her to do, and therefore she feels that she had no choice but to 
do it. Justine wilfully ignores what is arguably the logical solution, because for Justine 
her religious masochism overpowers her desire to end her suffering; she must suffer, 
because she must do what she deems to be right (Jolivet 2011, 584). 
Roland’s success here depended on utilising his cerebral nature to anticipate 
that this is exactly how Justine would behave. He weighed up her desire to escape 
against her overriding Christian virtue, and knew that she would cut him down, 
regardless of how desperate she was to escape (Carter 1979, 45). 36  Roland 
demonstrates his dominance in this situation because he is physically helpless. He has 
no physical control over how events will unfold, yet exerts an unrelenting 
psychological control that leads to complete success. He even turns the situation into 
further punishment for Justine, when it could have been her opportunity to finally win 
her freedom. As Carter (1978, 53-54) states: ‘[the reader] is bound to urge the spotless 
Justine, just this once, to soil her hands with crime.’ However, there are a number of 
reasons why this cannot happen. As we know, Justine has wrapped herself up in her 
religion, in order to shut out any effect the libertines’ words might have. In doing so, 
she has shut herself off from being able to use their words against them. In this state 
of passivity, she is reactive; thus, when Roland commands that she cut him down, she 
is powerless to do otherwise, because her Christian belief in the sanctity of life is all 
that guides her. She cannot put her life, or the lives of the other women held captive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Gurtwirth (1992, 215) describes it as Justine’s ‘ironic acquiescence to her fate…’ It is an example of 
the behaviour we see repeatedly through the text, where Justine’s masochism prompts her to make 
choices that are overwhelmingly detrimental to her, but in line with her religious beliefs. 
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by Roland, before her sense of duty. She must once again resort to pleading with 
Roland for her release, despite having fruitlessly covered this ground numerous times 
before. 
Thus, the primary characteristics of a Sadean sadist are all geared towards 
maintaining and furthering their pleasure: they are aware, focused and intuitive, 
intellectually and verbally adept at manipulating and controlling people in order to 
achieve their aims (Bataille 1986, 171). Conversely, Justine is directionless; though 
she travels a vast area over the course of the novel, she learns nothing, and remains 
unchanged throughout the text (Giraud 1965, 42). Though she remains remarkably 
physically unharmed, considering the tortures visited upon her, this has little to do 
with Justine developing any skills to look after herself, but rather by taking an 
opportunity to escape that is usually caused by something external to her; for 
example, she escapes from Roland after he is arrested for counterfeiting whilst on a 
business trip (218). Justine is unwilling to compromise her Catholic virtues, and thus 
unwilling to alter her behaviour, meaning that she remains a passive victim awaiting 
assistance, rather than abrogating her religion, in order to be proactive and to extricate 
herself from her situation. She allows herself to be dominated and controlled by the 
libertines, because she has no intellectual or behavioural adaptability, and little 
awareness of her own desires, beyond behaving in accordance with Catholic precepts. 
No matter how many times she fails in trying to persuade the libertines of Catholic 
morality, she dutifully tries again and again, while using this morality as a shield to 
protect herself against their moral system. That is why libertines – like Roland – can 
take advantage of her, because they listen and adapt. They may not agree with Justine 
in any way, but they use her words to improve their understanding of her, which they 
can then use later to manipulate her into behaving just as they want her to. The critical 
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masochistic tendencies that we can extract from Justine are that she surrenders her 
agency in favour of her virtue, meaning that she can be controlled, and that when she 
is controlled she cannot adapt, which are both masochistic tendencies that we will 
pursue in examining Encolpius and Thyestes. Her inability to compromise a belief 
system or meaningfully alter her behaviour means that she is the constant victim, 
which we will see occurs with Catullus and the absolutism of his love for Lesbia.  	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Encolpius: the failure of the masochistic picaro 
 
Encolpius’ masochism manifests primarily through the kaleidoscopic range of 
emotions he experiences throughout the text. The more emotionally agitated he 
becomes, the easier it is for him to be controlled, and hence steered along from place 
to place. This kind of emotional manipulation is common in masochistic 
relationships: masochists may allow themselves to be manipulated or taken advantage 
of emotionally, and will be coaxed into particular actions without perhaps realising 
that this is occurring. Coupled with this is Encolpius’ propensity for melodrama, and 
his tendency to overdramatise insignificant matters. As Fantham (1996, 164) 
observes: ‘Encolpius… tries to imitate epic and tragic behaviour in his otherwise 
disreputable life and the conflict of values creates pure farce.’ This chapter will 
identify these characteristics as marking Encolpius as a masochist: namely, his 
propensity for melodrama, his subsequent surrendering of agency, and the consequent 
state of passivity that he assumes. Encolpius’ masochism is tied to a deliberate choice 
not to assert his agency. Though there are opportunities in the text for him to utilise 
his superior education and, theoretically, his intellect, he chooses not to do so, and in 
doing so ensures his own suffering. His victimisation may be brief, transient, or 
repetitive, but his choice not to enforce his agency always culminates in the same 
outcome. Examining Encolpius’ relationship with Giton illustrates his melodramatic 
nature, and his tendency to be manipulated and, in turn, victimised. Giton engages 
with Encolpius’ melodrama, and exhibits it himself, in order to maintain his control 
over Encolpius. Examining the dynamic between Giton and Encolpius in turn 
facilitates comparison between Eumolpus and Encolpius, which shows how 
Encolpius’ masochistic traits make him ultimately a less successful picaro than 
Eumolpus. Finally, the Quartilla episode illustrates Encolpius’ passive nature, and 
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thus how his masochism positions him as the antithesis of the ideal Roman man, and 
the victim of Quartilla. 
Conte (1996, 5) styles Encolpius as a ‘mythomaniac’, arguing that he ‘is never 
without a spurious pretence of drama, a misconceived tragicising of experience.’ 
Encolpius needs and constantly wants attention, and when he is not getting that 
attention he will try to manufacture it, concocting a melodrama in his own mind, 
which can then spill out into his real life. For example, when Encolpius kills the 
“sacred goose” at Oenothea’s, he compares himself to Hercules defeating the 
Stymphalian birds.37 Encolpius feels threatened, after a “gang” of three geese show 
up, surround him and start pecking at him. Specifically, he notes that the 'leader and 
head of this savage assault’ (dux ac magister saevitiae, 136) even managed to peck 
his leg, while the other two content themselves with undoing his shoes and pulling at 
his tunic. The imagery employed here by Encolpius illustrates the kind of inflated and 
disproportionate language that he utilises to describe a fairly banal situation:  
 
Nec satiates defunctorio ictu, morte me anseris vindicavi: 
Tales Herculea Stymphalidas arte coactas 
ad caelum fugisse reor… (136) 
 
Not sated by a mere cursory blow, I avenged myself by the death of 
the goose. 
 Just as I imagine the Stymphalian birds fled into the sky, 
 driven by Hercules’ skill… 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 McMahon (1998, 206) points out the particular irony of this heroic comparison: ‘It is his search for a 
cure for his sexual failures which has brought him to this pathetic and laughable point, and yet he 
identifies himself as playing the role of the very paragon of virility.’  
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 The language used here – vindicavi, for example – is more reminiscent of 
Encolpius defeating a group of men, rather than a hardened gang of street geese.38 By 
doing this, Encolpius displaces himself from reality, and thus never feels 
responsibility for the situations that he finds himself in. If he styles himself as a 
mythical hero or victim, then he is either not responsible, because something has been 
done to him, or not responsible because he is acting heroically in order to save 
himself. Here, Encolpius has taken on the role of Hercules in order to, firstly, feel 
more powerful and manly than the situation warrants; and, secondly, when Oenothea 
reveals that the goose is ‘Priapi delicias’, to excuse and justify the role that he played 
in the goose’s death. This trope of avoidance of responsibility is central to the 
masochistic persona, being a part of the way that masochists separate themselves from 
culpability for their situation. Here we can recall the introductory discussion of 
masochism as a form of escape from responsibility and external pressure: as 
Baumeister (1988, 35-36) argues, masochists have a tendency to try and surrender 
control and self-awareness, and thus they can claim no responsibility for their actions.  
A useful example of this comes when Giton, Ascyltus, and Encolpius part 
ways (80). Barchiesi (1999, 129) observes that the quarrel scene is made more 
exciting by the parodic allusions that it employs: ‘elegy, tragedy, and historical 
exampla follow one another in an exhilarating series of debunking transformations.’ 
Panayotakis (1995, 110-111) reads the lead-up to this scene as an inversion of the 
Theseus and Ariadne myth. On the way home from Trimalchio’s – somewhat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Encolpius’ description of the geese as tres anseres sacri has caused debate among Petronian scholars, 
namely because Encolpius did not know at that point that they were sacred. Courtney (2001, 38) argues 
that this can be understood by ‘Petronius’ manipulation of first-person narrative… the narrator 
Encolpius sometimes introduces into the narrative details which the actor Encolpius did not at the time 
know but subsequently ascertained.’ Hamer (2007, 322) argues that Petronius uses sacer to invoke a 
passage from Livy 5.47, concerning Marcus Manlius and the sacred geese, ‘This suggestion of an epic 
battle also fits in with Encolpius’ general tendency to view his actions through a heroic lens.’ As 
Hamer points out, this does not entirely resolve Petronius’ use of sacer, but arguably it does integrate 
well within the wider use of ironic heroic allusion in the text. 
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unsurprisingly – the trio lose their way, but are saved because Giton has marked the 
way with chalk, ‘playing the part of an Ariadne in a first century A.D. Roman low-life 
milieu.’39 During the quarrel, Giton takes on the role of the ‘wife’, as Ascyltus and 
Encolpius come to blows over who should take him as their prize. The scene is both 
mime and farce (Panayotakis 1995, 111-112), interspersed with some elegiac verse, 
after Ascyltus and Giton have departed. 
Encolpius spends a clichéd three days weeping, breast-beating and lamenting 
his fate by the seaside, after the others depart (81), which is parodically reminiscent of 
Achilles’ grief when Briseis is taken away from him (Iliad 1.348-50).40 Quickly, 
though, Encolpius changes from being distraught to being filled with rage at what 
Giton and Ascyltus have done to him, and he sets out determined to revenge himself 
(Lateiner 2013, 317).41 He storms through the streets thinking of nothing but blood 
and destruction – caedem et sanguinem cogito – but is pulled up by a passing solider 
(82). Encolpius tries to bluff his way out of the situation; the soldier easily sees 
through Encolpius’ attempt;42 and Encolpius returns to his lodgings with the wind 
taken out of his sails.43  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 As Panayotakis (1995, 111) observes, this sets up the mythological inversion to come: ‘Giton, who 
plays the prudens Ariadne, not only is not going to be deserted by Encolpius, a new Theseus, but, 
according to this mythological travesty, he is going to be the one who will abandon Theseus for a 
Dionysus in the shape of Ascyltus!’ 
40 Conte (1996, 1-2) draws attention to the link between Encolpius’ grief and Achilles’: ‘It is easy for 
Encolpius, in a situation which has some features in common with that of Achilles… to yield to the 
temptation of the epic-heroic model, and to feel himself not so different from Achilles, even to the 
extent of repeating his model’s behaviour.’ 
41 Lateiner notes that: ‘Elaborate plans for revenge contribute here to the parody of epic (cf. Verg. Aen. 
9.44). Like his other grandiose plans, this one is soon completely deflated.’ Conte (1996, 4-5 likewise 
draws attention to the Virgilian link, arguing that the combination of Homeric and Virgilian allusion, 
‘creates a pathetic melodrama from the banal material of his own daily affairs.’ This kind of heroic 
allusion is very similar to the incident with the goose that we examined earlier, and highlights 
Encolpius’ melodramatic nature.  
42 The soldier sees through Encolpius’ ruse by observing that he is still wearing his slippers. Amusingly, 
Panayotakis (1995, 116) notes that Encolpius is wearing phaecasia, ‘a kind of unmanly Greek shoes’, 
the same footwear Encolpius earlier observes that Fortunata is wearing (67). 
43 Lateiner (2013, 317) comments: ‘His anger (ira) at violation and rejection leads him repeatedly to 
rage and feckless, soliloquizing self-pity.’ This is a common example of the kind of indulgent self-pity 
that Encolpius lapses into during the text, in order to feel victimised, and to make the situation more 
important than it arguably is. 
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This hinging between extreme emotions is typical of Encolpius, as is his 
inability to consider things rationally before acting. A consequence of Encolpius’ 
masochism is that he has no objectivity. Instead of turning his mind to an action and 
considering its consequences before taking action, here Encolpius prefers to whip 
himself into an emotional frenzy by dwelling on the wrongs done to him, inflating his 
sense of injustice, becoming incensed, and rousing himself to revenge. Further, he can 
ignore his own culpability in what has unfolded by styling himself firstly as a victim, 
and secondly as a mythical hero. Playing these two roles allows him to ignore the role 
that he may have played in Giton’s decision to choose Ascyltus over him. Denying 
this opportunity for self-awareness facilitates Encolpius’ denial of responsibility, 
meaning that he can place the blame for his situation squarely on Ascyltus. Like 
Justine, a feature of Encolpius’ masochism is denying his own culpability or 
responsibility in certain situations, and instead placing blame elsewhere. Encolpius’ 
passivity is closely related to this displacement of reality and, in turn, responsibility. 
While he is seeing himself as a victim, or less frequently – and far less effectively – as 
a hero, he rarely engages with the reality of a situation, and thus frequently lapses into 
a passive state, where he appears to have little control over the way that events play 
out around him.  
Encolpius’ relationship with Giton shows how Encolpius’ masochism makes 
him easy to manipulate. It is easy for Giton to play upon Encolpius’ emotions. 
Encolpius displays his emotions clearly; he cannot effectively dissemble or mute his 
emotions, and so Giton can easily determine what he needs to do to take advantage of 
Encolpius’ vulnerabilities. A particularly effective method of doing this is by grand 
displays of emotion, such as Giton’s suicide attempt (94), which I will explore in 
detail later in this chapter. These emotional exhibitions are so effective because they 
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mirror Encolpius’ own behavioural eccentricities, which is what Encolpius needs in 
order to assuage his own doubts. Muted emotions distress Encolpius: because he 
himself feels such a variegated range of emotions, small displays of emotion are 
ineffective upon him. He experiences things so largely that proportionately grand 
emotions are necessary to convince him of the genuineness of a person. While Justine 
was easily manipulated because of her naïve tendency to apply her Catholic belief 
system to everybody else and assume they were being honest, even when she had 
evidence to the contrary, similarly Encolpius is easily manipulated when people 
engage in the same kind of gratuitous displays of which he himself is so fond.  
Giton holds all the power in the relationship with Encolpius: he is the one who 
initially chooses Ascyltus (80), causing Encolpius great misery; he is the one who 
returns to Encolpius (91) – not through any great heroic act by Encolpius, as he had 
initially planned – and is welcomed back willingly and eagerly by Encolpius because 
he is incapable of dissembling. Giton, to that extent, holds the power because he 
knows that he holds the power (Slater 1990, 101).44 Encolpius is incapable of hiding 
his emotions or restraining them in any way, so that it is perfectly clear to Giton how 
much he means to Encolpius.  
At this point, comparison between Eumolpus and Encolpius is useful, before 
turning to the fabula inter amantes that occurs when Eumolpus meets Giton (Walsh 
1970, 98). Eumolpus possesses qualities that Encolpius tries to possess, but cannot 
successfully attain. As Beck (1979, 245) states: ‘While Eumolpus may be a mediocre 
artist in one medium of works, he is a brilliant one in another: though a third-rate 
poet, he is a first-rate raconteur.’ Eumolpus excels at that which Encolpius’ passive 
tendencies prevent him from excelling at: where Eumolpus controls, Encolpius is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Zeitlin (1971, 658) also observes in this regard that: ‘Giton’s modest demeanour and coy naiveté 
hide his unscrupulous manipulations.’ Encolpius, however, is entirely taken in by Giton’s veneer of 
modesty, because he is unable to see beyond the surface level of people’s personalities.  
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controlled; and where Eumolpus is adaptable and proactive, Encolpius is reactive and 
susceptible. 
In the Pergamum boy episode, Eumolpus poses as a philosopher of Socratic 
virtue in order to gain access to the boy’s house, taking a position as the boy’s mentor 
(85). Eventually he begins to bribe the boy in exchange for sexual favours: ‘…si ego 
hunc puerum basiavero ita ut ille non sentiat, cras illi par columbarum donabo’ (If I 
can kiss this boy without him knowing, tomorrow I will give him a pair of doves, 85). 
This cycle continues until Eumolpus promises the boy a thoroughbred, which he 
cannot deliver (86). After this, the boy refuses Eumolpus’ advances; Eumolpus 
ignores this refusal, and the relationship continues, until the boy’s constant eagerness 
becomes too much for Eumolpus and he tells the boy: ‘aut dormi aut ego iam patri 
dicam!’ (‘now go to sleep or I’ll tell your father!’ 87).  
In this inset Pergamum boy narrative we see several inversions to the typical 
pederastic relationship, which mirrors several of the inversions within the main body 
of the Satyricon. The boy as the sexual aggressor is one such inversion, one which we 
see reflected in the relationship between Encolpius and Giton (McGlathery 1998, 
215). This is quite a different relationship than the one between Eumolpus and the 
boy: Giton dominates the relationship because Encolpius is incapable of doing so 
(McGlathery 1998, 216). Whereas Eumolpus and the boy are both aggressive and 
dominant personalities, both taking advantage of a situation in order to get what they 
want (Slater 1990, 93-94), Encolpius cannot take the dominant role.  
Eumolpus tells this tale to Encolpius when he meets him in the gallery (83), 
and arguably is trying to portray a particular picture, or version, of himself, that will 
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appeal to Encolpius, and enable Eumolpus to take advantage of him.45 For Eumolpus, 
at this moment Encolpius is his ideal reader, as it were, and therefore he shapes his 
narrative in order to elicit a positive reaction from Encolpius.46 As we have seen, 
Encolpius is not particularly skilled at hiding his emotions, and Eumolpus quickly 
judges the type of story to tell when he enters the gallery and sees Encolpius (83),47 
and from there to manipulate Encolpius into taking him on as a companion.  
Zeitlin (1971, 671) discusses Encolpius’ susceptibility to being manipulated, 
and its relation to his inconstancy as a picaro: ‘Because of these romantic and heroic 
illusions, he is rarely able to maintain even a temporary mastery over events or to 
preserve his own picaresque independence. More often that the true picaro, he 
becomes a victim.’ The frequency with which Encolpius is conned, manipulated, and 
has his intentions and purpose easily thwarted, prevents him from taking control of a 
situation, and likewise contributes to his unreliability as a narrator, which I will 
examine further in section two. His narrative is coloured by his perception of what is 
happening around him, which is far too often misconceived.  
Eumolpus is a character who reads situations well, and who can move 
seamlessly from moment to moment, when the need arises. A pertinent example of 
this is on board the ship, when Encolpius and Giton are trying to hide from Lichas; 
Eumolpus quickly sifts through a few different plans, before deciding that they should 
be disguised as prisoners, and he will take control of them (101-103) (Courtney 2002, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Alter (1964, 71-72) discusses the importance of adaptability to a picaro, a category that we can 
loosely read Eumolpus as falling within. He observes that the ‘picaro as master of his fate is the jack-
of-all-trades, skilled manipulator, adept deceiver, artist of disguises, adaptable to all situations and all 
men.’ Certainly here we can see how Eumolpus does a ‘cold read’ on Encolpius, and characterises 
himself in a way that allows him to get something out of Encolpius. 
46 On this point, Anderson (1999, 56) observes that the tale of the Pergamum boy ‘works at a higher 
level to define quickly the side of Eumolpus’ character that marks him out both as a fit companion for 
Encolpius and his runaways, and as a threat to the anti-hero’s relationship with the young Giton.’ As I 
will shortly examine, this latter point is something that escapes Encolpius’ notice, until it is too late. 
47 Beck (1979, 247) observes that: ‘Encolpius is again and again the dupe of his romantic expectations. 
People invariably seem more formidable, more exotic than they really are… So, too, the first 
appearance of Eumolpus suggests to him the image of the noble, harrowed, and dishonoured genius.’ 
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159-160). He plays the role skilfully, until Giton is recognised. Later in the journey, 
he distracts everyone with his tale of the wife of Ephesus (110 ff.), to calm everyone 
down (Walsh 1970, 99-100); and he quickly ensures that they are well looked after 
when they arrive in Croton. Eumolpus’ speech likewise illustrates his intelligence and 
adaptability. His speech is quite economical and straightforward, but conveys mood 
and expression well (Beck 1979, 250).48 A good example of this is when Eumolpus 
relates his encounter with Ascyltus in the baths:  
 
Nam et dum lavor… paene vapulavi, quia conatus sum circa solium 
sedentibus carmen recitare, et postquam de balneo tanquam de 
theatro eiectus sum, circuire omnes angulos coepi et clara voce 
Encolpion clamitare. Ex altera parte iuvenis nudus, qui vestimenta 
perdiderat, non minore clamoris indignatione Gitona flagitabat. Et 
me quidem pueri tanquam insanum imitatione petulantissima 
deriserunt, ilium autem frequentia ingens circumvenit cum plausu et 
admiratione timidissima… Tanto magis expedit inguina quam 
ingenia fricare… (92) 
 
Now, while I was taking a bath, I nearly got beaten up, simply 
because I started to recite a poem to the people sitting around me, 
and just after I was thrown out of the bath, just like an actor, I started 
to search around every corner and calling out ‘Encolpius!’ in a loud 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Beck notes that ‘Eumolpus’ stories are effective not only because they express their author’s 
experience and his real outlook on life but also because in structure and language they are subtly and 
economically crafted to bring out the desired point and purpose.’ George (1966, 348) notes that the 
clever simplicity of Eumolpus’ language is what makes it skillful: ‘This is the keynote to Eumolpus’ 
literariness: it always bears a functional relation to the content, where Giton’s (and Encolpius’) is no 
more than chromium plating.’  
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voice. Somewhere else a naked young man, who had lost his clothes, 
was indignantly shouting for Giton. And as the boys just mocked me 
and childishly imitated me as crazy, instead a huge throng 
surrounded him with applause and spellbound admiration… A 
polished wick is much more profitable than a polished wit.49 
  
While his speech here is quite simple, it cleverly sets up the contrast between 
Eumolpus and Ascyltus; as Beck (1979, 251) observes: ‘ironic contrast is the very 
stuff of Eumolpus’ stories’. The mirroring in their actions, and the vast difference in 
their reception, is cleverly constructed, and culminates in the witticism of the final 
line of the quotation, through the juxtaposition of inguina and ingenia.50 Panayotakis 
(1995, 124) argues that the parallel spectacles ‘signify that in this passage we have to 
deal with another scene structured as a show in front of a theatrical audience.’ I see it 
as a central example of how Eumolpus can capture and entertain an audience. For 
example, where Trimalchio relies on entrapping his guests and virtually bribing them 
into being “entertained” by his stories, Eumolpus’ witty, entertaining, and colourful 
style of storytelling alone allows him to capture an audience.51  
Encolpius, on the other hand, is passive, submissive and suggestible, 
characteristics that all make their way into his speech. Indeed, as George (1966, 350-
351) notes, Encolpius’ speech frequently parrots the speech of others.52  This kind of 
parroting of style occurs throughout the text, depending on where Encolpius is and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The final sentence of this translation comes from Sullivan (1965), as it so deftly captures Eumolpus’ 
wit. 
50 Courtney (2001, 145) notes that the symmetry of Eumolpus and Ascyltus in this scene foreshadows 
that Eumolpus is imminently going to take over Ascyltus’ position within the plot. 
51  Beck (1979, 246) comments on the positive attention Eumolpus’ stories receive, observing 
particularly the emotional responses that Tryphaena and Lichas give to the tale of the Wife of Ephesus 
(113), and how Encolpius reacts ‘with alternating Schadenfreude and depression’ to Eumolpus’ 
retelling of his experience in the baths (92).  
52 George notes that Encolpius’ opening discussion with Agamemnon is a good example of this, as is 
the quarrel with Ascyltus at 79-80. 
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with whom he is speaking. It makes it difficult to discern what the real Encolpius is 
actually like, beneath all the mimicry and dramatisation. I would argue that this is tied 
to his lack of real identity, or sense of self, which instead seems to be tied to the 
company he keeps. Not only does he take cues on how to speak from other people, 
but his behaviour and direction often seems to be tied to them as well.  
Finally, the scene where Eumolpus meets Giton clearly illustrates the inherent 
differences between Eumolpus and Encolpius, and how Giton uses melodrama and 
theatrics in order to manipulate Encolpius. When they first meet, Eumolpus 
immediately offers himself as a lover to Giton – something that should be 
unsurprising to both the reader and Encolpius, given the narrative that Eumolpus has 
just disclosed – and Encolpius quickly turns his wrath on him: et ego iracundus sum, 
et tu libidinosus; video, quam non conveniat his moribus (I am passionate and you are 
libidinous: understand, these are dispositions which should not come together, 94). 
This is a curious statement, leaving aside the fact that Encolpius himself is both 
iracundus and libidinosus. It is true that two men, one who is easily provoked and 
irascible, and one who is lecherous, should not enter a situation like this. But, of 
course, that is exactly what Encolpius has just allowed to happen, even though he 
apparently is aware of Eumolpus’ proclivities. He has already noted to himself his 
worry that he has brought home Ascyltus’ double (92), which is what he has done, but 
perhaps to an even greater extent (Slater 1990, 101). Ascyltus’ only crime is to share 
the same passion for Giton that Encolpius does; to no greater extent than Encolpius 
himself does Ascyltus display ‘untoward’ intentions, and the inevitable parting of 
Ascyltus’ and Encolpius’ friendship occurs because of this shared affection. 
Eumolpus, on the other hand, seems to have no need for any kind of genuine 
affection; rather he operates primarily on the pleasure principle, simply taking what 
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he wants and discarding it when it has become too much effort, as he did with the 
Pergamum boy (McGlathery 1998, 212). Therefore, to have brought Eumolpus into 
contact with Giton was a foolish error on Encolpius’ part, if not an unsurprising one. 
 Following this statement to Eumolpus, the scene quickly devolves into sheer 
farce (Walsh 1970, 98). According to Encolpius, Eumolpus is struck down by his 
stinging attack, but it is far more likely that he is quickly summing up the best way to 
take advantage of Encolpius, which he quickly does by locking Encolpius in the room 
and running off after Giton, who had already exited the room earlier, perceiving 
Encolpius’ mounting agitation (Courtney 2001, 146).53 Encolpius, proving his earlier 
statement of iracundus sum, instantly decides that he shall have to kill himself, being 
bereft of all hope. At this point Giton returns, highlighting the fact that Encolpius 
must have been locked in only for a matter of moments, and declares that he must be 
the one to commit suicide first (…specta invicem, quod me spectare voluisti, 94). The 
mimica mors is then in full swing, as Giton then snatches a (blunt) razor from 
Eumolpus’ servant and draws it across his throat.54 Encolpius immediately attempts to 
follow him, only to realise that no harm has been done, whilst Eumolpus and his slave 
watch on.  
 Giton’s choice of the razor seems to be a premeditated or considered move;55 
as I mentioned earlier, throughout the novel Giton makes extravagant, seemingly 
calculated moves that serve to create the best possible scenario for him. He initially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Panayotakis (1995, 123) observes that the hasty entrances and exits that pervade this scene are 
reminiscent of Aristophanic comedy, ‘which add to the slapstick tone of the scene.’ 
54 Henderson (2010, 486) argues that in terms of parody, this episode most closely resembles ‘the 
nurse’s interruption of Myrrha’s suicide in Ovid’s Metamorphoses (10.382-388)… [Giton’s] theatrics 
affording Encolpius the opportunity to play the Virgilian hero Nisus or the Ovidian heroine Thisbe…’ 
As Conte (1996, 78) observes: ‘But Encolpius is not Nisus, nor is Giton Euryalus: the other characters 
in the episode have no doubt of this… That is why Eumolpus and his slave are not particularly alarmed 
and can stand by enjoying the scenario of the lovers’ death… It is a farcical death, a show by actors 
playing a part.’ However, in that specific moment, only Giton was aware that he was the one playing a 
part.  
55 Slater (1990, 103) points out the fact that Giton collapses, even though the razor was blunt, which 
suggests that he was acting out a scene, rather than making a genuine attempt.  
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chooses Ascyltus over Encolpius; he then returns to Encolpius after this absence, 
meaning that Encolpius’ affections for him have only increased, having missed him so 
much. Whether or not Giton did endure any kind of misery during this absence is 
unclear; he certainly tells Encolpius that he does, but this could be another deception 
intended to induce Encolpius’ pity and guilt (Courtney 2001, 144). This attempted 
suicide is arguably another calculated move on Giton’s part, which achieves its 
purpose of not only making Encolpius forget his recent rage at Eumolpus – and 
perhaps by extension Giton, given that he had betrayed him before – but apparently 
reaffirms his devotion to Encolpius (Panayotakis 1995, 127), another possible by-
product of Encolpius’ frenzied state.  
 George argues that the style of Giton’s speech mirrors the absurdity of what he 
says, and thus ‘lowers the risk of their being taken seriously’ (George 1966, 343). 
This is certainly true from an exterior perspective: Giton’s words and behaviour 
should be viewed as speculatively and cautiously as Encolpius himself is, as 
Eumolpus appears to do in respect of both of them during the scene at the lodging 
house. However, Encolpius lacks the ability to be so judicious or discerning, and thus 
he is exactly the sort of person who would fall for Giton’s absurdities, and does so. 
When Giton exhibits the same tendency to aggrandise, and to speak and act with 
overblown emotion and language,56 whether purposefully or as a symptom of his time 
with Encolpius, Encolpius is entirely taken in by it. This comes back to this idea of 
masochistic gullibility: Encolpius buys into Giton’s theatrics and allows himself to be 
manipulated through them, in the same way that Justine was manipulated by Roland, 
who took advantage of her trusting nature.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 George (1966, 341) argues that: ‘The spurious emotions and false drama demanded of the declaimer 
in the rhetorical schools have in him become indistinguishable from genuine emotions and real drama.’ 
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Encolpius’ passivity can clearly be seen during the Quartilla episode. The 
Quartilla episode presents a confection of emotions, and begins when we see Quartilla 
and her cohort appear in order to exact revenge on Encolpius, Ascyltus, and Giton, 
presumably because at some point earlier in the text they have interrupted Quartilla 
conducting secret Priapean rites. We know this because Quartilla’s maid states that 
Encolpius & Co have interrupted Quartilla’s mystic rites (16), and because Quartilla 
herself states that she is concerned that they will make public that which they 
observed in the shrine of Priapus (17).57 This is the only information that we are 
offered; we do not know when these events happened in the context of the very murky 
timeline that we have, nor do we know even approximately where it took place.58 
Arguably, however, knowing precisely what had happened before may not necessarily 
assist greatly in making sense of the scene that follows. It may explain why it is 
happening, but not necessarily what is happening. The fragmented nature of the 
episode makes it more difficult to comprehend, which serves to magnify the 
incongruity of what seems to be unfolding, and Encolpius offers us little to aid in its 
comprehension.59  
The haphazard nature of the scene is relative to the changing moods of both 
Quartilla and Encolpius. Quartilla inspires fear in the group before she even enters the 
room, with a bold knock on the door (16), which breaks the bolt and the door easily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Baldwin (2006, 39) observes that Encolpius does not disagree with Quartilla’s assertion, which may 
validate it to some extent, and that ‘he does reassure Quartilla that he will not betray the secret, 
exhibiting (if only for reasons of self-preservation) more respect than scorn for Priapus.’ I think that the 
idea of self-preservation is key to the way that this scene plays out more broadly. Taking together 
Encolpius’ passivity, and his sense of self-preservation, it is possible that he is just saying whatever he 
thinks Quartilla wants to hear. 
58 Citing Sullivan, Walsh, and Van Thiel, Schmeling (1996, 460-463) sets out a proposed chronology 
that suggests the mystic rites scene may have directly preceded the fragments of the Quartilla episode 
that we have, and that both Quartilla scenes precede the scene with Agamemnon that now typically 
opens the text. As with much scholarship on the Satyricon, this timeline explains certain features of the 
extant Quartilla scene but not others. Encolpius’ lack of explanation about who Quartilla is and how 
they met her makes more sense, if they had only very recently encountered her, but Encolpius’ 
apparent confusion about Quartilla’s purpose and personality remains incongruous and unanswered.  
59 Section two will further examine the structure of the Satyricon, and how the text may be episodic, 
rather than a continuous plot leading to an eventual resolution. 
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opens,60 and when she eventually enters she puts on a mesmerising display of grief 
(17). Quartilla is alternatively angry and distressed that Encolpius will divulge her 
holy mysteries, and when he promises not to, she suddenly becomes manically 
excited (18).61 Encolpius is unable to perceive that the shifts in Quartilla’s moods are 
anything but genuine, arguably because his own moods are liable to shift just as 
quickly and dramatically; as Conte (1996, 112) states: ‘Encolpius is inevitably deeply 
impressed by the tragic poses of Quartilla, and his own naïve tendency to pathetic 
gesture drives him into the trap.’ From this point the mood of the scene continues in 
an up and down manner, devolving into an aphrodisiac fuelled quasi-orgy (20-21), 
followed by a slightly more respectable dinner party (21), followed with the rape of 
Encolpius and Ascyltus by a prostitute (23-24), and finally the ‘wedding’ between 
Giton and Pannychis (26).62 
The Quartilla scene displays many of Encolpius’ emotional and behavioural 
fluctuations. His masochistic nature prevents him from thinking rationally, and 
perhaps finding a way to escape. He becomes the constant victim, through his 
inability to check his emotions, which would perhaps enable lucid thought, and would 
in turn allow him to exert some semblance of control and thus extricate himself from 
the situation. Similarly, we can recall Justine’s monotonous victimisation: she 
defaulted to the same behaviour with each libertine, because it is her nature to be the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Courtney (2001, 65) points out that in all likelihood the lock broke on the door due to the battering 
that Ascyltus gave it earlier (11), ‘but no doubt we are meant to understand that the startled 
companions see it as a traditional sign of an epiphany.’ 
61 Rankin (1971, 40) notes that: ‘Quartilla’s volatile personality, veering from one pole to another, 
between hatred and favour, laughter and tears, creates an atmosphere of mystification in which it is 
impossible for her captives to be sure of anything…’ This eccentricity and grandiosity is the kind of 
behaviour that a susceptible character like Encolpius easily falls for, and by which he is overwhelmed. 
62 Sandy (1969, 294) argues that Encolpius initially baulks at the idea of the marriage on moralistic 
grounds: ‘Encolpius’ reaction to Quartilla’s disgusting proposal is that of any reasonably moral person.’ 
Alternatively, Courtney (2001, 70) argues that it is more to do with the way that Encolpius sees Giton: 
‘Encolpius… protests that Giton is a modest young boy (at the moment this may be an opportunistic 
claim, but it is actually how the starry-eyed Encolpius sees Giton).’ I prefer Courtney’s interpretation, 
which echoes the point I made earlier about how Encolpius repeatedly is fooled by Giton’s veneer of 
coquettish naivety.  
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‘gratuitous victim’ (Carter 1979, 39). Similarly in Justine, Justine urgently wanted to 
escape from each of the libertines, but was not willing to do anything that would 
compromise her beliefs to achieve this, and so waited passively for an opportunity to 
present itself. Encolpius is ruled by his passivity, his femininity, and his tendency to 
self-pity (Lateiner 2013, 317). It is not a matter of not wanting to escape, or not 
wanting the scene playing out around him to end; it is simply a matter of not being 
able to convert these feelings to a sensible and proactive course of action. He waits to 
be helped, to be rescued, rather than creating that help for himself. 
He initially shows some resolve by determining that the three men could 
overcome Quartilla and her cohort: 
 
Tres enim erant mulierculae… contra nos, quibus si nihil aliud, 
virilis sexus esset. Immo ego sic iam paria composueram, ut si 
depugnandum foret, ipse cum Quartilla consisterem, Ascyltus 
cum ancilla, Giton cum virgine… (19) 
 
They were three mere women…we had at least our manhood in 
our favour, if nothing else… Indeed, I had already matched our 
forces in pairs. If it came to a real fight, I was to face Quartilla, 
Ascyltus her maid, Giton the girl…63  
 
But Encolpius is afraid and he cannot see past his fear. He allows his fear of Quartilla, 
and what is about to happen to him, to control his behaviour, meaning that he is too 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Encolpius later reveals (25) that the virgine could not be aged more than seven (…quam non plus 
quam septem annos habere videbatur [et ea ipsa primum cum Quartilla in cellam venerat nostram]), 
further adding to the oddity of the men being so terrified of three mere ‘women’.  
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overcome to take any action.64  Thus, despite recognising that the opportunity is there 
to overwhelm Quartilla, Encolpius submits (Tunc vero excidit omnis constantia 
attonitis, et mors non dubia miserorum oculos coepit obducere/But then all our 
resolution yielded to astonishment, and the darkness of certain death proceeded to 
fall on our unhappy eyes, 19). As McMahon (1998, 201) notes: ‘Once at the mercy of 
Quartilla, then, Encolpius is physically, psychically, and socially relegated to a 
condition of compliance with her will and that of her company.’ Encolpius becomes 
overwhelmed and does not resist Quartilla’s control (McMahon 1998, 201).65  
It is difficult to tell, both because of the fragmentary nature of the text and 
Encolpius’ unreliability, whether it should be ‘our resolution’ or Encolpius’ 
resolution, if indeed the others possessed any to begin with. It was, of course, 
Encolpius’ observation that the three men could fight each particular woman, and this 
is followed only by his observation that they have collectively lost their resolve.66 
This loss of resolve by Encolpius persists for the rest of the scene. The next we hear 
of escape is when Encolpius remarks that there is no one to come to the rescue (sed 
nec in auxilio erat quisquam, 21) and, besides that, when he tried to call for help 
(invocare Quiritum fidem), Quartilla’s maid pricked him with a hair pin. Encolpius 
still thinks of escape, but does not think that it is something he could do for himself; 
he only thinks of being rescued. To this end, Encolpius’ submissive behaviour mirrors 
the variegated forms of abuse which he suffers at Quartilla’s behest; he is sodomised 
repeatedly, raped by Quartilla with her staff, generally passed around unwillingly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 As Richlin (1983, 194) observes: ‘Quartilla… is far beyond the powers of the three cowardly fratres 
to resist. 
65 McMahon notes that: ‘Even as the narrator relating the fearful and uncertain atmosphere of the 
Quartilla episode, Encolpius is also deprived of both the opportunity and the actual ability to express 
his reactions to such threatening events with any success beyond a simple plea for leniency.’ That is, 
Quartilla takes control of the entire situation, and Encolpius does not have the capacity to try to take it 
back. 
66 Lateiner (2013, 307) observes that ‘These men show us how “real men” should not behave.’ This fits 
into the wider idea of masochistic agency. Here Encolpius’ surrenders the agency he has as a Roman 
man, and capitulates to Quartilla’s power. 
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from person to person, and even when he is not being sexually assaulted, he is being 
pricked (pungebat) by Quartilla’s maid, Psyche. He fulfils the passive role both in a 
sexual sense and an anti-masculine sense; in this sense, Slater (1990, 42) observes the 
shift in the balance of power that permeates the entire episode: ‘the women and 
pathics become the aggressors. Encolpius and Ascyltus are forced to perform sexually 
by means of fear, actual violence, and drugs.’  Encolpius has not the wit nor the 
aggression to invert the roles as he should be able to do as a Roman man (McMahon 
1998, 200);67 rather he fulfils the weaker role, the feminine role, and sees no other 
option but to accept his fate and wait for his release (Lateiner 2013, 307). This is a 
feature of masochism, this unwilling and yet willing victimisation. We saw similar 
behaviour with Justine, who progressed through a series of victimisations without 
being able to relinquish her status as victim.  
Encolpius’ reactions and emotions are often so intense that it becomes difficult 
to distinguish the actual value of an action. For example, he does not react with any 
more fear or distress when he is raped than when Quartilla first announces herself and 
her intentions.68 This is in the context of almost a series of emotional resets, where 
Encolpius is all of a sudden relaxed and happy and laughing, and then quickly 
extremely distressed. This is, of course, one facet of his unreliability as a narrator, an 
inability to convey any kind of emotional spectrum from which the reader can classify 
a response, which will be explored further in section two, but it is also a facet of his 
masochism, in that he has very little control over his emotions and his ability to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 McMahon notes that: ‘As a result of Encolpius’ failure to respond physically in the face of the eager 
and energetic attentions of his assaulter, his social and cultural status is further demeaned.’ This occurs 
throughout the text; indeed, it is difficult to find an instance where Encolpius retains his social and 
cultural status for any sustained period of time. 
68 For example, when Quartilla explains that no one is to be allowed in, until she has taken from them 
the remedy for her fever, Encolpius explains ego autem frigidior hieme Gallica factus nullum potui 
verbum emittere/ but I went colder than a winter in Gall, and was unable to say a word (20), which is 
arguably as strong a statement – if not stronger – than in the midst of the orgy, when he despairs non 
tenui ego diuitius lacrimas, sed ad ultimam perductus tristitiam/ I was unable to hold back my tears 
any more, but was brought to the greatest misery.  
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express them. Aside from these incidents – and his submission at Trimalchio’s dinner 
that will be explored in the later chapter – there are several instances on Croton when 
we see Encolpius willingly surrender his agency. First, he allows himself to be steered 
around and controlled by Eumolpus; then he allows himself to be spat upon in the inn, 
‘I put my hands on my eyes, and without any beginning for mercy… whipped and 
spat on’ (132); and, finally, he allows Proselenus to use him as she will (‘ac me… 
nihil recusantem’), including allowing her to thrash him with a wooden rod while he 
lies there crying (134), shortly after she has called him ‘soft and weak’ (mollis et 
debilis). Here he gives himself over to another’s control and makes no attempt to stop 
what is happening to him; instead, he readily acknowledges that he is allowing it to 
happen. 
Thus, we can conclude several key things concerning Encolpius’ masochism. 
Strong emotions, be they positive or negative, tend to make Encolpius choose to 
surrender his agency, and thus be susceptible to control. Further to that, Encolpius’ 
mythomania leaves him predisposed to overreacting and overdramatising situations 
that may not warrant such excitement. The way that these heightened emotions affect 
Encolpius’ narration will be explored in section two, but for now it is evident that not 
only does this extremity of emotion cloud his judgment, but it also impacts on his 
ability to exert control. When he is upset, scared, or worried, he allows himself to be 
led, as the old lady does when she takes him to Oenothea, or he allows himself to be 
controlled, as he is by Quartilla. Encolpius is easily manipulated, particularly by 
Giton, and he lacks the insight to realise that it is happening, and it is unlikely that he 
would be able to stop it even if he did. Each of these occasions leads to Encolpius 
suffering in some way, even if it is only transient suffering. It is the culmination of 
these actions that establishes Encolpius’ masochistic identity. Thus, understanding 
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Encolpius’ masochism allows the reader to appreciate the influence of Encolpius over 
the text, by identifying points of commonality in his seemingly unpredictable 
behaviour. This allows a deeper examination of his motivations and behaviours within 
specific episodes, which can then be juxtaposed and facilitate a more cohesive 
understanding of the text as a whole. 
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Catullus: the masochistic lover 
 
This chapter will focus primarily on Catullus’ relationship with Lesbia, as this 
is where his masochistic characteristics are most clearly exhibited. Catullus shows the 
three central tropes through which we have been analysing masochism: namely, 
passivity, control, and displacement of responsibility, but he has a far greater 
awareness of his own behaviour than Justine and Encolpius. Examining the arc of the 
Lesbia poems illustrates that Catullus surrenders his patriarchal agency to Lesbia, 
meaning that Catullus’ feelings for Lesbia control him, and that, consequently, 
Catullus’ increasing frustration with himself and Lesbia leads him to place blame 
entirely on her. Catullus’ passivity is more nuanced than we have seen in the previous 
two chapters, and is intricately tied in with the tropes of control and responsibility. 
Catullus surrenders himself to his feelings for Lesbia – and to Lesbia herself – and is 
the passive victim of them, in the sense that he does not actively change his own 
situation; as Wiseman (1985, 146) observes: ‘There is one thing about her [Lesbia] 
that comes through clearly enough – her dominance. She acted, he reacted.’ However, 
Catullus is not a gratuitous victim in the same way as Justine, or an incompetent 
victim like Encolpius; rather, Catullus is entirely aware of what is happening, but does 
not believe that he can change it. This awareness leads him to rail against his 
situation, and to project that anger and frustration onto Lesbia, rather than to change it 
himself. This chapter will examine how these three central ideas of control, choice 
(passivity) and responsibility manifest. This chapter focuses on Catullus’ perception 
and construction alone, and the next chapter will broaden the perspective of the 
masochistic reading, to consider if Catullus is really as helpless as he perceives 
himself to be. 
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 I begin by outlining the theoretical basis of masochistic love, in order to 
highlight the aspects of Catullus’ persona on which this chapter will focus. As 
examined earlier, broadly masochism ‘refers to a personality structure based on 
submission and dependence’ (Charme 1983, 222). Critically, this submission of 
agency and dependent tendency may not necessarily manifest in all facets of 
someone’s life or personality, but rather present in only certain spheres, such as love 
or religion. Baumeister (1988, 36) observes that masochism is often prevalent among 
esteemed and powerful men, because ‘exerting responsibility and maintaining esteem 
may become emotionally draining’, and thus the individual may look for a 
psychological outlet in another facet of their life, through the practice of sexual 
masochism, or masochistic love.  
 Fenichel (1945, 352) sees masochism as an amplification of infatuation and 
falling in love; consequently, the masochist loses independence and autonomy, in 
their desperation and desire to maintain that experience. As Charme (1983, 222) 
observes: ‘he lives through his partner, seeing his partner as everything. His 
willingness to sacrifice everything for his partner reflects a feeling of his own 
insignificance and helplessness compared to the other’s magnificence and 
omnipotence.’ Finally, and perhaps most pertinent to an examination of Catullus: 
‘The more suffering he is willing to endure, the greater his love must be’ (Charme 
1983, 222). This process of self-sacrifice can lead the masochist to place blame on the 
other person, seeing them as responsible for the masochist’s behaviour, and, in turn, 
cause the masochist to debase themselves in order to earn approval. The Catullan 
persona exhibits this compulsion to surrender control and independence for Lesbia, 
and to give primacy to her above everything else. Similarly, as the Lesbia poems 
progress, Catullus becomes fixated on the idea that the suffering he endures proves 
	   80	  
his love for Lesbia, and that ultimately Lesbia is responsible for inflicting that 
suffering on him, and should be held accountable.  
Poem 51 is a fruitful starting point for this examination, notionally exploring 
Catullus’ first encounter with Lesbia.69 This poem both establishes and foreshadows 
the characteristics that come to mark Catullus as a masochist. Engaging in a 
translation of Sappho allows Catullus to place himself in the feminine role; and the 
fourth strophe, which departs from Sappho’s poem, individualises Catullus’ own 
situation and addresses the challenge that he faces. As D’Angour (2006, 299) argues: 
‘Otium is a nuisance for Catullus because, one supposes, it allows him to brood 
obsessively about Lesbia. The self-address and insistent threefold repetition 
(otium…otio…otium) drive home the point that this represents Catullus’ individual 
viewpoint rather than Sappho’s.’ I will return to the fourth strophe shortly, and the 
consequences of otium for Catullus, after examining the previous three strophes.  
 Poem 51 is the poem where the loss of control and surrender of self that 
Fenichel and Charme outline begins. The first two lines (ille mi par esse deo videtur, 
ille, si fas est, superare divos/ that man seems to me to be equal to a god, that man, if 
it is allowed, surpasses the gods) position not only Lesbia’s companion as godlike, 
but, by extension, Lesbia herself as diva. As Fredricksmeyer (1965, 157) notes: 
‘Lesbia bestows divine felicity and perfection upon her lover and thus she herself is 
revealed, indirectly, as diva, goddess par excellence.’ In identifying Lesbia in this 
way, Catullus elevates Lesbia beyond the mere human, idealising her with divine 
characteristics. As we will see in examining poems 5 and 7 particularly, Lesbia’s 
pseudo-divinity contributes to the uniqueness of their love, as Catullus defines it. The 
counterpart to recognising Lesbia as divine is that it eventually places an expectation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 This chapter assumes that the fourth strophe belongs to poem 51. I echo here Adler’s statement 
(1981, 174) that there is no intention to argue for a unified reading, but rather to explore a reading of 
the poem that includes the fourth strophe as a part of the whole.  
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on Lesbia that she cannot live up to, at least in terms of the expectations that Catullus 
places upon her. As we will see in examining poems 11 and 58 particularly, Lesbia’s 
indiscretions, her ‘faults’, shatter the insular world that Catullus tries to create for 
them.  
 The second strophe explores Catullus’ reaction to seeing Lesbia, and it is here 
that we see the qualities that will form Catullus’ masochistic persona begin to appear. 
Particularly, the use of nam simul te highlights the difference between the experience 
of Lesbia’s companion and Catullus’ own experience, and in turn the simultaneously 
positive and negative effects that Lesbia can cause, which reflects more broadly on all 
the Lesbia poems.70 Fitzgerald (1995, 136) describes Catullus’ knowledge of Lesbia 
as ‘both disillusionment and enlightenment’; arguably, this is representative of the 
way that Lesbia is presented more broadly, where pleasure is counterbalanced by an 
equal amount of pain. Catullus watches Lesbia’s companion (qui sedens adversus 
identidem te spectat et audit dulce ridentem/ who, sitting opposite you, again and 
again watches you, and hears you laughing sweetly) and Catullus, in response, is 
struck dumb (nihil est super mi); while Lesbia’s companion can easily, even 
habitually (identidem) hold and enjoy Lesbia’s attention, Catullus is rendered 
powerless at the sight of Lesbia.  
 O’Higgins (1990, 157) observes that ‘Catullus’ naming of his beloved – 
Lesbia – also grants her a specific identity and a more substantial independent 
existence than Sappho’s anonymous girl.’ Indeed, specifying Lesbia’s name also 
serves to specify Catullus’ anguish: it gives it an external focus, and moves control, 
notionally, from Catullus to Lesbia. It is this shift of control that is key to a 
masochistic reading of the Catullan persona. Catullus’ laboured or restricted speech in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Arkins (1982) observes that: ‘What should be emphasised about poem 51 is that Catullus is in love 
with Lesbia and finds it a painful experience.’ This pain transcends, of course, beyond this poem, and 
will come to be a marker of Catullus’ experience with Lesbia generally.  
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the third strophe (lingua torpet) illustrates how he is rendered powerless by Lesbia, 
and is controlled by his desire. ‘The central two stanzas of poem 51 show vividly the 
overpowering effect which his passion had on Catullus’ (Fredricksmeyer 1983, 45); 
that is, the physicality of Catullus’ reactions foreshadows the masochistic peril to 
come. Catullus’ inability to control himself makes him submissive, and at this point 
he is submissive to his feelings for Lesbia, not even to Lesbia herself.  
 The final strophe similarly foreshadows Catullus’ struggles. Here, arguably, 
otium can be read as analogous to the stasis that Catullus’ love for Lesbia places him 
in. Unable to exert change himself, Catullus finds himself stuck, unable to alter his 
own circumstances.71 Justine suffered from the same kind of immovability: she could 
not change her Catholic viewpoint, and in turn could not overcome her situation; 
similarly, Catullus cannot overcome the paralysing effect that Lesbia has upon his 
autonomy, and thus cannot escape his feelings for her. As Stark (1957, 333) 
accurately observes: ‘Amor und otium bedingen hier fast sich gegenseitig… Sein 
otium ist, wie die otia des Paris, die Liebe; so sehr, daß diese otium für ihn molestum 
ist.’ Catullus’ love, unless checked or controlled, will eventually torment him, and 
overrun him.  
However, despite the danger that Catullus appears to forewarn, or self-
diagnose, in this strophe, he makes no attempt to counsel himself away from otium; 
rather, as we know, he walks headlong into it. Woodman (2006, 611) notes that: 
‘Whereas we might have expected Catullus to end the sentence by giving himself 
some kind of medical advice such as petendum est… instead he substitutes molestum 
est… Catullus is capitalising on the common notion that “the cure is worse than the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Fredricksmeyer (1983, 45) notes that: ‘The last stanza, moreover, indicates that the experience of 
meeting and falling in love with Lesbia brought on him a personal crisis, a traumatic break with his 
earlier life.’ This personal crisis, explored forcibly and insistently through the seventies, will be 
explored further in section two, when examining how Catullus’ perception and portrayal of Lesbia, and 
of his relationship with her, influences the narrative. 
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disease”.’ This is reminiscent of the notion of willing victimisation, which I have 
discussed in relation to both Encolpius and Justine, where a masochist allows 
something to happen, because the alternate course appears worse, or appears more 
difficult. Catullus, at this point, cannot entertain the notion of not pursuing Lesbia, 
despite the apparent danger (otium et reges prius et beatas perdidit urbes/ otium first 
destroyed rulers and prosperous cities).72 Segal (1970, 30) notes that ‘the tone of 
hesitation and doubt indicates, of course, that Catullus recognises this otium as no 
easy possession. It has its dangers. But, just because it is dangerous or even harmful 
(molestum), it is not necessarily repudiated.’ We can recall here Charme’s earlier 
point on suffering as proof of love: Catullus is willing to make this choice, regardless 
of the pain that it may cause, or the destruction, to subjugate himself to Lesbia in 
order to prove his love.  
Thus, this poem foreshadows several tropes that we can now examine more 
broadly within the Lesbia poems: firstly, Catullus’ idealisation of Lesbia, casting her 
as a diva domina; and, secondly, Catullus’ choice to fly in the face of his own 
apparent advice, and choose otium over negotium. This will have wider repercussions 
in the context of how Catullus can them assimilate their relationship into the Roman 
context, particularly the expectations that Roman society has of Catullus himself.73 
Finally, while the trope of responsibility is not explicitly foreshadowed in this poem, 
the collocation of Catullus’ idealisation of Lesbia, and his decision to risk his own 
destruction for her, pre-empts the resentment that will eventually manifest in 
Catullus’ attitude towards Lesbia.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Fredricksmeyer (1965, 161) observes that Catullus ‘in no way attempts, or admonishes himself, to 
terminate this condition and turn instead towards negotium.’ 
73 Miller (2002, 429) observes that ‘Catullus is very conscious of whom Roman society wants him to 
be.’ This, in time, will be one of the prominent factors in the disintegration of his relationship with 
Lesbia. 
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It is useful to turn to the theoretical framework through which the remaining 
poems will be examined. Conte discusses the redefinition of language and the 
‘reduction of the world to a partial field of vision’ (1994, 37) in relation to elegiac 
poetry. Though Conte deals specifically with elegiac poetry, arguably elements of it 
are clearly present in the way that the character of Catullus defines his love for 
Lesbia. Conte (1994, 37) states: 
 
[The poet] establishes his identity as diversity, asserts that he is 
enclosed within part of the world (let us call it love for now) which 
seems to him to be self-sufficient and to contain in microcosm all 
that is necessary for a full life. But the “model of the world” that is 
thereby proposed, if confronted with reality, will turn out to be 
partial and will clearly reveal its ideological lines of force. 
 
This is certainly what Catullus attempts to do in poems 5 and 7. He seeks to 
restructure the context and conditions of the world that he designs for himself and 
Lesbia; he structures his microcosm around the time he and Lesbia have together, and 
the quantity of the desire between them. Both time and desire become immeasurable 
in Catullus’ newly established construction. Conte (1994, 37) further argues that: ‘At 
this centre of this ideological system is located the conception of the lover-poet as a 
slave–of his beloved, his passion, his incurable weakness, and ultimately his own 
poetry.’ While the trope of servitium amoris is typically not discussed within 
Catullus’ poetry, arguably the underlying characteristics that underpin servitium 
amoris are present in some form within Catullus’ work, and as these characteristics 
intersect with masochistic qualities, they warrant further examination.  
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 Copley (1947, 285) defines servitium amoris as: 
 
An expression of the lover’s humility and abasement, of his 
willingness in the name of love to undergo punishments and to 
undertake duties which in real life were felt to be peculiar to the 
slave alone… it idealises love out of all relation to reality… and 
transports the poets into a fantasy-world created out of their own 
imagination. 
 
The critical aspects to focus on in Catullus’ Lesbia poems are the ideas of 
debasement, and idealising love out of all relation to reality. One of Lyne’s arguments 
against servitium amoris being present in Catullus is that ‘Catullus’ ideals of love 
excluded acquiescence (let alone glorying) in degradation’ (1979, 121). It may be true 
that Catullus’ ideals of love did not include debasement or degradation, but, as we 
will see in the remainder of this chapter, the reality that Catullus must eventually face 
is far from the idealisation that we see set out in poems such as 5, 7, and 51.  
Rather, absent in Catullus is the enjoyment in servility. Catullus expresses his 
frustration with his relationship with Lesbia through various coloured reactions to 
what he perceives as Lesbia’s apathy and antagonism. To argue that Catullus does not 
portray servitium amoris because he does not name it or accept it seems 
counterproductive. Instead it is more useful to appreciate Catullus as portraying a 
negative response to servility, while still experiencing and conveying the themes and 
associated experiences of an enslaved lover. Debasement, servility – and to an extent 
compliance – all exist in Catullus, and all these qualities form part of what Lyne and 
Copley define as servitium amoris. Perhaps a useful way of considering servitium 
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amoris in Catullus would be to express it as a facet of saevitia amoris. Catullus often 
feels that he is being savaged, that he is caught up in a maelstrom of inexplicable and 
unfair emotions, and yet is unable to extricate himself. He regards Lesbia as cruel and 
he feels that he is being treated cruelly. Yet as much as he rebels and reacts to this 
cruelty, he does not free himself from it. Rather than going hand in hand with 
servitium, amor in Catullus more readily brings to mind furor or similarly negative 
emotions, such as what is fluently captured in ideas such as odi et amo (85.1).74 
Catullus may not glorify self-degradation, and may not explicitly consent to it, as for 
example Tibullus does, but he also does not walk away from Lesbia, in order to cease 
that abasement. This intersects with the masochistic tropes of control and 
responsibility. Catullus cannot compel himself to leave Lesbia, and so blames his 
situation squarely on her.  
It is the idea of saevitia amoris that distinguishes servitium amoris from 
masochism, because even as Catullus rails against his treatment, he still gets pleasure 
from it. This is something that I will return to in greater detail in the next Catullus 
chapter, when I examine the power dynamic between Catullus and Lesbia. In 
servitium amoris, the lover has placed himself in that situation willingly and has 
accepted his place there (as is the case with Tibullus); the masochist, however, refuses 
to accept that it is his choice that has led him there, and instead places blame on the 
other party. 
 In terms of the idealisation of love out of all proportion with reality, it is 
instructive to return to Conte once more, as this will position our examination for the 
remainder of the chapter. Conte (1994, 41-42) discusses the difficulties inherent in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 In this vein, Lateiner (1977, 27) observes that: ‘Love (in a wide sense) and anger are the subjects of 
Catullus’ poetry (cf. odi et amo); a vocabulary of neologisms and unusually common, coarse, and 
strange words distinguishes it… The emotions of hate and love find rhetorical and poetic expression in 
laudatio and detraction.’ 
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insular world that is created, when the lover tries to ‘recuperate’ outside elements 
within that world:  
 
He will thereby create a condition of permanent discomfort, a 
tension between irreconcilable rhetorics. The vicissitudes of an 
amatory relation (a night refused, the mistress’s whim or 
inconstancy) will not only make him suffer for what they are, but 
will also set off a crisis that threatens the precarious equilibrium of 
the structure of elegy and disintegrates its artful construction by 
restoring the transplanted elements to their original context and 
meaning. 
 
That is, bringing values such as fides and pietas into the poetic microcosm – mores of 
contemporary Rome that are abrogated by a love affair – highlights the intrinsic 
tension that exists within it. An apt example of this is the aeternum sanctae foedus 
amicitiae that Catullus hopes for in poem 109, a much-contested poem among 
Catullan scholars. Konstan (1973, 102-03) points out that the language of the poem is 
almost at odds with itself. In the first line, Lesbia offers Catullus an amor, carrying 
with it this sense of transience: a fleeting love affair, which is certainly a common 
enough meaning of amor. Having related Lesbia’s offer in the first two lines, Catullus 
spends the rest of the poem wishing that he could transform this transient amor into a 
binding alliance, an aeternum sanctae foedus amicitiae. Linguistically this expression 
is both curious and complex. Firstly, it is an unusual form of expression for a lover. 
Ross (1969, 81 ff.) notes that it takes its context from a political sphere, rather than 
any kind of erotic terminology. Literally it seems that Catullus desires an enduring 
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alliance of sacred friendship, carrying over concepts that exist well outside of the 
erotic domain, in order to try and stabilise and solidify his relationship with Lesbia. 
Lyne (1980, 23 ff.) disagrees with Ross, and attributes the term to being indicative of 
the social dealings of the aristocratic class. I prefer Skinner’s reading (2003, 69-70), 
which posits that both Ross and Lyne are wrong to read it as explicitly political and 
explicitly social; rather, it represents the blending of the political and the socio-
cultural, emblematic of the development of the Lesbia poems.    
 Catullus uses poems 5 and 7 to create an insular environment, in which he 
controls the parameters of his own existence. He establishes himself and Lesbia at the 
centre of this world, and narrows the scope of it to exclude those whom he perceives 
to be disruptive, or to pose any kind of potential threat to the rules by which he has 
established these parameters. He seeks to restructure the context and conditions of the 
world that he designs for him and Lesbia; both time and desire become immeasurable 
in Catullus’ newly-established construction. The first three lines of poem 5 outline 
Catullus’ two central goals: 
 
Vivamus, mea Lesbia, atque amemus, 
rumoresque senum severiorum 
omnes unius aestimemus assis. (5.1-3) 
 
Let us live, my Lesbia, and let us love, 
and let us value all the rumours of old men 
at one penny.  
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Placing Lesbia at the middle of the line gives her primacy, making her equivalent to 
both life and love (Commager 1964, 362).75  Catullus then devalues the senum 
severiorium, in effect silencing any concern Lesbia may have about what others may 
think. Fredricksmeyer (1970, 438), noting the senes’ position as traditionally the most 
censorious and moralising of Roman citizens, argues that omnes and unius illustrate 
Catullus’ evaluation of them: ‘The hissing sibilants of the former line echo the 
hissing, snarking sounds of the rumores senum severiorium; the sibilants of the 
second line, in which the poet evaluates the rumores, emphasise his own disdain for 
them.’76 That is, Catullus urges Lesbia to follow his lead and to disregard the 
traditional Roman world that exists outside of their love, and to focus on the 
amalgamation of life and love, that is, to surrender agency along with him. 
 Lines 7 to 9 weave in the idea of limitless love:  
 
da mi basia mille, deinde centum, 
dein mille altera, dein secunda centum, 
deinde usque altera mille, deinde centum. (5.7-9) 
 
Give me a thousand kisses, then a hundred, 
then another thousand, then a second hundred, 
then even another thousand, then a hundred. 
 
The simplicity of language in the above lines emphasises the raw passion that 
Catullus seeks to convey (Segal 1968, 287); beyond the urgency of da in the first line, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Commager observes that: ‘The arrangement of words in the first line… and the double elision 
effectively make life, loved one, and love itself all compact.’ 
76 Henderson (1999, 73) similarly reads unius and omnes as signaling, ‘“Us and them”. The sides we 
must choose between. On their side is the despised, dead, cash.’  
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we have no other verbs, and the lines focus solely on conveying the multitude of 
Catullus’ desire. The emphatic movement of the alternating numbers ‘propel the 
number of kisses, love’s passion, toward more and more dizzying heights’ 
(Fredricksmeyer 1970, 440), and this ‘passion is conceived of as an answer to life’s 
brevity’ (Dettmer 1997, 23), in answer to the nox perpetua of line 6. This desire not to 
impose limits on his love for Lesbia is juxtaposed with a need to remove their love 
from the prying eyes of general society: 
 
dein, cum milia multa fecerimus,  
conturbabimus illa, ne sciamus, 
aut ne quis malus invidere possit, 
cum tantum sciat esse basiorum. (5.10-13) 
 
Then, when we have made many thousands, 
let us throw out the count, so that we cannot know, 
nor can any malicious person look askance,  
when he knows that our kisses are so many. 
 
Here Catullus emphasises the division between conturbare and scire. Scire is cold 
rationality, reminiscent of the logical mundaneness of everyday life, whereas 
conturbare is ‘the irrationality of passion’ (Fredricksmeyer 1970, 441). The process 
of counting, rather than the process of knowing the final count, is what is important. 
As Henderson (1999, 74) argues: ‘For lyric’s QED is non-knowledge; and the process 
of computation is the end of the discipline, not the results.’ Commanger (1964, 362) 
echoes this sentiment, noting that: ‘If a final total of kisses were reached, love would 
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inevitably be at an end, just as, once the total count of our days is accomplished, life 
is at an end.’ Thus, the urging use of conturbabimus brings us back to vivamus and 
amemus in the first line: to live is to love without limit. 
 The other purpose of conturbare is to once again return to the idea of 
excluding others. Fredricksmeyer (1970, 442) argues that, ‘By suggesting, at the same 
time, a defence against this threat, the poet creates the impression of enclosing the 
poem, the private world of his and Lesbia’s love, with a protective ring, as it were, to 
secure it against the malevolence and the envy of a hostile outside world.’ The 
consequence of excluding the senes, and the wider Roman society, is that Catullus has 
excluded the social hierarchy that those senes represent, and thus his own status has 
gone with it. Within Catullus’ redefined world, he has surrendered his powers as a 
Roman man. Further, by equating Lesbia with life itself, he has placed her in the 
position of power, and thus has surrendered his patriarchal powers to her.  
This idea of limitless love is then picked up in poem 7, when Lesbia asks how 
many kisses are enough: 
 
Quaeris, quot mihi basiationes,  
tuae, Lesbia, sint satis superque. (1-2) 
 
You ask how many kisses from you,  
Lesbia, are enough and more for me. 
 
The answer to this question is similarly limitless. Though this poem has more artifice 
than 5 (Dettmer 1997, 23), the central premise of the boundlessness of Catullus’ love 
for Lesbia remains the same, as something that cannot and should not be counted. 
	   92	  
Indeed, Segal (1968, 294) argues that when Catullus repeats satis et super in line 10, 
it is to ‘announce jubilantly the triumph of passion over limit’. The consequence of 
this ‘triumph of passion over limit’ is what the satis et super is contained within, 
vesano Catullo. As Dettmer (1997, 25) points out, this ‘sets the stage for the pain, the 
anger, and the ambivalence towards Lesbia that is to follow’. By loving Lesbia so 
entirely, indeed making his life dependent on loving her, Catullus opens himself up to 
all the negative connotations that go with vesanus Catullus. Even within poem 7 
itself, the limitless desire of vesano Catullo seems at odds with Lesbia’s question of 
quot basiationes in the first line. Lesbia’s need for quantification seeks to impose a 
limitation on their desire; she ‘assumes the perspective of a meddling outsider, posing 
herself a version of the malus in poem 5’ (Young 2015, 78).  
Adler (1981, 134) argues that: ‘No one asks another “Just how many kisses do 
you want?” unless he is less enthusiastic than the other about the kissing, and it is a 
question calculated to damp the other’s enthusiasm not because the answer is far to 
seek but because it shows the other that he is alone in his passion.’ This is our first 
indication that Lesbia may not be as content inside this insular world as Catullus is. 
Bertman (1978, 478) argues that the first line ending with basiationes and the final 
line ending with mala lingua ‘is not an accident, for the only magic potent enough to 
defeat the mala lingua is the magic of the basiationes themselves.’ If we recall 
Young’s point above that Lesbia herself has become almost synonymous with the 
malus in poem 5, and thus the mala lingua in poem 7, then this indicates the 
opposition between Lesbia (as mala lingua) and Catullus (as basiationes) that will 
pervade the rest of the Lesbia poems. Where Catullus presents himself as the desiring 
and passionate lover (cf. cupido amanti, 70.3), passionate and loyal, Lesbia becomes a 
disease and a destructive force for Catullus (cf. pestem perniciemque, 76.20).  
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Thus, arguably, the biggest problem affecting the stability of Catullus’ insular 
environment is Lesbia herself. While Catullus has deftly and purposefully removed 
their relationship from social constraints, he cannot physically remove Lesbia from 
Roman society itself. The fact remains that these two realities – Catullus’ constructed 
reality, and the contemporary Rome that he and Lesbia live within – run parallel, and 
one bleeds into the other unless tightly controlled. When Lesbia begins to rupture 
Catullus’ idealised world, Catullus is forced to begin reintroducing the Roman values 
that he had previously counted as worthless. This is done not necessarily to try and 
control Lesbia, as Catullus becomes increasingly aware that he cannot change her 
(non iam illud quaero, contra ut me diligat illa, aut, quod non potis est, esse pudica 
velit/ now I do not ask that she love me as I love her, or, what is impossible, that she 
be chaste, 76.23-24), but rather to try to reassert his power as a Roman man. Catullus 
has already surrendered control to both Lesbia herself, and his love for Lesbia, so this 
reassertion comes predominantly through juxtaposing his own loyalty (fides) with 
Lesbia’s betrayals and faults (culpa).  
Thus, in poem 11, which is one of the first poems where we see this 
juxtaposition of loyalty and betrayal, Catullus focuses on the loyalty and fidelity of 
Furius and Aurelius, before then attacking Lesbia for her infidelity:  
 
Cum suis vivat valeatque moechis, 
quos simul complexa tenet trecentos, 
nullum amans vere, sed identidem omnium 
ilia rumpens; 
nec meum respectet, ut ante, amorem, 
qui illius culpa cecidit velut prati 
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ultimi flos, praetereunte postquam 
tactus aratro est. (11.17-24) 
 
Let her live and be well with her lovers, 
whom she holds, grasping three hundred at once, 
truly loving none, but breaking them asunder 
over and over;  
 
Do not let her look for my love, as she did before, 
which, because of her fault, has been cut down, 
like a flower, the meadow’s last,  
after a passing plough touches it. 
 
Catullus introduces a definite contemporary context to this poem: it is not set 
within Rome itself, but he traverses the boundaries of Rome’s territory, and discusses 
the monimenta magni Caesaris, thus bringing a definite sense of time to the poem 
(Ross 1969, 98). This journey, though, has an unreal element to it, and thus poem 11 
serves as almost a transitional poem, with a sense of odyssey (Scott 1983, 40), where 
Catullus slowly begins to reintroduce his poems into a Roman setting. Thus, when he 
turns to Lesbia’s adultery at the end of the poem, it is contextualised within the 
boundaries of Rome. Similarly, just as Catullus juxtaposes the fidelity of his friends 
against the infidelity of Lesbia, so too does he contrast the fantastical journey in the 
first part of the poem with the gritty realism of its conclusion (Armstrong 2013, 50).77 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Armstrong observes that ‘wanderlust transmutes into simple, voracious lust’.  
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Lesbia has breached Catullus’ exclusionary world, and it is thus very much within 
Rome itself that Catullus has been mown down.  
 Though the explicit sexual violence comes only at the end of the poem, 
Catullus employs Caesar as an exemplar of physical aggression, and that aggression 
gains momentum as the poem continues, moving closer and closer to Rome, and 
closer to Lesbia.78 As Forsyth (1991, 462) notes: ‘[Catullus] begins to shift his 
attention from the outer macrocosm to the inner macrocosm, from the imagined rape 
of exotic foreigners to his own very real rape by Lesbia.’ Lesbia, like Caesar, is an 
unstoppable invading force, against whom Catullus finds himself powerless.79 The 
use of identidem in line 19 makes a clear link between poem 11 (identidem omnium) 
and poem 51 (identidem te, 51.3). The link highlights the different kinds of 
powerlessness that Catullus experiences: on the one hand, rendered powerless at the 
mere sight of Lesbia; on the other, powerless to stop her destruction of Catullus’ love 
(Bright 1976, 115).  
This poem thus illustrates the central masochistic tropes that we have seen 
with Justine and Encolpius. Catullus, as the delicate flos, has been mown down by the 
destructive plough; he has been rendered powerless by Lesbia, and by the loss of his 
own patriarchal agency. Secondly, Catullus begins to shift responsibility for his 
situation onto Lesbia. In line 17 Catullus uses cum suis moechis to describe Lesbia 
with her three hundred lovers. As Bright (1976, 110) observes, this ‘shows the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Scott (1983, 41) argues that ‘Catullus drew on the fluid tradition concerning Scylla to shape the 
imagery and invective of his message for Lesbia. His picture deftly combines throughout the 
primordial, epic beast and the later, sexually wanton woman.’  
79 Miller (2002, 428-429) observes that: ‘Poem 11 is all about power, whether Lesbia’s over Catullus, 
Caesar’s over the world, Roman ideology’s power to dictate masculine and feminine sexual roles, or 
Catullus’ power rhetorically to frame and caricature Lesbia by inverting those sexual norms, so that 
Lesbia becomes the voracious monster and Catullus the passive flower.’ This power to emphasise and 
demonise Lesbia’s behaviour is one of the few that Catullus possesses, so that through the course of the 
poems Lesbia takes on an increasingly negative persona. This is something that I will examine further 
in section two, when analysing the effect that Catullus’ perception and portrayal of Lesbia has over the 
narrative.  
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myopia we should expect from Catullus (or from the elegiac tradition): anyone else, 
of course, is moechus. He, of course, is not.’ Seeing himself as superior to Lesbia is 
essential to the way that Catullus perceives and rationalises their relationship. He is 
her victim, because he is morally superior, and thus defenceless against her 
inconstancy. Similarly, Justine saw herself as morally superior to the libertines, 
despite being their constant victim. Both Justine and Catullus take solace in their 
perceived superiority.  
This degradation of Lesbia is picked up again in poem 58, where Lesbia’s 
betrayal is placed squarely within Rome: 
 
Caeli, Lesbia nostra, Lesbia illa, 
illa Lesbia, quam Catullus unam 
plus quam se atque suos amavit omnes, 
nunc in quadriviis et angiportis 
glubit magnanimi Remi nepotes. 
 
Caelius, our Lesbia, that Lesbia,  
that Lesbia, whom alone Catullus  
loved more than himself and all his own, 
now in the crossroads and back alleys of Rome, 
jacks off the grandsons of great Remus. 
 
There is a certain furtiveness to the location here, expressed in terms of crossroads 
and back alleys, but this relates more to Lesbia’s underhanded behaviour, rather than 
deliberate obfuscation on Catullus’ part. Thus, Catullus is slowly integrating Roman 
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themes and locales into his relationship with Lesbia, moving it out of this isolated and 
private setting and very much into his own contemporary society. Poem 58, though 
compact, conveys an extraordinary amount of feeling. As Bright (1976, 106) notes: 
‘The fact that the poem is addressed to Caelius should be a warning… But we are 
distracted, indeed overwhelmed, by the melodic repetition of the magic name, and 
instinctively build a concept of the relationship being developed.’ This poem follows 
a formula that is similar to some of the later Lesbia poems, where Catullus initially 
draws the reader in, focusing on his love for Lesbia, and his fidelity, before then 
rapidly switching focus to Lesbia’s faults. 
 Catullus unam plus quam se atque suos amavit omnes draws attention once 
again to the uniqueness of Catullus’ love, how superior and unparalleled it is. The 
mantra-like use of Lesbia’s name makes the focus of the poem undoubtable: Lesbia is 
inescapable. It sets up a false expectation, using a ‘touching geminatio of Lesbia’s 
name’ (Richlin 1992, 152), before ‘The fourth line brings her down to the backstreets 
of Rome, and the final one flashes love, hatred, sickness’ (Lateiner 1977, 17). 
Catullus has returned to where he began: within Rome, watching on (figuratively) as 
Lesbia occupies the attention of another man (or men). Lesbia’s actions in poem 51, 
as Catullus observed her (dulce ridentem, 51.5), have been exchanged for the coarser 
glubit, conveying Catullus’ anger and cynicism. Placing both the magnanimi Remi 
nepotes and Lesbia in quadriviis et angiportis mounts a moral attack on both Lesbia 
and Rome (Muse 2009, 302). Thus, here Catullus rebels against both Lesbia, for 
disrupting their insular world, and Rome, for penetrating their insular world. Catullus 
uses poem 58 to express his frustration with the situation that he has created, but 
places the blame for that on two external sources.  
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   Thus, as we have seen, the theme of responsibility develops far more 
intensity and intricacy within Catullus than it did in the Satyricon, as a by-product of 
the disintegration of his relationship with Lesbia. Rather than admit or accept that he 
has willingly entered the relationship, allowed himself to be controlled and has not 
left of his own volition, Catullus places all blame for the decline of their relationship 
on Lesbia, and Catullus willingly embraces his victimisation insofar as it releases him 
from that responsibility. Passivity also plays out somewhat differently: Catullus 
displays passivity, but he is very much aware of his own inertia. He tries to counter 
this stasis by attacking Lesbia, reproaching her for her lack of fides. This chapter’s 
exploration of Catullus’ masochistic qualities highlights some of the elements that 
affect Catullus’ narration. My analysis in this chapter has focused on Catullus’ 
perspective alone, and the next Catullan chapter will broaden the examination and 
consider the effect that Catullus’ masochistic perception has on the narrative, when 
the reader only has Catullus’ voice with which to contend.  
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Thyestes: paranoia, delusion, and masochistic appetite 
 
This chapter demonstrates Thyestes’ masochistic qualities, which I draw out 
through analysing the inherent characteristics of Atreus and Thyestes. My central 
focus is the many ways in which the brothers are mirror images of each other, but that 
Atreus emerges as a far more successful character: his proactive aggression easily 
defeats Thyestes’ vacillating masochism. Ultimately, Thyestes returns home because 
he desires the power and wealth that awaits him. Despite it being clear that he does 
not trust Atreus, and fears what may await him, Thyestes returns home. I argue that it 
is masochistic delusion that allows this to happen, and which facilitates the deliberate 
passivity that Thyestes exhibits. Thyestes’ masochism means that he is not alert or on 
guard, and thus he is easily manipulated by Atreus. Atreus is irresistible: as the ‘new 
Tantalus’ (Boyle 1997, 44), the reader is drawn into Atreus’ world, where he is 
auctor. Rules, rites, and societal order are defined by Atreus alone; even the gods are 
excluded from this world of Atreus’ own making (dimitto superos; summa votorum 
attigi, 888). Thyestes’ lack of proactivity and awareness make him an ideal victim for 
Atreus’ machinations. An examination of the two brothers’ inherent characteristics, 
and their decision-making processes, reveals Thyestes’ masochism, and illustrates 
how Atreus exploits Thyestes’ weaknesses to achieve his victory. My analysis thus 
begins with Atreus, and demonstrates how Thyestes’ masochism stands in stark 
contrast to Atreus’ power.  
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Atreus’ opening soliloquy illustrates his frustrated anger. He is inultus (178), a 
mere iratus Atreus (180).80 His need to take revenge on Thyestes prompts a crescendo 
of statements on what lengths he will go to in order to have his revenge (180-189), 
culminating in haec ipsa pollens incliti Pelopis domus ruat vel in me, dummodo in 
fratrem ruat (this powerful palace itself, celebrated Pelops’ house, may it fall on me, 
as long as it falls on my brother, 190-191). Atreus’ fury coalesces with his paranoia: 
as he plots against Thyestes, he worries that Thyestes is plotting against him in return 
(aut perdet aut peribit; in medio est scelus positum occupant/ kill or be killed; 
between us is the crime for whoever first attempts it, 203-204).  
 Bak (1995, 182) identifies that precipitating experiences to paranoia are 
‘particularly emphasised injuries to the ego, such as slights, frustrated ambitions, 
injustices.’ Atreus outlines what Thyestes has done to him from line 220 onwards, 
culminating in these consequences for Atreus: 
 
Per regna trepidus exul erravi mea,  
pars nulla generis tuta ab insidiis vacat,  
corrupta coniunx, imperi quassa est fides, 
domus aegra, dubius sanguis est – certi nihil 
nisi frater hostis. (237-241) 
 
As a restless exile, I wandered through my kingdom,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Braden (1985, 42) notes that even in this statement, we see the determination and the purpose that 
Atreus possesses: ‘Indeed, part of what he sets before himself – like Nero and Medea – is his own 
name; the phrase iratus Atreus is offered as a reproach, but it resonates in its isolation as something a 
bit more impressive: a play title, maybe, like Hercules Furens.’ This line is an early indication of the 
way that Atreus summons his own power to rouse himself to action. Fitch & McElduff (2002, 25) note 
that: ‘It is worth adding that, since iratus is almost an anagram of Atreus, the phrase implies that anger 
is built into his role.’ I will expand on the notion of Atreus as the personification of furor later in this 
chapter. 
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no part of my family safe and free from snares,  
my wife corrupted, the trust of my empire broken,  
my home diseased, my bloodline doubtful –  
nothing certain except my brother’s enmity.  
 
This makes clear exactly what it is that Atreus feels Thyestes has taken from him, and 
what he aims to regain through this plot: his kingship, his masculinity, and his 
paternal role. Even though Atreus already has these things, he does not feel that they 
will be truly affirmed until he has shown himself superior to Thyestes, until he has 
caused him this same emptiness and uncertainty. Accordingly, Atreus is able to 
couple this experience with his own specific knowledge of Thyestes, in order to 
anticipate what Thyestes will do:  
 
S:  Iam tempus illi fecit aerumnas leves.  
 
A:  Erras; malorum sensus accrescit die.  
Leve est miserias ferre, perferre est grave. (305-7) 
 
S:  By now time has made his troubles light.  
 
A:  Wrong; a sense of injustice grows by day.  
It is easy to bear misfortune; to continue to do so is a burden.  
 
Again, this passage echoes Atreus’ own mindset. He uses this hyper-awareness of his 
own situation to predict Thyestes’ actions. He knows that Thyestes will not be able to 
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resist his invitation, partly because he believes him to be power-hungry, and partly 
because Atreus believes that were their roles reversed, he would not be able to resist 
(Rose 1986, 120).81 In order to explore how Atreus’ hyper-awareness is integral to his 
success, I examine Atreus’ viewpoint, as evinced in his conversation with the satelles, 
and how he confronts his own doubts and concerns in order to sure up his plan. 
 There are certainly points of commonality in the behaviour of Atreus and 
Sadean sadists. As we have seen, conviction and preparation are essential to both the 
ethos and the success of a Sadean sadist. They determine their desires, calculate the 
most logical and efficient way to achieve their desires, identify any possible problems 
and how to overcome them; and, finally, they have both the belief and determination 
to attain their desires (Henaff 1999, 281). Control and logic become essential in the 
planning phase, as well as a particularly psychological awareness. This means that 
even though they may not adhere to the same moral system, a Sadean sadist must be 
able to anticipate someone else’s actions, so they can adapt their plan to not only 
overcome this, but also take advantage of it. We saw this with the game of “cut-the-
cord” that Roland played with Justine, where he anticipated that Justine would cut 
him down before he died, and used this to maximise his own pleasure.  
 Much as a Sadean sadist sees their actions as rational because they are 
pleasurable for them – eschewing entirely the viewpoint of their victim or an external 
cultural viewpoint (Bataille 1986, 171)82 – so does Atreus see his own actions in 
Thyestes. The conversation with the satelles sets out Atreus’ views on morality and 
kingship, and this sets up the tone for Atreus’ behaviour throughout the whole play. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Rose argues that: ‘Consumed as he is by regni furor, he assumes that Thyestes is similarly motivated 
(302), and so he devises the scheme for luring him to punishment by inviting him to exchange the 
worst state for the better.’  
82 Bataille observes that the Sadean ethos reflects the idea that ‘the man who admits the value of other 
people necessarily imposes limits upon himself. Respect for others hinders him and prevents him from 
measuring the fullest extent of his desire.’ 
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That is, by appreciating the viewpoint that Atreus sets up at the beginning of the play, 
the reader can appreciate the consistency of his behaviour throughout. This does not 
mean that a reader or viewer cannot appreciate his behaviour as reprehensible, but, 
like with Sade’s sadists, can also recognise that to Atreus it is both logical and 
rational, employing what Mader (2002, 245) defines as ‘self-reflexive logic’.  
Atreus displaces a ‘conventional’ moral system and replaces it with his own 
regime, which helps him achieve his ultimate goal of taking revenge on Thyestes. 
Much about Atreus’ motivations and beliefs can be appreciated from examining his 
conversation with the satelles, where he outlines his viewpoint and his need to take 
revenge on Thyestes.83 The satelles provides the counterpoint to Atreus, which serves 
to only strengthen Atreus’ confidence in his own philosophy (Giancotti 1953, 104),84 
similarly to the way the philosophies of Sadean sadists were only strengthened by 
Justine’s Catholicism-based arguments against them. Atreus considers autocratic and 
tyrannical power as the only worthwhile kind of power, epitomised in ‘quod nolunt 
velint’ (212): 
 
Satelles: Fama te populi nihil  
adversa terret? 
 
  Atreus: Maximum hoc regni bonum est,  
quod facta domini cogitur populis sui 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 This scene is a common type of Senecan Affektszene, reminiscent of the domina-nutrix scenes in 
Medea (116-178; 380-430); Phaedra (85-273); and Agamemnon (108-225). As Mader (1998, 25) 
observes: ‘These scenes, placed immediately after the first choral ode, show broad similarities in 
structure and conception: ablaze with love or hate, the domina meditates bloody vengeance; a nutrix 
intervenes to urge moderation, but fails to deflect her mistress from her nefarious course.’ For further 
discussion of this, see Tarrant (1985, 116) and Heldmann (1974, 108-164).  
84 Giancotti observes that ‘Lo accompagna una guardia la cui funzione consiste nel far risaltare l'indole 
e i disegni di lui’. Mader (1998, 31-33) also points out that ‘a major function of these scenes… is to 
dramatise the duel between furor and mens bona.’  
	   104	  
tam ferre quam laudare. 
 
S: Quos cogit metus 
laudare, eosdem reddit inimicos metus.  
at qui favoris gloriam veri petit,  
animo magis quam voce laudari volet.  
 
A: Laus vera humili saepe contigit viro, 
non nisi potenti falsa. Quod nolunt velint. (204-212) 
 
S: Does adverse public opinion not deter you? 
 
A: This is the greatest virtue of kingship: that which is thought as kingly 
deeds, the people themselves must bear and even praise.  
 
S: Those whom fear compels to praise, so fear returns them as foes. But 
he who seeks the glory of true favour will want to be praised in spirit 
more than in voice.  
 
A: True praise is attained even by the lowly man; false comes only to the 
strong. Let them want what they do not want. (204-212) 
 
The ideas expressed in quod nolunt velint become emblematic of Atreus’ intentions 
throughout the entire play. As Mader (1998, 37) argues: ‘Atreus savours the essence 
of true power – a libido dominandi which defines itself not one-dimensionally in 
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relation to physical coercion, but more sadistically as the despot’s control over the 
subjects’ visible responses, and so over their wills.’ Not only is this how Atreus wants 
to rule – and feels he must rule – but this is what he wants to do to Thyestes: to 
physically coerce Thyestes into doing something irredeemably horrible (aliquod 
audendum est nefas atrox, cruentum… 193-194).85  
This conversation with the satelles is a clash of two opposing belief systems 
and the ideas of rational and irrational action that flow from them. The satelles is 
promoting the idealised bonus rex, who acts with appropriate clementia and earns the 
favour of his subjects through his tempered behaviour (Rose 1986, 119). For Atreus, 
this kind of behaviour is unnecessary and counter-productive, when he can simply 
inspire the people to tolerate and accept his behaviour through exercising fear and 
tyrannical power. 86  Atreus’ rationale here can be read alongside Seneca’s De 
Clementia, where Seneca warns Nero, inter alia, of the dangers of ruling through fear 
and hatred:87 
 
Contrariis in contraria agitur; nam cum invisus sit, quia 
timetur, timeri vult, quia invisus est, et illo exsecrabili versu, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Like Fitch & McElduff (2002, 25) observed that iratus is linguistically and figuratively equated with 
Atreus, so too does Boyle (2017, 178) equate atrox with Atreus: ‘It [atrox] occurs only four times in 
the tragedies, including twice in this play (also at 745), where it seems alliteratively suggestive of 
Atreus, as if atrox meant ‘Atrean’. This is a compelling point, and adds to the way that Seneca 
connects Atreus with words that symbolise power and control. Not only does Atreus overpower 
Thyestes psychologically, but it is as if he brings language itself under his own control and purview.  
86 Braden (1970, 12) observes that in De Clementia Seneca makes a clear distinction between clementia 
and misericordia, because ‘clementia alone confirms the power of its bestower: pardon is a royal 
prerogative, and its exercise displays royalty.’ As Braden observes, Atreus provides the 
counterargument to this in Thyestes, arguing that false praise comes only to the strong and powerful. 
Korfmacher (1946, 52) reads the distinction between clementia and misericordia in De Clementia as 
paying service to traditional Stoic apatheia: ‘whereby he pronounced clementia a virtue but made a 
vice of its alleged opposite misericordia (a subdivision of aegritudo), illustrating his point by the 
statement that clementia is to religio (genuine piety) as misericordia is to superstitio (debased 
superstition).’ To Atreus, both clementia and misericordia are signs of weakness, compared to ruling 
through fear alone. I will return to the notion of Stoic apatheia in the second Seneca chapter, when 
examining Thyestes’ veneer of Stoicism.  
87 For further discussion of De Clementia and Atrean inversion, see Lefevre (1985, 1266-1267); 
Tarrant (1985, 121; p. 176); Boyle (2017, 187). 
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qui multos praecipites dedit, utitur: ‘oderint, dum metuant’ 
ignarus, quanta rabies oriatur, ubi supra modum odia 
creverunt (204-212).  
 
Conflicting causes force him to conflicting courses; for when 
he is hated because he is feared, he wants to be feared because 
he is hated; and, ignorant of how much rage is stirred, when 
enmity grows to such an extent, he takes that accursed line, 
which drives many headlong falls, ‘Let them hate, so long as 
they fear’.88  
 
One can infer that within this philosophy that Seneca proposes, ruling through fear 
and hate is an irrational course; conversely, ruling with judiciousness and mercy is 
clearly sensible and thus rational. Atreus’ philosophy, however, is entirely different: 
what Seneca defines in De Clementia as a vice, that is, being a tyrannical and 
avaricious ruler, Atreus sees as a virtue, because he firmly believes this will bring him 
success, much as Seneca believes and proposes the opposite in De Clementia (Davis 
2003, 70).89  Atreus has unshakeable faith in his philosophy, and is thus fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 ‘Quod nolunt velint’, of course, finds its roots in Accius’ Atreus’ ‘oderint dum metuant’ (let them 
hate, so long as they fear), which was picked up by various later Romans: Cicero (Cat. 1.13); Caligula 
(Suet. Gai. 30.1); Seneca himself, as above, and in De Ira (1.20.4); and Octavia’s Nero (457), inter 
alia. 
89 Davis points out that: ‘we find that… the Minister consistently advances positions adopted by 
Seneca himself in On Mercy and that Atreus, with equal consistency, rejects them… he [the Minister] 
seems to think that, like the good ruler depicted in On Mercy, Atreus will long for the citizens to 
approve his commands. In fact, Atreus despises the people and their approbation (205-7).’ The people 
only have meaning to Atreus insofar as they are a symbol of his power; their desires and wants have no 
meaning to him, in the same way that the victims of Sadean sadists only have meaning inasmuch as 
they exist to facilitate their pleasure. 
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committed to it (Rose 1986, 122);90 all his actions are guided and motivated by it, 
which is integral to his success.  
Beyond his commitment to his philosophy, a key element to Atreus’ 
characterisation is his need to not only punish Thyestes, but to take pleasure in the act 
of punishment: 
 
De fine poenae loqueris; ego poenam volo.  
Perimat tyrannus lenis; in regno meo 
mors impetratur. (246-248) 
 
You speak of the end of punishment; I want punishment itself.  
Let the mild king murder; death is begged for in my kingdom.  
 
Atreus wants Thyestes to suffer, and to see Thyestes bring about his own downfall. 
There is certainly a bestial streak to Atreus’ desire (Boyle 1997, 46 ): it is not enough 
to do something to Thyestes; Thyestes must play a primary role in his own suffering 
(quod est in isto scelere praecipuum nefas, hoc ipse faciet/what is the principal sin in 
this crime, he himself shall do, 285-286). Atreus uses his own experience of exile to 
predict Thyestes’ actions. Atreus sees Thyestes as possessing certain characteristics: 
he is power-hungry, tyrannical, violent and bestial; all qualities which Atreus himself 
possesses: 
 
Aliquod audendum est nefas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Rose argues that: ‘Atreus craves absolute control for its own sake over an unwilling populace. No 
cost is too high for the preservation of this autocratic power.’ We can refer back here to Atreus’ earlier 
point of haec ipsa pollens incliti Pelopis domus ruat vel in me, dummodo in fratrem ruat (190-191). 
Giancotti (1953, 106) likewise observes: ‘ché egli è uomo il quale ha il coraggio delle proprie opinion.’  
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atrox, cruentum, tale quod frater meus 
suum esse mallet. (193-195) 
 
Some atrocious crime must be boldly ventured,  
cruel, such which my brother would prefer to be his.  
 
Atreus thus understands and perceives Thyestes as a mirror image of himself91 – 
though an inferior image, of course – which means he is uniquely placed to defeat 
Thyestes, knowing that he must trap Thyestes as he would trap himself. This 
motivates his decision to kill Thyestes’ children (because Atreus knows that is his 
own – if not his only – vulnerability), and in turn inspires his plan to lure Thyestes 
back from exile with the promise of shared kingship (because Atreus knows he 
himself could not resist the opportunity for power). Atreus sees his actions as simply 
‘getting in first’ (non poterat capi, nisi capere vellet. regna nunc sperat mea…/ he 
would not be able to be caught, unless he wanted to catch. Even now he hopes for my 
kingdom… 288-299). 
That is, Atreus is taking revenge on Thyestes before Thyestes has another 
chance to overthrow him; thus, Atreus legitimises his actions by seeing it as simply 
proactive action, which – if terrible enough – will ultimately rob Thyestes of the 
opportunity to retaliate, and thus will establish and solidify Atreus’ despotic power 
(Giancotti 1953, 105-106). Atreus’ astuteness is also illustrated by the way in which 
he considers and dismisses certain courses of action, ultimately making choices that 
are motivated by reason and that will give him the least variables, rather than choices 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Davis notes that ‘Atreus views Thyestes as possessing the same criminality that he does. He also, 
claims Atreus, possesses the same desire for power (288f.).’ Thyestes’ past behaviour leads Atreus to 
this conclusion, and there is nothing that happens upon Thyestes’ return that persuades Atreus away 
from this view. 
	   109	  
motivated by emotions. For example, when the satelles asks Atreus whether he plans 
to involve Agamemnon and Menelaus in his plot (317), initially Atreus states that 
they are too young to carry out such a ruse successfully (318-319), and also that he 
does not wish them to bear any guilt or responsibility (Ut ipsi crimine et culpa vacent, 
321). He then reconsiders and decides that such assistance will prove their parentage 
one way or the other: should they assist him, then clearly they are his sons; should 
they plead Thyestes’ case, then they have betrayed Atreus and his worst fears 
(paranoia) will be confirmed – si patruum vocant, pater est, (329-330). Atreus then 
reconsiders once more, appreciating that such a burden would place undue stress and 
responsibility on his sons, meaning that they may unwittingly derail his plan, deciding 
finally that they shall play an ignorant and blameless role (330-333).92 
Atreus also exhibits psychological strength by recognising that occasionally he 
is going to experience doubts or misgivings about his chosen course of action. Given 
that these doubts are counterintuitive to Atreus’ ultimate purpose, they can be deemed 
as irrational, or unhelpful emotions. Rather than trying to suppress these doubts, he 
addresses them and rationalises them. As Bersani (1989, 103) observes: ‘Paranoia is a 
necessary and desired structure of thought’, insofar as it can make an individual alert 
and aware of specific concerns that need to be addressed. On this point, Schiesaro 
(2009, 221) observes that ‘…an unwillingness, or inability, fully to engage with the 
irrational dimension of the self, even as its existence is clearly perceived, ultimately 
results in a mutilation, if not an outright denial, of the self.’ That is, characters who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Tarrant (1985, 135) notes: ‘The speech does not advance the action, but fills out the portrait of 
Atreus by showing him rooting out the last vestiges of respect for goodness.’ I agree to a point with this 
argument, certainly insofar as it fills out the portrait of Atreus. It develops the epicentre of Atreus’ 
concern: his children. In doing so, it reveals and solidifies the nexus of Atreus’ hated for Thyestes, and 
the reason for his particular brand of revenge. Schiesaro (2003, 157) observes that Atreus draws on his 
own experience to rationalise the decision not to tell them: ‘Atreus… carefully considers the reliability 
of his own sons as possible accomplices in the execution of the plot, and bases his judgement, once 
again, on actual experience: ‘the art of silence is taught by life’s many ills’ (318: tacere multis discitur 
vitae malis).’  
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can recognise desires stemming from irrational and passionate emotions and 
reactions, such as anger or lust, but cannot embrace these emotions, undergo more 
psychological trauma through this act of suppression, and, furthermore, are less likely 
to successful achieve their desire.  
This act of suppression is in line with Bak’s theory on paranoia, where the 
paranoia, and its accompanying sadistic fantasies, will be suppressed by the 
masochist, and is thus tantamount to masochistic delusion (Bak 1995, 191). One of 
Atreus’ strengths is that he not only full embraces his anger and fury, but uses these 
emotions as a logical mechanism for dealing with other less helpful emotions:  
 
…anime, quid rursus times 
et ante rem subsidis? audendum est, age! 
quod est in isto scelere praecipuum nefas,  
hoc ipse faciet. (283-286) 
 
Spirit, why do you fear, turn back and halt before the deed? 
Be bold, begin! 
What is the principal sin in this crime, he himself shall do.  
 
Atreus recognises his doubt and addresses it. He summons his courage, which is 
inspired by his anger and rage, and refocuses on Thyestes, reminding himself of the 
central purpose for considering his plan in the first place. Atreus thus exerts control 
through a complete awareness of all his emotions.93  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 In this regard, Bersani (1989, 100) notes that embracing, rationalising, and surpassing the paranoid 
stage ‘allows the original masochistic wish to become conscious by creating the conditions in which it 
can be reformulated as a triumphant narcissism.’ Arguably, narcissistic is too mild a description for 
Atreus, but he certainly does transform any semblance of masochistic paranoia into an ultimate triumph. 
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Schiesaro’s point on irrationality, and Bak’s on paranoia, are integral to 
demonstrating and understanding Thyestes’ masochism. Atreus’ psychological 
cognisance contrasts markedly with Thyestes’ lack of awareness, which manifests 
primarily in his inability to unite thought and action, and to consider his plans 
thoroughly before executing them. Seneca illustrates Thyestes’ imprudence by 
highlighting his physical unwillingness: 
 
Modo inter illa, quae putant cuncti aspera 
fortis fui laetusque; nunc contra in metus 
revolvor; animus haeret ac retro cupit 
corpus referre, moveo nolentem gradum. (417-420) 
 
Recently, amongst such fortune, which all count as adverse, I was strong 
and joyful; now, in opposition, I am returning into fears;  
my spirit is stalled and, my body desiring to turn back,  
I move unwilling step along. 
 
Here Thyestes acknowledges his physical trepidation, yet allows himself to be 
persuaded by Tantalus to return home to Atreus (421-490).94 Despite being conscious 
of the unlikelihood of a conciliatory reunion with Atreus, Thyestes suppresses his 
doubts and allows himself to be led, as he tells Tantalus ‘ego vos sequor, non duco’ 
(489). Thyestes’ inability to assert his authority here, and his unusual decision to 
follow rather than to lead, recalls his ancestor Tantalus’ capitulation to the Fury 
(sequor, 100) in the prologue (Boyle 1997, 44). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Giancotti (1953, 103) argues that firstly Tantalus and then Thyestes are persuaded by the mirage of 
power that the palace represents.  
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 Tantalus’ interaction with the Fury frames the action of the play, and 
illustrates a key difference between Tantalus’ situation and Thyestes’. The Fury 
appears as both the instigator and the stage manager of the drama (Schiesaro 2003, 
38-39). The power of the Fury’s language commands and outlines the themes that will 
dominate the entire play:  
 
Ante perturba domum 
inferque tecum proelia et ferri malum 
regibus amorem, concute insano ferum 
pectus tumultu. (83 – 86) 
 
First throw your house into disorder,  
bear strife with you and a love of the sword,  
evil to kings, compel this wild heart with mad turmoil.  
 
It is the Fury who demands the action of the play, who determines the tumult that is to 
come. There is no mystery to what she desires: libido victrix (46); Thracium fiat nefas 
maiore numero (56-56); hunc furorem divide in totam domum (101). Indeed, the 
Fury’s proclamation of Thracium fiat nefas maiore numero highlights the central 
ideas of nefas and scelus within the play (Rose 1986, 118), and also the idea of moral 
inversion: nolo for volo, nefas for fas, scelus for fides, and ira for ratio (Schiesaro 
2003, 39). Tantalus tries to resist the insistent Fury (stabo et arcebo scelus, 95), but is 
quickly overcome (96-100). Here the Fury’s speech and action overpowers Tantalus’ 
attempt at silent inertia. The final word in this capitulation, sequor, as already 
discussed, anticipates Thyestes’ ego vos sequor, non duco (489), which casts both 
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Tantalus and Thyestes as powerless: they do not act, but follow.95 The Fury and 
Atreus control the action of the play, while Tantalus and Thyestes are left to be drawn 
into the drama and controlled by the two. 
 The central difference between Tantalus and Thyestes is choice (agency). As 
Schiesaro (2003, 149) points out: ‘Tantalus was tortured and in fact had no means to 
escape from an overwhelming supernatural entity. Thyestes had been engaged in a 
dialectic exchange with his son that could easily leave room for retreating. The tragic-
sounding acceptance of what appears to be an inevitable destiny is totally 
disproportionate to the situation.’ Unlike Tantalus, Thyestes should not be at the 
mercy of his son; rather, Thyestes should be able to exert his will over Tantalus, but 
chooses instead to follow, rather than lead. This kind of passivity is indicative of 
Thyestes’ masochistic persona. By choosing to be passive, and surrendering his 
agency as the pater familias, Thyestes is giving responsibility to Tantalus, and thus 
absolving himself of responsibility for what may happen when they return to Argos. It 
also makes clear why Thyestes ultimately will be no match for Atreus: his lack of 
proactivity and his desire to follow mark him as psychologically and linguistically 
inferior to Atreus. It also betrays Thyestes’ inner desire, which is in opposition to his 
outwardly Stoic musings: ultimately, Thyestes wants to return to his former royal life 
and all the trappings of it, but is unwilling to take responsibility for his desires.  
Thyestes defines his doubts as irrational, but arguably it is his masochistic 
delusion that makes his behaviour irrational. His constant attempts to reassure himself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Davis (2003, 43) notes the similarity between Tantalus and Thyestes: ‘The stage action, the dragging 
of the ghost onstage, his attempt to flee, his blocking of the entrance into the house and his scourging, 
underline a point which should be clear from Tantalus’ own words: the ghost is a reluctant polluter of 
his house. He resists the Fury’s commands and, initially at least, has to be compelled to obey. In the 
end, however, Tantalus yields to his instincts (97-100) and infects the house… Thyestes also professes 
reluctance, but he too is overcome by innate disposition.’ Tantalus, in a sense, represents the combined 
image of the two brothers: his crime inspires Atreus, and his unwillingness and passivity reflects 
Thyestes.  
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of his faith in his brother (credula praesta pectora fratri, 962-3) are his way of 
convincing himself that his doubts are irrational. In reality, it is the act of denying 
them that makes them irrational, and defines him as psychologically inferior to 
Atreus. It is in observing Thyestes’ actions and decisions that Atreus’ psychological 
astuteness is made clear. Taken concomitantly, the two brothers have the same 
information available to them, and yet use this information in markedly different 
ways. They grew up together; have betrayed each other; and each fulfilled the current 
role of the other at various times (leader and exile). In part, Thyestes is lured in by the 
possibility of freedom, forgiveness, and luxury, but ultimately tries to continually 
quash his doubts of Atreus’ genuineness without due consideration (Boyle 1997, 49). 
Given the sequence of the play, the reader is aware of Atreus’ plans before Thyestes 
first appears, already worrying about what fate may await him, and knows that 
Thyestes is right to worry. Even if this were not so, Thyestes’ own words, when he is 
trying to quash his fears, betray how unlikely his hopes for reconciliation are: 
 
Amat Thyesten frater?  aetherias prius 
perfundet Arctos pontus et Siculi rapax 
consistet aestus unda et Ionio seges 
matura pelago surget et lucem dabit 
nox atra terris, ante cum flammis aquae,  
cum morte vita, cum mari ventus fidem 
foedusque iungent. (476-482) 
 
His brother love Thyestes? First the sea will drench the 
celestial Bears, and the furious waves of the Sicilian  
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tide stand still, and ripe fields grow in the Ionian Sea, 
and black night will give light to earth,  
before water joins fire, life with death,  
and wind with sea in confidence and contract. 
 
Despite the apocalyptic force of this statement, Thyestes quickly tries to quash 
this worry. He does not thoroughly contemplate his fears, or rationalise them, as 
Atreus does; rather, he tries to suppress them, and accordingly loses control of his 
own fate (Rose 1986, 127).96 They continually reappear and he continually tries to 
ignore them, until they physically manifest in the penultimate scenes of the play. 
There are certainly similarities between the way that masochism manifests in 
Encolpius and Thyestes. Encolpius allows himself to be steered about from place to 
place: his movement and direction is nearly always decided upon by somebody else, 
and he follows without assenting or protesting. Thyestes allows Tantalus to lead him 
home to Atreus, and then he allows Atreus to dictate his actions when he returns 
home. The central difference between the two is the motivation for their passivity: 
Encolpius becomes passive when he becomes overwhelmed; Thyestes retreats into 
passivity because he does not want to make a decision. Thyestes tries to sustain an 
image of himself that is free from worldly desires, but ultimately he is ruled by those 
desires. His paranoia arises because he fears that Atreus will trap him before he can 
reclaim his riches, and his desire for the riches leads him into masochistic delusion. It 
is an almost simultaneous process, contingent entirely on the risks Thyestes is willing 
to take to regain the throne. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Rose argues that: ‘The verbal connections [e.g. Thyestes’ repeated use of nolo] suggest that he acts 
as he does because he cannot resist his brother’s will. Thyestes’ loss of control vividly represents 
Atreus’ growing control over him.’ 
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Bersani (1989, 102) notes that paranoia often materialises at the intersection of 
desire and fear: ‘Paranoia repeats phenomena as design. What you thought was a 
chance juxtaposition may turn out to be a deliberate coupling. If that possibility 
inspires panic, it is also desired.’ There is no doubt that Thyestes illustrates panic: 
phrases like ‘Causam timoris ipse quam ignoro exigis’ (You demand the cause of my 
fear, which I do not know, 434), and it is the struggle between his fear and desire that 
causes Thyestes’ unwilling step. Ultimately, it is desire that wins out, when Thyestes’ 
capitulates with little resistance to Tantalus’ persuasion.  
One could not say that Tantalus puts up a compelling argument, certainly no 
more compelling than that which has passed between the two before that. Tantalus 
asks what power Atreus has against Thyestes (484), at which point Thyestes replies 
that it is because of his sons that he fears Atreus (485-486), which cannot be the truth, 
or at least the complete truth, given that if that were the sole reason then Thyestes 
would not have led them into danger in the first place. Tantalus then asks if he fears to 
be caught if he is on his guard (Decipi cautus times? 486), at which Thyestes agrees to 
follow. There is nothing convincing or particularly cogent about Tantalus’ words: 
Thyestes follows because ultimately his desire wins out, and his longing for the 
throne proves irresistible.  
There is one final element of Thyestes’ masochism to consider, which is the 
guilt complex. Nacht (1995, 32) discusses the guilt complex in masochists as an 
inward turn of aggression: ‘Psychoanalytic studies have shown that masochism is 
derived from the aggressive forces by a turning round of these against the subject. 
This mechanism brings into play the guilt complex and its result: the need to be 
punished.’ Nacht (1997, 20 ff.) acknowledges that the expression ‘guilt complex’ is 
not an all-encompassing or clear concept, which in part is because guilt is often 
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processed subconsciously by the superego, as I mentioned in the introduction. 
Thyestes’ awareness of Atreus’ hatred for him – despite his attempts to quash his 
doubts – suggests that he is aware to some degree of his own wrongdoing. His 
conversation with Tantalus does not betray any guilt or feeling of responsibility for 
what he has done, but his conversation with Atreus, upon his arrival, does indicate a 
guilty conscience:  
 
Dilvere possem cuncta, nisi talis fores. 
sed fateor, Atreu, fateor, admisi omnia 
quae credidisti. pessimam causam meam 
hodierna pietas fecit. est prorsus nocens 
quicumque visus tam bono fratri est nocens. (512-516) 
 
I could excuse everything I’ve done, if you were not as you are. 
But I confess Atreus, I confess. I did all that you believed. 
Your piety today has made my case the worst.  
Indeed guilty is he who seems guilty to so good a brother. 
 
This confession of guilt is virtually unprompted. Atreus has urged that they 
forget the past and reunite as brothers, which either Thyestes believes, and thus 
unburdens himself of his guilt because he feels it is safe to do so, or Thyestes does not 
believe Atreus, and confesses to try to placate Atreus. The latter seems an unsound 
strategy. As Boyle (2017, 281) notes, the legal language used here – dilvere, admisi, 
causam, nocens – suggests that Thyestes has come prepared to defend himself: ‘But 
instead of an apologia the audience witnesses ‘a refusal to defend’ contrary to the 
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Senecan norm, where characters regularly mount a defence of their conduct.’ 
Arguably, this confession is Thyestes’ masochistic guilt complex surfacing. In the 
past, away in his exile, he has been able to repress his feelings of guilt, and perhaps 
convinced himself that he had atoned for his past actions through the act of his exile; 
however, returning to Atreus meant that his guilt, and his need for punishment, has 
resurfaced.  
 This desire for punishment does not stand at odds with Thyestes’ desire for the 
throne. After all, the events that resulted in his exile occurred because he desired more 
power. The need for suffering and the desire to gain something can be intertwined. As 
we have seen in the previous chapters, masochism does not always manifest in one 
direction. Indeed, these two opposing masochistic manifestations in Thyestes provides 
explanation for his inconstancy: his ‘unwilling step’ is the result of two opposing 
masochistic tropes. The opening words of Thyestes’ song in the final act seem to 
confirm that his guilt and his desire have been satisfied by his return home: 
 
Pectora longis hebetata malis, 
iam sollicitas ponite curas. 
fugiat maeror fugiatque pavor, 
fugiat trepidi comes exilii 
tristis egestas rebusque gravis 
pudor afflictis… (920-925) 
 
Heart, dulled by long miseries,  
now put aside fretful cares. 
Away with sorrow, away with fear, 
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away with bitter want, the companion of gloomy exiles,  
and shame, the heavy burden of misfortune. 
 
His sense of satiety and relief, of course, does not last long, as his sense of foreboding 
grows, and Atreus enters to glory in his victory over Thyestes. Mythologically it is 
inevitable that Thyestes reached this point, and likewise through Seneca’s own 
characterisation of Thyestes it is inevitable that he has reached this point. Thyestes’ 
masochistic desire, and his masochistic guilt complex, drew him inexorably towards 
Atreus, and the riches of the crown. Thyestes’ masochistic passivity meant that he 
was never able to exercise enough caution, or have enough awareness, to escape 
Atreus’ plan.  
  Thyestes is one of Seneca’s darkest plays, depicting moral turpitude and black 
imagery. As Boyle (1997, 33) writes: ‘Here nature, the gods are reduced to shocked, 
impotent observers of human bestiality and sin.’ Seneca systematically depicts 
Atreus’ assumption of control over the entire storyline, illustrating Thyestes’ moral 
and psychological disintegration, until he becomes almost indicative of Atreus’ earlier 
words ‘quod nolunt velint’. Thyestes is constantly forced to do that he which he may 
not want to do, whether it is by Atreus, Tantalus, or even himself. He is unable to 
express himself, to fully assert his identity and impose himself on the plot of his own 
making; rather, he is swept along by those around him, constantly being pushed to 
exactly where Atreus wants him. Thyestes acts contrary to what he thinks, and he 
thinks nothing of his body’s involuntary actions. He refuses to unite thought and 
action, to consider appropriately and identify an appropriate course of action. Atreus 
successfully controls Thyestes, not only physically, in terms of the acts that he makes 
him commit, but psychologically; in spite of himself, Thyestes seals his own fate. It is 
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a case of sadistic triumph over masochistic discombobulation: Atreus thinks of 
everything, anticipates everything, and executes everything perfectly; Thyestes, in 
contrast, ignores stark reality, promotes vain hope over informed reason, and cannot 
determine his own wants in order to even hope to impose his will on the situation. The 
autocratic, sadistic, relentless and ‘bestial’ (Boyle 1997, 46) Atreus conquers the 
vacillating, irrational, and masochistic Thyestes.  
 
 
 
 
	   121	  
Section 1 conclusion 
 
This section has identified the key tropes that make up the masochistic 
persona, and explored how they manifest within our central texts. Masochism has a 
set of psychological behaviours and traits attached to it, which influence characters’ 
behaviour, and their understanding of what is happening around them, being, at its 
core, a ‘personality structure based on submission and dependence’ (Charme, 1983, 
221). This section has identified three particular traits that are inherent in reading 
masochism: control, passivity, and responsibility. Masochistic characters often choose 
passivity, opting to submit to the will of another person, or a situation, rather than 
trying to assert themselves; they may choose to be controlled, or unwillingly be 
controlled by people, and are unable to extricate themselves from that control; and, 
finally, they refuse or are unwilling to accept responsibility for any consequences that 
may come about as a result of their deliberate disavowal of their agency. The 
characters and texts that this section has examined have shown that while there are 
varying degrees of masochistic behaviour, and a variance in which particular traits 
characters show, and to what degree, the underlying characteristics remain the same. 
Ultimately, this examination and understanding of the masochistic persona allows a 
different and deeper reading of these characters, particularly in terms of seeing their 
victimisation as an ironically purposeful choice, and it enables an analysis of 
masochistic narrative, which will be explored in the following section.  
The (ironic) reality of a sadomasochistic relationship is that a sadist requires a 
victim, but this victim does not by necessity need to be a masochist; whether or not 
the victim enjoys the nature of their relationship is irrelevant to a sadist, as the 
relationship is essentially impersonal (Deleuze 1997, 19). This was clear in Justine, 
where the sadists had no regard for Justine’s welfare or protestations; though her 
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masochism was useful to them, insofar as it allowed them to manipulate her easily, 
her actual identity was irrelevant. Deleuze refers to this as the ‘dual language’ of 
sadism (1997, 19), based on the personal predilections of the sadist, versus the 
impersonal practice of these predilections upon the victim, meaning that the 
personality or individuality of the victim is irrelevant.  
A masochist needs someone to control, dominate, or victimise them; however, 
this person does not need to be a sadist, but rather someone who is capable of 
fulfilling a pseudo-sadistic role. Many of the characters Encolpius falls victim to are 
not sadistic; they are simply adept at taking advantage of weaker characters like 
Encolpius, and he becomes their ideal mark. In the case of Catullus, we do not know 
what Lesbia is; certainly in Catullus’ mind she is sadistic and cruel (Greene 1998, 19); 
indeed, the only reality we have that exists for Lesbia is the one that Catullus makes 
for her. Thus, terms such as dominance and submission are synonymous with 
sadomasochism: the sadist seeks to dominate and the masochist to submit, though the 
sadist does not always seek the masochist specifically, wishing rather simply to 
dominate; and nor does the masochist seek the sadist: often masochists 
subconsciously seeks a dominant person, and therefore are not aware of what they are 
pursuing. This can be one of the difficulties of examining sadomasochism: the two 
terms are inseparable, and yet the sadist and the masochist themselves are.  
Justine served as a useful template for exploring the central facets of the 
masochistic persona. Sade’s preoccupation with his sadists means that Justine’s 
character is only fleshed out enough to show her as an ideal victim. As a character, 
Justine does not have the same complexity as our classical characters, because she 
exists mainly to facilitate the libertines’ pleasure. Justine’s staunch Catholicism is a 
useful vehicle for her masochistic victimisation: because of her faith, Justine is 
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controlled, manipulated, and tortured. Sade highlights the apparent absurdity of 
Justine’s intractable virtue by pitting her against the self-centric philosophies of the 
libertines.  
The next Justine chapter will examine the way that Justine’s masochism 
produces a cyclical text, and the repercussions of this, which are a direct result of 
Justine’s narration. As there are two levels to Justine’s narration – the Justine who 
experiences events immediately, and the Justine who narrates them at a later point to 
Juliette – I will examine the similarities between the two types of narration, and show 
that the exterior Justine still has not learnt anything from her misadventures. She still 
has the same narrowed view of the world that the interior Justine does, and cannot see 
that her behaviour in any way contributed to her misfortunes. This ultimately shows 
that Justine’s masochism is pervasive: both the interior and exterior Justine suffer 
under the same moral masochism, and it infects both levels of the text’s narrative.  
Justine’s masochism facilitates the cyclical nature of the narrative, as she 
becomes trapped in a repetitive series of misadventures. The narrative does not vary, 
because Justine has no ability to vary it. As we have seen, her masochism causes her 
to be controlled and passive; she is unable to do anything proactive to free herself 
from her situation, unless it is in line with her virtuous principles. Any agency that she 
has is tied to her virtue, and she cannot commit an act that is outside of that perceived 
agency. She cannot change her approach to the libertines, or play a deceptive role in 
order to escape from her situation. She is repeatedly captured by the libertines, 
because she expects reciprocal behaviour from everyone she encounters; her 
experience does not vary, and she does not learn from those experiences. Her refusal 
to take responsibility for her situation, and to proactively try to change her fate, means 
that she is continually ensnared and victimised by the libertines.  
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Encolpius, like Justine, readily submitted to the will of others, and offered 
little resistance when he found himself in an undesirable situation. In the Quartilla 
scene, Encolpius capitulates to Quartilla’s control, and is unable to do anything 
proactive to extricate himself from the situation. Encolpius is easily controlled and 
emotionally manipulated, particularly by characters like Giton and Eumolpus, who 
take advantage of Encolpius’ irrational and gullible personality. Finally, because 
Encolpius rarely asserts his own will, or thinks independently of others, he takes little 
responsibility for the events that befall him. Rather, he sees himself as a victim, 
whether that be of Quartilla, Ascyltus, or a more aggrandised concept such as ‘fate’.  
It was clear in the Satyricon that Encolpius’ masochistic behaviours were 
exacerbated by situations where he became highly emotional or stressed. Encolpius is 
more prone to passivity when he becomes agitated or overwhelmed, causing him to 
surrender his agency and submit to a particular person, like Trimalchio, or to a group 
dynamic, like during the Quartilla scene. The same qualities that make Encolpius a 
poor picaro – his passivity, lack of self-control or awareness, and inability to take 
responsibility for his behaviour – also make him a masochist. The next section will 
explore the ramifications of Encolpius’ masochistic behaviours for his narrative 
consistency, and his untrustworthiness as a narrator. In that sense, expanding on the 
comparison already made between Encolpius and Eumolpus further illustrates 
Encolpius’ masochistic persona, and his unreliability as a narrator: Eumolpus is the 
ultimate con man, and his ability to inveigle his way into people’s lives makes him a 
skilled picaro, and an entertaining narrator. Encolpius, on the other hand, has 
difficulty sustaining a role for any length of time, and he is unable to deliver a 
narrative that is not coloured by his own deluded understanding of what is happening 
around him.  
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 Catullus is controlled by his love for Lesbia, and finds himself in a state of 
(seemingly) unwilling servitude to her. Though his resentment towards Lesbia 
increases markedly, he feels that he is unable to stop himself from loving her, or 
actively separate himself from her. This is in line with Charme’s discussion of the oft-
distorted nature of masochistic love, where the masochist ‘believes that voluntary 
sacrifice and submission are ways to express unshakable love and loyalty to his 
partner. The more suffering he is willing to tolerate, the greater his love must be’ 
(Charme 1983, 222). This desire to love Lesbia more than anyone has been loved 
before (cf. 87.1-2) turns Catullus’ love into a trial to be endured, because his 
masochistic traits mean that he is controlled by that love.  
As we have seen, though Catullus may address the shortcomings in his 
relationship with Lesbia, he still passively submits to her; he cannot stop loving her, 
and is thus victimised by that love. His desire to prove his love by enduring all that 
Lesbia does to him means that Catullus is controlled by it, and cannot change his 
situation. By placing the blame for their situation entirely on Lesbia, Catullus denies 
all responsibility for his situation. Perceiving Lesbia to be the catalyst for his distress 
has a strong influence on how Catullus portrays both himself and Lesbia, which in 
turn has important ramifications for the development of the narrative, given that 
Catullus’ voice is the only one the reader has. Lesbia herself has no voice with which 
to defend herself, or to temper Catullus’ version of events. The next chapter will 
interrogate Catullus’ relationship with Lesbia through the lens of the masochistic 
contract, which introduces the notion of deliberate yet unconscious victimisation. In 
the next chapter I propose that while Catullus sees himself as the powerless victim of 
Lesbia, the reality is that he unconsciously victimises her, by demanding his own 
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suffering. I will show how this manifests in the later Lesbia poems, and why it is the 
reason that Catullus’ repeated “attempts” to abandon Lesbia fail. 
Thyestes’ masochism became clear by reading his behaviour against Atreus’. 
Thyestes’ vacillating nature, and his lack of awareness of what was happening around 
him, showed him as not only a far weaker character than his brother, but as a 
masochist, suffering both an unconscious need to be punished for his past actions, and 
under masochistic delusion, as he tried to quell his paranoia about returning home. 
Atreus’ presence in the play is commanding: following on from the Fury in the 
prologue, he determines and dictates how his plan will unfold, and follows through 
with every minute detail until he achieves success. Thyestes, on the other hand, 
abandons any half-formulated plans that he may have formed on his way to Argos. 
Thyestes is easily controlled by those around him, passively submitting to the 
directions of Tantalus and Atreus. Thyestes does not take responsibility for his 
situation, nor for the possible repercussions of his original betrayal of Atreus, 
meaning that he is easily coerced into the penultimate events of the play, eventually 
making Atreus triumphant in his victory.  
Understanding these inherent differences between the two brothers will be 
intrinsic to the next Senecan chapter, which examines the control that each of them 
can assert over the narrative. Tragic drama, of course, does not have a single, 
continuous narrative, but presents multiple perspectives, through which the reader can 
make their own judgments. Atreus’ psychological power and conviction makes him 
not only a more successful character than Thyestes, but a more persuasive and 
believable character. This, combined with the mythological prefiguration, means that 
when Thyestes first appears on stage, conversing in “Stoic” tones, his words do not 
have the same power or persuasiveness that Atreus’ words do. This means that the 
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narrative that Thyestes presents never has the resonance or the ability to become 
misleading or unreliable, because Thyestes himself is not a persuasive character. His 
masochistic persona causes his vacillating behaviour, which ultimately makes him a 
character that does not embody confidence or trustworthiness.  
This section has demonstrated the way masochistic traits manifest in classical 
texts. This now allows us, in section two, to examine the effect a masochist has on a 
narrative. Understanding these points of commonalities in masochists is similarly 
useful for analysing and appreciating the roles that masochists play across different 
genres. The next section will utilise the definitional framework of this section to 
explore the implications of masochistic characteristics for narrative and genre. 
Understanding the baseline behaviours that make up the masochistic persona forms 
the mechanism by which we have identified masochists within this section, and from 
here the next step is to understand how these features colour and influence narrative 
construction.  
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Justine: sublimity and masochistic narration 
 
 This chapter explores how Justine’s masochistic persona creates dissonance 
between the levels of narration in Justine. Justine’s narrative picks up in the light of 
Sade’s own opening dedication, which appears to stand in stark contrast to the events 
within the novel. Sade claims in his opening that he wishes to show virtue trampled 
on by vice, so that the glory of virtue itself will be awakened in the reader, giving 
them a greater appreciation of the importance and righteousness of behaving 
virtuously. This contrasts with the sublimity of the ending of Justine, where, having 
finally survived her trials, Justine is struck down by a bolt of lightning (263). Finally, 
the extradiegetic narrator encourages the reader to be sympathetic to Justine’s plights. 
Understanding Sade’s aims within the dedication, his concluding statements, and the 
body of the narrative itself, requires examination of the differences between the 
historical author and reader, the implied author and reader, and the narrator and 
narratee. As Frappier-Mazur (1998, 191) explores, the emotional reactions of the 
historical reader and the modern reader could be quite different. Bearing these 
elements in mind, we can then examine Justine itself, to appreciate how Justine’s 
masochism makes her an unreliable narrator, one whose perception of what is 
happening around her is so affected by her religious masochism that she misreads, 
misreports, and withholds information from the reader. Examining this element of 
Justine’s persona establishes the link between masochism and unreliability, which 
shapes my subsequent reading of my classical texts. 
One of the central reasons that Justine is an unreliable narrator is because there 
is little difference, or additional insight, between the exterior and interior versions of 
Justine; that is, the Justine who narrates her misadventures and the Justine who 
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immediately experiences them.97 Justine’s masochism is one of the contributing 
factors to this lack of insight, as it is her unfailing devotion to her religion that 
compromises her insight, and prevents her from learning from her previous 
adventures, and adapting to new ones. I begin this chapter by analysing the way 
Justine’s masochism influences her narration, starting with the Bressac episode, and 
will then move to consider the impact that Sade’s dedication, the implied author, and 
the extradiegetic narrator have on the narrative.  
The Bressac episode occurs at an early stage in Justine’s misadventures. 
Having run away from the libertine Saint-Florent into the woods, Justine is lamenting 
her fate when she hears Bressac enter the woods with his male servant and lover, 
Jasmine. The exterior Justine – that is, the Justine relating her story – notes that the 
Comte de Bressac “possessed a considerable degree of wickedness and libertinism in 
his head” (49). Justine tries to exhort Bressac to have mercy on her; however, he and 
Jasmine tie each of Justine’s limbs to four trees, and stand by and mock her as she 
suffers. Eventually, Bressac releases Justine and says: “Thérèse, follow us and hold 
your tongue. If you do what I say, you won’t have cause to regret it… but if you 
abuse my favours, if you betray my trust or do not submit to my will… see these four 
trees, Thérèse… the slightest act of disobedience will see you brought back here 
straightaway” (51). Justine agrees at once, ignoring at this stage the clear 
incompatibility between her views and those of Bressac: “I gave him my word that I 
would do what he asked. However, he was as insensitive to my joy as to my pain.” 
Justine is taken on as a paid companion to Bressac’s aunt, Madame de 
Bressac, upon whom Bressac is dependent, by virtue of Madame de Bressac’s 
marriage to his uncle. The exterior Justine begins to explain the personalities of both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 From now on, I shall refer to them as the ‘exterior’ and ‘interior’ Justine, in order to easily 
differentiate between the two. 
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Madame de Bressac and the Comte de Bressac. As she explains the depravity of 
Bressac, she interrupts herself to state: “Should I be honest with you? Alas, yes, 
because to hide my faults from you would be to betray your trust and ill repay the 
interest that my misfortunes have inspired in you” (54). Here Justine partially 
recognises a possible weakness in the reliability of her narration; if she were not to 
confess to Madame de Lorsange that she fell in love with Bressac, she would be 
holding back a part of her story, and thus retelling her story in an unreliable or 
incomplete way. Thus, the exterior Justine points out a key difference between her 
story and the story of the interior Justine: the exterior Justine no longer loves Bressac, 
and can recognise him for what he is, a libertine who seeks to ‘systematically 
undermine and ultimately destroy any notion of feminine virtue’ (Neff 2002, 420). 
However, both versions of Justine’s narration are still unreliable in how they 
understand and handle Bressac’s attitude and behaviour.  
Thus, the narrative proceeds along two lines of unreliability: firstly, the 
tendency of the interior Justine’s affections to colour her impression of Bressac, and 
her own behaviour towards him; secondly, her lack of comprehension of Bressac’s 
libertine philosophies, and the attitude of Justine towards them. Grayson (1990, 84-
85) identifies this unreliability as the consequence of splitting, in the sense of the 
layering of the novel, and the versions of Justine within each subsequent story: 
‘Unfortunately, Justine seems to undermine herself in the process of reconstructing 
and narrating the events of her life. Her splits lead to multiple relationships: Justine-
Juliette, Thérèse-Juliette, Thérèse-Justine, Thérèse and other victims, victim and 
persecutor, Madame de Lorsange and the nameless narrator, and so on. Each alias and 
therefore each interaction manifests a partial relationship to language, resulting in an 
overall inconsistency in the text and in Justine’s identity.’ The reluctance of the 
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exterior Justine to recognise her past feelings for Bressac is an example of this kind of 
partial relationship: although she acknowledges that she once possessed those 
feelings, she has no desire to recognise them, or to scrutinise how they may have 
impacted on her behaviour.  
Justine’s masochism provides another explanation for her feelings for Bressac, 
and her later reluctance to acknowledge them. As the previous Sadean chapter 
explored, Justine’s masochism primarily manifests as a facet of her religious beliefs; 
however, these traits make her susceptible to other forms of masochism as well. I 
recall here Charme’s discussion of the common qualities of masochism as a distortion 
of love, which includes that the masochist will lose their sense of ‘independence and 
autonomy… His willingness to sacrifice everything for his partner reflects a feeling of 
his own insignificance and helplessness compared to the other’s magnificence and 
omnipotence’ (1983, 222). This is the same type of masochism that we saw at work in 
Catullus in the last section.   
This is certainly the case initially for Justine, who states: “In spite of all my 
reflections on his cruelty, his distant attitude towards women, the depravity of his 
tastes, and the moral gulf that separated us, nothing in the world could extinguish 
such a gripping passion, and if the Comte had asked me to lay down his life, I would 
have sacrificed it for him a thousand times” (54). This illustrates to what degree 
Justine had submitted to Bressac, and that he had taken a position of paramount 
importance in her life, far and above herself.98 Justine’s attempts to see some good in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Delers (2010, 661) argues that: ‘By making the innocent Justine fall madly in love with a murderous 
homosexual libertine, the author reveals himself to be an astute manipulator of generic expectations: he 
manages to balance the dark reality of Justine’s situation with ironic glimpses of hope for a positive 
sentimental resolution to the plot.’ I cannot agree with this point; rather, falling in love with Bressac 
makes Justine’s situation more hopeless. The dedication to the text has left us with the impression that 
there will be little happiness for Justine, which thus subverts any hope the reader may experience that 
Bressac will be softened by Justine’s affections. Further, Sade uses Justine’s affections for Bressac to 
make her masochism more palpable, and ultimately her situation more hopeless.  
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Bressac’s behaviour towards her further accords with the masochist’s tendency to 
interpret abusive behaviour as evidence of love (Charme 1984, 222): “I was so blind 
to his coldness towards me, I was sometimes weak enough to believe that he was not 
so indifferent towards me” (54).  
These observations of Justine clearly illustrate her unreliability. She can 
recognise and identify the differences between herself and Bressac, but only to the 
point of identifying their absurdity; she cannot overcome the feelings herself, and 
instead feels emotionally tied to Bressac, and in turn desires to try to convert him 
away from his libertine ways. Her love for Bressac, and the masochism that inspires, 
coalesces with her religious masochism to make her situation more hopeless. Each 
attempt Justine makes is met by unfailing resistance from Bressac, who counters 
Justine with his own arguments about the role of Nature, such as those that I explored 
earlier. Having made these many unsuccessful attempts, Justine observes: “I tried to 
find personal reasons to stifle in my heart the unhappy flame of passion that burned 
there, but is love an illness that one can recover from? All of my attempts to quell it 
merely served to make its flame burn more brightly, and the perfidious Comte never 
appeared more lovable to me than when I had taken account of everything that should 
have made me detest him” (60). While there is a higher level of awareness here, both 
of her own feelings and the improbability of them, the irrationality remains: Justine 
submits to her feelings for Bressac, despite the evident improbability that these 
feelings have any kind of hope, and those feelings distract her from making any 
attempt to escape. 
Four years pass in this way, with Justine consumed and ruled by her feelings 
for Bressac. At this point, Bressac tries to enlist Justine’s help in his plot to kill his 
aunt, so that he can claim his inheritance. Justine tries to plead with Bressac to change 
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his mind and to consider another plan, but he is unmoved. It is here that Justine’s 
unreliability becomes more apparent, as she explains: “But I did not know the man I 
was dealing with, I did not know the extent to which passions engendered crime in 
this perverse soul” (64). This statement is patently unreliable; not only has she had 
four years to understand Bressac, but he has spent those four years repeatedly sharing 
his views and proclivities with her. Bressac’s plan, and his determination to carry it 
through, should come as no surprise to Justine.  
Justine decides to pretend to go along with Bressac’s scheme, in a bid to buy 
herself some time to formulate some sort of plan. Here Justine acknowledges that 
Bressac’s proposal has effectively rendered nugatory all her former feelings, and she 
is now consumed only with stopping his plans. Unsurprisingly, unable to come up 
with a plan of her own initiative to stop Bressac, Justine reveals everything to his 
aunt. Bressac gets wind of her treachery, through reading the body language of both 
Justine and his aunt, employing the kind of libertine intuition and alertness that we 
have seen elsewhere. Justine, however, does not suspect that he has found them out 
(the exterior Justine laments “I confess to you, Madame… nothing prepared me for th 
shocking misfortune that awaited me… I felt so certain that the Marquise’s secret and 
her plans were safe that I never imagined that the Comte could have discovered them” 
68), once again illustrating her usual ignorance and misplaced confidence. Bressac 
asks Justine to meet him later for a walk in the woods, where he takes her back to the 
original four trees he tied her to on their first meeting. Here Bressac says, “What has 
your falseness led you to do, unworthy creature? You have risked your life without 
saving my aunt’s. The deed is done and I shall reap its rewards on returning to the 
castle, but you must die and you must learn before you expire that the path of virtue is 
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not always the safest one, and that there are circumstances in this world when 
complicity with a crime is preferable to treachery.” (69).  
It is pertinent to recall these words as Justine’s story continues, particularly 
during the Roland episode, where she is confronted with the choice of complicity in 
crime, in order to save her own life. With Roland, arguably, the choice is theoretically 
easier, because no other innocent life is at stake, like that of the Marquise de Bressac; 
rather, Justine will ultimately save the lives of the other women Roland has enslaved, 
were she to decide to let Roland hang. Carter (1978, 53-54) describes this as Sade’s 
immoral victory over the reader, ‘who is bound to urge the spotless Justine, just this 
once, to soil her hands with crime.’ It never crosses the interior Justine’s mind that 
she could have allowed Roland to die, nor does it cross the mind of the exterior 
Justine, who only remarks on Roland’s cruelty, when he immediately pretends 
afterwards that he is going to kill her by suspending her into a pit full of his former 
victims, before hoisting her back out: “Was I to complain, was I to congratulate 
myself? What kind of reward was this for what I had done once again just done for 
him… oh, what a man!” (214). She offers no reflection on what had occurred just 
before this, and whether she made the right decision. 
The final point to consider is the way in which Justine narrates her experiences 
to the reader, as this plays an important role in her unreliability. Justine’s masochism, 
as a product of her religious beliefs, manifests not only as a need to live by the strict 
tenets of her religion, and to try to persuade others towards her faith, but also in her 
unwillingness to enter into descriptive dialogue that is not analogous with her faith. 
This means that Justine will often utilise metaphors, or simply avoid describing events 
in detail. Ultimately, this means that the reader does not get a full appreciation of 
Justine’s experiences, which in turn restricts the empathetic connection that a reader is 
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capable of establishing with Justine herself. As Grayson (1990, 87) explains: 
‘Justine’s very delicacy of word and deed is a false position in the Sadian/Hobbesian 
jungle, encouraging her victimisation. This delicacy is most apparent in her 
relationship to metaphor and her refusal to detail certain scenes, which reduces both 
their impact and our sympathy for her.’ For example, when Justine is trapped within 
the monastery, she states: “Two nights later, I slept with Jerome. I will not describe 
his horrific behaviour to you, it was even more terrifying” (146). She deliberately 
withholds information from the reader, making a value judgement on their behalf that 
they do not need access to that particular piece of information. Her masochism thus 
infiltrates the perspective that the reader has open to them in engaging with the text. 
Further to this, the libertines’ directness and openness of speech contrasts 
sharply with Justine’s silence, ultimately meaning that they are the more reliable and 
trustworthy characters. The reader is privy to the same treatises by the libertines as 
Justine receives, and their accounts are no less detailed and no less coherent than hers. 
In the face of Justine’s harrowing experiences, it is difficult to be persuaded to her 
view, and her lack of narrative colour similarly makes it difficult to sympathise with 
her, ultimately meaning that the reader may be persuaded away from Justine, and 
towards the libertines’ perspective.  
I would now like to move to the other aspects of narration in Justine, to 
establish how Sade constructs a text around Justine’s masochistic unreliability. Justine 
opens with a dedication to Marie-Constance Quesnet, whom Sade took on as a paid 
companion after he left the Bastille (Lever 1995, 379). Sade held Constance’s virtue 
and morals in high regard, and he made mention of their friendship in his will (Lever 
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1995, 585).99 Sade uses the dedication to suggest to Constance – and by extension the 
reader – the kinds of reactions that she will have while reading his text: 
 
Yes, Constance, it is to you that I am dedicating this work. At once 
the example and honour of your sex, combining the fairest and most 
enlightened intellect with the most sensitive of natures, you alone 
can know those sweet tears shed by suffering Virtue… Once you 
have understood my motives, they will not be disavowed by them… 
The aims of this fiction (which is not as fictional as some might 
think) are doubtless new. The ascendancy of Virtue over Vice, good 
rewarded and evil punished, such is the general trend of works of 
this nature. Shall we ever tire of reading them! But everywhere to 
represent Vice as triumphant and Virtue a victim of its attacks; to 
show a wretched girl wandering from one misfortune to another; the 
plaything of wickedness; the butt of every kind of debauchery; 
confronted with the most barbaric and most monstrous tastes; 
stunned by the most brazen and most specious sophistries… in short, 
to dare to write the boldest of descriptions, the most terrifying of 
maxims, all with the most energetic brushstrokes, with the sole aim 
of obtaining from all of this one of the most sublime moral lessons 
that humanity has ever been taught, was, I am sure you will agree, to 
reach this goal by a road seldom trodden before. 
 Have I succeeded, Constance? Will a tear from your eyes confirm 
my virtory? In short, having read Justine, will you say ‘oh, how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Sade writes: ‘Wishing to make this lady aware, so far as my feeble powers permit, of my extreme 
gratitude for the care and sincere friendship with which she has provided me from August 25, 1790, to 
the day of my death.’ 
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these portraits of crime make me proud to love Virtue! How sublime 
she is when she weeps! How beautiful she is in misfortune! 
 Oh, Constance! These words need only escape your lips and my 
labours are rewarded. (3-4) 
 
The notion of the sublime is noteworthy, in the novel generally, and across Sade’s 
works in particular. Sade himself discusses the use of the sublime in his essay Idée 
sur les romans. This essay sees Sade chart the development of the novel through time, 
and offer his thoughts on what makes a successful novel.100 I will return to that more 
general discussion shortly, but Sade’s understanding and appreciation of the sublime 
as a literary tool goes hand in hand with his philosophical views on Nature: 
 
Nature, more bizarre than any moralist has ever painted her, escapes 
willy-nilly from the dikes which the moralists’ policy would like to 
prescribe for her; uniform in her élans, irregular in her effects, her 
breast always agitated, she is like the rim of a volcano from which 
are ejaculated in turn either the precious stones which serve man’s 
taste for luxury or the balls of fire which annihilate him. Great, when 
she populates the earth with an Antoninus or a Titus, she is frightful 
when she vomits forth an Andronicus or a Nero; but she is always 
sublime, always majestic, always worthy of our study, of the labours 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 For further discussion of where Sade’s essay fits into the development of the novel in France, and 
literary criticism associated with the genre, see Grieder (1972, 278 ff.). Sade’s lengthy imprisonment 
terms meant that he had the time and opportunity to read an astounding amount of literature, which he 
integrates into Idée sur les romans. May (1965, 5-11) provides a thorough analysis of Sade’s influences 
in Idée sur les romans, and how Sade’s theories present themselves in his own texts. 
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of our paintbrushes, of our respectful admiration – because her 
designs are not known to us.101 (17) 
 
Taking this idea concomitantly with the dedication to Justine, Sade uses the sublime 
to show Justine at the mercy of Nature, in the sense of what we might call the ‘gothic 
sublime’, that is, Justine being ultimately killed by the bolt of lightning, and the 
libertines themselves as a product of Nature. In Justine, Sade substitutes ‘nature in a 
state of perpetual motion for God’ (Bataille 1973, 110). His libertines often embrace 
this idea of perpetual motion to rationalise their own acts, as Bressac states: 
 
“Oh, what does it matter to Nature’s eternal creation that the mass of 
flesh which today makes up a biped creature should tomorrow be 
reproduced as a thousand different insects… Oh, Therese, it is only 
man’s pride that made murder a crime. Imagining himself to be the 
most sublime being on the planet and the most essential to it, this 
vain creature proceeded from this false principle to ensure that any 
action that would destroy his fellows must necessarily be a foul one, 
but his vanity, his folly, in no way changes the laws of Nature… 
Human passions are nothing but the means by which she employs to 
achieve her aims. When she needs more individuals, she inspires 
love in us and thus creates them. When destruction becomes 
necessary to her, she fills our hearts with vengeance, avarice, 
lewdness, and ambition, and so we have murders, but she has always 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 All translations of Idée sur les romans are adapted from Coward’s translation. 
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worked in her own interests… Nature does not place in our hands the 
means to disrupt her economy.” (62) 
 
The other libertines within the text provide variations on this same ideal, forming the 
basis for a philosophy that Sade, as the implied author, is trying to push through the 
work as a whole. This philosophy does not necessarily go hand in hand with the 
historical Sade, however, as it is not consistent across all his works (Bataille 1973, 
110). Separating the historical author and the implied author is difficult in the case of 
Sade, where his characterisations are so often merged with the man himself.102 Nelles 
(1993, 22) describes the separation between the historical author and the implied 
author as: ‘The historical author writes, the historical reader reads; the implied author 
means, the implied reader interprets.’ Naturally, attitudes have changed much towards 
the historical Sade, and his writings, since he came back into vogue through the 20th 
century (Wilson 1954, 167). We, as modern readers, are able to reflect more clinically 
on Sade’s works like Français, encore un effort si vous voulez être républicains, 
Sade’s Republican pamphlet in La Philosophie dans le boudoir, than Sade’s 
contemporary Frenchmen, in the grip of revolution. 103  Similarly, the kinds of 
philosophies – or the way Sade expressed his philosophies – are not as inexplicable or 
as shocking now, as they would have been; as Kearney states (1982, 95), Sade is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Particularly, Sade’s time and experience in prison permeates his books, and makes it difficult to 
separate the man and the text. Phillips (2001, 42) notes that the society at Silling in the 120 Days ‘is 
indeed only possible in the imaginary world conceived in and framed by prison walls.’ McMorran 
(2013, 1131) observes the ‘influence of Sade’s imprisonment upon fictional topographies dominated by 
isolated, confined, and subterranean spaces.’ Phillips and McMorran are right to observe that 
topography within the 120 Days, and it is also present within Justine. Many of the libertines Justine 
encounters, as we saw in the first chapter, live in an isolated space, which gives them the licence to 
control their victims without interference, for example the monastery that was buried deep in the woods. 
Here Sade transforms a feature of his imprisonment into a strength of his libertines. 
103 For a thorough analysis of Sade’s philosophical design in Français, encore un effort, see Shea (2010, 
106-130). 
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‘rather like a man who has invented a light-bulb before electricity has been 
harnessed.’  
We, as modern readers, also have the benefit of approaching Sade through the 
weight of scholarship about him, identifying and in some ways humanising Sade’s 
own writings, ‘the freest mind that ever was’, according to Guillaume Apollinaire 
(1909, 22). As Reinhard states (1995, 786), discussing Lacan’s seminal work Kant 
avec Sade, ‘…the conjunction of Kant with Sade not only indicates the break that 
joins the two figures, but also itself marks a break in the history of ethics, a rupture 
that will have opened the way for the emergency of psychoanalysis – not as the 
elaboration of the Sadian catalogue of perversions, but as one of modernity’s epochal 
responses to the escalating intensity of both moral law and pathological objects in the 
aftermath of traditional ethics based on either revelation or the common good.’ Thus, 
Sade is read from the point of modernity; that kind of juxtaposition with Kant is not 
something that would have been done contemporaneously. Statements like ‘Sade is 
the inaugural step of a subversion, of which, however amusing it might seem with 
respect to the coldness of the man, Kant is the turning point…’ (Lacan 1989, 56) can 
only be retrospectively read into Sade’s works. 
Finally, frequently Sade’s works are read cumulatively; that is, in the 
knowledge of the full Sadean oeuvre; with the benefit of a more intimate knowledge 
of Sade through his own letters, and, as an extension of that, a consideration of the 
circumstances under which Sade wrote.104 This cumulative reading is perhaps even 
more pertinent to Justine, a text that Sade returned to twice, becoming more emphatic 
and more debauched with each version. Shea (2010, 107), discussing Sade’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 McMorran (2013, 1131) notes that ‘Sade’s author is a voyeur as well as an artist, concealing himself 
behind his narrators in order to see and paint more truly… Sade’s isolation from the outside world for 
much of his career arguably imposed just such an approach.’ Here again we can consider the 
fundamental impact that Sade’s imprisonment had upon his writing and the construction of voices 
within it. 
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engagement with Cynicism, points to the differences between the openings of Justine, 
ou les malheurs de la vertu and La nouvelle Justine: ‘Sade [in Justine, ou les 
malheurs de la vertu] simultaneously claims Cynicism for himself and distances 
himself from the claim by displacing the Cynicism onto his characters and denying its 
corrosive effects on the reader. But by the time La nouvelle Justine came to press he 
had cast such caution to the wind.’105  Such a statement is true not only of Sade’s 
engagement with Cynicism in his works, but his approach to vice, libertinage, and his 
disavowal of virtue more generally.  
Thus, Sade’s contemporaries – taking Constance, for example, as his ideal 
reader – did not have the benefit of considering the place of infamy that Sade would 
ultimately take in literature (Blanchot 2004, 8).106 Instead, we must consider the 
expectations that Sade’s historical readers would have had for the novel more 
generally. The novel in 18th century France was not considered a highbrow genre; 
Georges May (1965, 5) quotes Rousseau as saying: ‘In my present circumstances, I 
can no longer endure any serious reading; and all works requiring cogitation bore me 
to death. Novels and travel books are from now on all I can tolerate’, and that Voltaire 
commented that the popularity of the novel in France and England ‘proves that Paris 
and London are filled with idle men who need nothing but amusement.’ Sade seemed 
to share this view, writing to his wife: ‘Would you be so good as to locate for me a 
few really interesting and really philosophical novels, but not too sombre, and not too 
sentimental either, for I utterly detest both these extremes. I say novels since, in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Jolivet (2011), Delers (2010), and Phillips (2002) provide useful discussion of the differences 
between the second and final versions of Justine. Aside from the increased violence, and length of the 
libertines’ diatribes, the central difference is that it has a third-person narrator: Justine loses her 
narrative powers. 
106 Blanchot writes: ‘But the book also illustrates that there is no scandal where there is no respect, and 
that where the scandal is extraordinary, the respect is extreme. Who is more respected than Sade? How 
many of us, even today, deeply believe that just holding this accursed book in our hands for a moment 
or two would make Rousseau’s disdainful allegation come true: that any young girl who reads even one 
page of this book will be lost? Such respect is certainly a treasure for a literature and a civilisation.’ 
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evening, I find it impossible to do any serious reading here’ (Oeuvres complètes, 
251). Perhaps part of Sade’s decision to write Idée sur les romans is to justify his use 
of the novel as the vehicle for his writings. May (1965, 8) posits that while we cannot 
know for sure, ‘Sade came eventually to realise that, in his own age, the novel had 
become not only the most popular literary genre, but also the most flexible and the 
best suited to the expression of new ideas and of a new view of Man’ (1965, 8). We 
could perhaps add to this the limitless nature of the novel, meaning that Sade had an 
almost endless capacity to canvass his ideas.  
This brings us to Sade’s own musings on the nature of the novel. Sade opens 
his essay by reflecting on the two central purposes that he sees for the novel: 
 
Man is subject to two weaknesses which are closely connected with 
his existence and which characterise it. He must always implore; he 
must always love; there you have the foundation for all novels. He 
has written some in order to depict the people he was imploring; he 
has written others in order to celebrate those he loved… But since 
man has implored and loved everywhere in the world, there have 
always been novels, that is, works of fiction; sometimes they have 
depicted the fabled objects of his worship; at other times, they have 
depicted the more real objects of his love. (5) 
 
Sade then traces the development of the novel through time, before coming to 
discuss the English novel, particularly the works of Richardson and Fielding, whom 
he greatly admires. It is here that we begin to get a clear indication of the link 
between Sade’s view of the novel, and his words in the dedication to Justine: 
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His [the novelist’s] work should show man not only for what he is, 
or for what he pretends to be – that is the historian’s work – but also 
as he can be, as he is when modified by vice and the impulses of 
passion. All the passions and vices must be known, they must all be 
employed if one wishes to be a novelist; from them we learn that the 
imposed triumph of virtue is not always of interest… For whenever 
virtue triumphs, things being what they must be, our tears are 
stoppered even before they can flow; but, if after the severest trials, 
we see virtue finally trampled on by vice, our souls are invariably 
torn apart, and the work, as Diderot said, having penetrated right 
through our hearts, must unfailingly produce that interest which 
alone earns praise. (11-12) 
 
Sade refers here to Diderot’s essay A Study of Richardson, published in 1762, in 
which Diderot discusses the motivation for acting, and determines that acting must 
come from an understanding of human nature (1953, 372):  
 
…the actor who plays from thought, from study of human nature, 
from constant imitation of some ideal type, from imagination, from 
memory, will be one and the same at all performances… His passion 
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has a definite course – it has bursts, and it has reactions; it has a 
beginning, a middle, and an end.107 
 
It is thus axiomatic that Sade’s dedication frames and foreshadows both 
Justine’s forthcoming tortures, and that these tortures are set against a backdrop of 
sublimity, which will be created through violence and libertinage (Frappier-Mazur, 
189),108 because one could not exist without the other. Justine’s victimisation could 
not exist without the libertine’s need to ‘create’, to attempt to transgress or to glory in 
the image of nature, which in turn would mean that there could be no pathos, no 
moment that ‘pulls upon the heartstrings’ of the reader, who watches Justine undergo 
these tortures, and Justine would not necessarily continue to endure these tortures if 
she were not a masochist. At the same time, the two types of the sublime that Sade 
strives for – through violence and through victimisation – cannot be self-sufficient, 
and thematically should not be coefficient. That is, the sort of sublimity that brings a 
tear to the reader’s eye is overwhelmed by the sublime violence of the libertines, and 
ultimately destroyed by the ‘gothic’ sublime, when Justine is felled by the bolt of 
lightning, perhaps metaphorically signalling Nature’s approval of the libertines.  
 Thus, beginning the novel in the light of the dedication, we can anticipate the 
events that are to come, albeit imprecisely, knowing that we are going to see vice 
painted in ‘the most energetic brush strokes’, and that Justine’s hopes for salvation are 
entirely futile. The desires of Justine, as she experiences her misadventures, are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Delon’s Le sublime et l’idée d’énergie discusses Diderot’s use of the sublime, particularly stating 
that the sublime allows man to wield creative power in the image of nature: ‘Il devient le propre de 
l’homme créateur à l’image de la nature’ (1986, 69). Certainly there is a connection here between 
Diderot’s conception of the sublime and Sade’s. Nature in Sade, as noted earlier, takes the place of a 
divine power, and the libertines see themselves as acting in nature’s image. Their actions, which for the 
most part take the form of violence, are what Frappier-Mazur (1998, 186) terms ‘estheticisation’. 
108 Frappier-Mazur comments that: ‘Nowhere is this esthetics better illustrated than when Sadean 
violence, inseparable from eroticism, culminates in the effect of sublime.’  
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against the grain of what Sade wants to achieve within the novel. Similarly, the 
musings of the Justine who is telling her story cannot be leading to a triumphant or 
redemptive ending, because Sade has already stated in the dedication that a story 
where virtue triumphs is old hat. This marries with his discussion of Richardson’s 
Clarissa in Idée sur le romans: 
 
…if after twelve or fifteen volumes, the immortal Richardson had 
virtuously concluded by having Lovelace converted, and by having 
him wed Clarissa peacefully, would readers have shed as many tears 
over this transformed version as they have when reading it in its 
authentic form? (12) 
 
Though we cannot take this as a direct reflection on Sade’s purpose in Justine, it does 
make clear that Sade saw no real creative purpose in a ‘happily ever after’ ending to a 
novel. Therefore, in examining Justine’s narration, we can bear in mind the tension 
between her narratorial purpose – both the interior and exterior versions of Justine – 
and Sade’s authorial intent. When Justine gives her interpretation of events – those 
that are happening and have happened – it is against the grain of what Sade is 
ultimately trying to show. When her understanding and views of events do not match 
with those of the libertines, her narrative is misreporting to the reader. As I identified 
in the introduction, misreporting occurs because the narrator has misunderstood, has 
been confused, or lacks the requisite knowledge to understand (Phelan and Martin 
1999, 95). It is Justine’s masochism, manifesting through her religious martyrdom, 
that means she cannot understand appreciate the libertines’ viewpoint, and illustrate 
any awareness of what is happening to her. As we have seen, even when Justine is 
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reflecting back on her experiences, she shows no insight as to how or why her 
adventures unfolded in the way that they did.  
The vast difference between the views of Justine, and the apparent views of 
the implied author, Sade, make reading and comprehending Justine complex. Booth 
(1961, 157) argues: ‘The implied author may be more or less distant from the reader. 
The distance may be intellectual… moral (the works of Sade), or aesthetic.’ If we 
accept that the views of Sade’s libertines are more in line with Sade’s own views as 
the implied author, the inherent difficulty in reading Justine is that the views of the 
implied author are not only distant from the reader, but are also seemingly distant 
from the central character. Sade employs what Booth (1961, 378) terms ‘psychic 
vividness’ to immerse the reader in his views; he subjects the reader to prolonged 
exposure to the inside views of his libertines, arguably to persuade the reader away 
from examining them through the scope of traditional virtues. However, this psychic 
vividness plays out against the sincerity of Justine’s Catholic virtue, creating a 
complex and often confusing narrative blend. As Edmiston (1987, p.148) states: ‘If 
there is a communication between the implied author of a text and the reader, at the 
expense of the unknowing narrator, we can say that the implied author is ironic and 
that the narrator is unreliable.’ Here Edmiston is discussing the first version of 
Justine, but his analysis begins from a similar point of acknowledgment of a historical 
reading of Sade (1987, 148), 109  and, as noted earlier, the same narrative and 
characterisation difficulties arise in both the first and second versions of Justine.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Edmiston notes that: ‘If we know Sade historically, then we know that he intended to justify vice 
and to ridicule virtue… and we read the text by searching for clues of disparity between his values and 
those of his heroine.’ That is, despite what the dedication and opening narrative may suggest, we try to 
find the antithesis within the text. Justine’s masochism facilitates that antithesis, because her 
masochistic nature makes her a character that is difficult to sympathise with. 
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Finally, the extradiegetic narrator, who concludes the novel, returns to this 
same dissonance between the implied reader and the narrators, appearing to urge the 
reader toward the path of virtue: 
 
Oh you who have shed tears over the misfortunes of virtue, you who 
have pitied the wretched Justine, while forgiving the perhaps rather 
strong colours which we have felt obligated to use, may you at least 
derive some benefit from it as Madame de Lorsange! May you be 
convinced like her that true happiness is found in the bosom of virtue 
alone, and that if, for reasons which it is not ours to divine, God 
allows it to be persecuted on Earth, it is to make up for it in Heaven 
with the sweetest rewards. (264) 
 
It is hard to read this conclusion, much like the opening dedication, without a hint of 
irony. This may in part be because Justine was originally conceived as a satire 
(Phillips 2001, 94), within which Justine represented the Catholic Church. Edmiston 
(1987, 154) posits that there is a nihilistic irony about the text as a whole: ‘He [the 
observer] will sympathise yet feel superior because he knows the victim cannot win.’ 
Certainly, there is a definite nihilism about Justine, and the reader can view Justine as 
the perennial and hopeless victim. Sade’s construction of the masochistic elements of 
the text adds to this sense of nihilism, because there is an inevitable feeling that 
Justine is complicit in what is happening to her. Her inability to change, to take power 
away from the libertines by action, rather than by repetitive and ineffective speech, 
ultimately marks her as the weaker character, and removes part of the reader’s 
sympathy and identification. The detached and often emotionless way in which she 
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tells her story only adds to this lack of identification and sympathy. Sade uses 
Justine’s masochism in two ways: to make her narrative unreliable, and to further 
alienate Justine and her suffering from the reader, so that their attention will be drawn 
to his sadists.  
 Thus, having examined the construction of Justine, we can see the dissonance 
between the layers of narration. There is, on the one hand, the implied author, Sade, 
and the overwhelming knowledge of the historical Sade that goes with that. It is 
difficult not to read the text in light of all that we know about Sade’s philosophical 
ideas, and his desire to promote them. There is then the extradiegetic narrator, who 
introduces the two sisters, Justine and Juliette, and who returns at the end to speak 
effusively of the joy of virtue. Finally, there are the two versions of Justine, one who 
can speak with the benefit of hindsight, though who only really employs this to 
provide additional information the interior Justine could not have yet known, and the 
Justine who experiences firsthand these tortures. The cumulative effect of these layers 
of narration is that Justine is neither persuasive nor reliable as a narrator. Her 
masochistic failure to grasp the words or ideas of the libertines means that she cannot 
interpret or comprehend their actions fully; her unwillingness to alter her own 
behaviour, or to be complicit in any way with the schemes of the libertines, means 
that she is often trapped in unfortunate situations by virtue of her own masochistic 
behaviour; and, finally, her sense of decorum means that she often does not explain 
the full extent of the horrors visited upon her, so that it is difficult for the reader to 
sympathise with her. Ultimately, this shows that Sade’s polarisation of sadism and 
masochism works to show his sadistic libertines as effervescent, reliable and fleshed-
out characters, and Justine as ineffectual and unreliable.  
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Encolpius: the unreliable masochist and the Cena Trimalchionis 
 
This chapter will examine Encolpius’ masochism, and consequent unreliable 
narration, as the focal point of the Satyricon’s narrative structure. The Satyricon is not 
a text which is constructed around what we might call typical narrative milestones 
(Zeitlin 1971, 652-53): there is no discernible goal for the characters, no definitive 
beginning, middle, and end, and no tipping points where the reader feels that 
something momentous has happened or is about to happen; instead, the reader is 
drawn along episodically and interchangeably, and on a first reading may be almost as 
befuddled as the characters themselves. One feature that links the often seemingly 
disconnected episodes in the Satyricon is our narrator Encolpius, who is consistently 
inconsistent. Reading the text through Encolpius highlights his masochism as a 
binding feature, and brings an immediacy to reading and comprehending the text. It is 
Encolpius’ masochistic nature that allows the text to wander and meander, and to fete 
the moment of storytelling itself. This occurs because Encolpius’ surrendering of his 
agency allows other characters to dominate the narrative, and to make their moment 
in the spotlight last. I apply this character-based reading to the Cena Trimalchionis, 
which is a useful vehicle through which to propose this kind of reading, given that it 
is a virtually complete episode, and in many ways is a microcosm of the Satyricon as 
a whole. The Cena illustrates how Encolpius’ masochism facilitates the exploratory 
nature of the episode, by submitting to Trimalchio’s control, which features a series of 
short, loosely-connected episodes, which lead to no real resolution or conclusion, but 
rather revel in the experience of storytelling. 
This chapter orients our reading of the text directly around Encolpius’ 
behaviour from moment to moment, rather than trying to comprehend it within a 
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broader plot. Positioning our reading around a character-based, episodic reading 
means that we can focus our reading of the text around Encolpius himself, and read 
the text as a series of individualised adventures, linked by some overlapping 
characters.110 Encolpius’ masochism is key to this kind of reading. The qualities that 
mark him as a masochist – his submissive nature, his uncontrollable emotions, and his 
tendency to dramatise – are the qualities that allow him to facilitate and perpetuate the 
meandering and sometimes cyclical elements of the text (Knight 1989, 348). 
Returning briefly to the Quartilla episode that I examined in the earlier chapter, the 
longevity of that scene, fragmentary as it is, is primarily because of Encolpius’ 
submission to Quartilla’s control. His unwillingness, or inability, to take proactive 
action against Quartilla and her cohort, his melodramatic reactions and vacillating 
mood, ensures that the misadventure continues for the duration of the night.  
Fundamentally, all of Encolpius’ actions and decisions are motivated by his 
emotions, and consequently his behaviour is almost always out of control, allowing 
him to be suggestible and thus easily controlled. Encolpius rarely considers a 
decision: he reacts passionately to events, and typically these reactions become more 
and more grandiose as one passionate decision influences the next. To this end, his 
personality and his emotional state are tenuous; he lives at the mercy of his emotions 
(Conte 1996, 157). Encolpius rarely remains content, but on the other hand also rarely 
remains unhappy; he is interchangeable rather than constant, and turbulent rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Wicks (1989, 314) discusses that this kind of discontinuity can occur within the picaresque form: 
‘The narrative discontinuity or breaking of normative narrative rhythms is formally suited to the 
mimesis of chaos, nightmare, and outsiderdom; it reflects the continuous disintegration and 
disorientation that are seminal to the picaresque situation.’ This chapter embraces recognition of 
picaresque elements in the Satyricon, but rather than seeing them as a full answer to the question of 
genre, rather sees them as one of the cumulative elements that creates the hybrid nature of the 
Satyricon. Wicks’ observation highlights some of the elements that are critical in prolonging and 
energising the Satyricon’s narrative. As I will illustrate, Encolpius’ chaotic nature is critical to the 
continuing discontinuity of the text.  
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tranquil, meaning that because by his very nature he vacillates, he rarely maintains the 
same emotional state for any length of time (Sullivan 1966, 119).  
This kind of behaviour occurs throughout the text: the controlling character 
may change from episode to episode, but Encolpius’ overreactions and histrionics 
remain consistent. Encolpius’ lack of insight allows characters to remain in the story 
for longer, or to move the narrative laterally, rather than forwards. 111  While 
Eumolpus’ attachment to Encolpius and Giton is an example of the former, a good 
example of the latter comes at the beginning of the text, when Encolpius attempts to 
return home to his lodgings: he has no memory of the right way to go and is unable to 
complete even this simple task (6). Unable to assist himself, he wanders aimlessly in 
circles, returning constantly to the same place, until eventually he asks an old lady 
selling vegetables if she knows where he lives (7).112 When the lady says she can take 
him there without a problem, Encolpius is not surprised, but rather simply thinks her 
uncanny, and is then shocked when shortly afterwards they arrive at a brothel. 
Encolpius reacts rather than thinks: he does not consider his decisions or show any 
kind of foresight or hindsight (Wicks 1989, 312); he seemingly has no goals, nor any 
kind of momentum, and simply behaves however the moment takes him (Zeitlin 
1971, 683). This facilitates the anecdotal epic structure, because Encolpius as a 
character exists anecdotally, repeatedly, and apparently without purpose, and it seems 
unlikely that he could achieve any kind of purpose or goal even if he were to 
particularly desire one. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Richlin (1983, 190) aptly describes Encolpius as a ‘butt, endlessly experiencing humiliation only to 
be revived again for more of the same.’ Encolpius is inescapably passive, and thus characters can 
repeatedly take advantage of him.  
112 Wicks (1989, 312) argues that: ‘This preposterous question shifts the whole fictional world of the 
Satyricon into a disorientation from which it will never recover.’ I disagree that this question shifts the 
fictional world, as this suggests that the text was on solid footing before this point, but this kind of 
incredible gullibility is illustrative of the chaotic and nonsensical way in which Encolpius exists.     
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 Schmeling (1991, 371) argues that Petronius’ overall purpose was to create the 
Satyricon as an episodic text, and that even if the text were not fragmentary, it would 
still read in this individualised and episodic way. He argues that Petronius wanted to 
engage in an epic-type text, in terms of geography and length, in order to invert and 
parody the epic style. Schmeling (1991, 359) suggests that the episodes of the 
Satyricon revolve around a series of peripeteia, so that Petronius can focus on the 
‘crises in mediis rebus’. In this way, Encolpius is an ideal catalyst for sudden shifts in 
the mood of an episode, or the way in which events unfold, because he is an 
unpredictable and vertiginous character.  
An incident at the end of the Cena metaphorically illustrates this desire to 
focus on the incidental, fleeting events of the plot, rather than seeking some kind of 
plot resolution. When Encolpius, Ascyltus and Giton attempt to escape from the 
dinner, they encounter several obstacles: firstly, Ascyltus is frightened by a dog (72) – 
an actual dog this time, in contrast with Encolpius’ incident with the mural on their 
way in (29) – and falls into a fishpond. Encolpius attempts to help him, but is too 
drunk to be of much use, and ends up falling into the pond with him. A porter then 
comes to try and assist them, who tells them that no one can enter through the same 
door that they entered (alia intrant, alia exeunt). While Courtney (2001, 117), inter 
alios, draws attention to the Virgilian connection here, and the descent to the 
underworld in Aeneid book 6, the other point to be made here is that there are no open 
and shut endings in the Satyricon: the path of Encolpius to escape Trimalchio must be 
as convoluted as the plot itself; nor is Petronius ready to end the episode at this point, 
so by complicating the exit strategy of the protagonists, who are too muddled and 
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ineffectual to effect their own egress,113 he extends the episode, which eventually 
culminates in the gauche and bizarre mock funeral for Trimalchio (78).  
Schmeling (1991, 375) argues that Petronius wrote the episodes of the 
Satyricon for a group recitation of some sort, which explains why they can be read 
episodically rather than cumulatively, and also explains the variety of scenes, 
locations, and genres that appear.114 He argues that the Cena is in the style of a 
symposium, which in part is a natural explanation for the way the narrative is passed 
around between characters. Certainly, Habinnas’ late entry (65), and its resemblance 
to the entrance of Alcibiades in the Symposium (216d) invites the reader to recall 
Plato (Cameron 1969, 367-368).115  
If Schmeling is right that each episode loosely embraces a particular genre, 
then it becomes even more clear why Encolpius is the ideal fit for such a confection 
of episodes. Zeitlin (1971, 683) states that Encolpius ‘has no past or future, no 
destination or purpose’, which makes him an effective central character for a text that 
has no desire to reach a particular purpose, or to be introspective.116 We can take this 
point even further than that, though: Encolpius’ behaviour, tied as it is to his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Conte (1996, 125) points out that ‘the scholastici of the Satyricon… are really powerless victims of 
the aggression which the world of the freedmen commits against them.’ While Conte’s point is made 
out through a variety of incidents in the Satyricon, it is here that we can clearly see how much 
Encolpius, Ascyltus, and Giton are subdued and oppressed within Trimalchio’s domain. 
114  Hägg (1983) likewise points out that the Satyricon demonstrates Petronius’ ‘artistic talent, 
demonstrating his keen eye for human weaknesses and exploring his facility for widely different styles.’  
115 Cameron states that, with this allusion, Petronius is not mocking Plato: ‘He was writing for men as 
well read and as alert as himself, men who would see at once the absurdity of and the skill of making 
the vulgar Habinnas play the role of the aristocratic and romantic Alcibiades. Once more Petronius 
casts an absurdly unheroic character in the part of a figure from serious literature.’ As Cameron points 
out, this aggrandizing of pathetic and morally bankrupt characters occurs throughout the text. 
Encolpius, as we have seen, frequently likens himself to a Homeric or Virgilian hero; and, of course, 
during the Pergamum boy episode, Eumolpus was cast as a kind of depraved and morally bankrupt 
Socrates.  
116 Anderson (1982, 99-100) discusses Petronius’ use of satire and social commentary, arguing that his 
choice of style (or styles) is more convenience than principle: ‘He had after all to keep the narrative 
going in something, without necessarily setting out to advocate it… The fact that Petronius ridicules 
extremes of style, high and low, may be due to the fact that they are easy to ridicule, rather than that he 
approves of the means required to frame and offset them.’ I agree with this point, which marries well 
with Hägg’s point about the Satyricon illustrating Petronius’ prowess for a variety of genres. Encolpius 
as a character is almost like a blank canvas, through which Petronius can show his versatility.  
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masochistic psychology, makes him malleable, so that he can be shifted from genre to 
genre without seeming out of place,117 by virtue of the fact that his behaviour and 
mannerisms are always constantly egregious, and thus in a sense he is always out of 
place. Zeitlin is right to say that Encolpius has no purpose, but even more than that he 
has no real sense of self. He is parrot-like in his behaviour and speech, meaning that 
he can be manipulated into a variety of situations, and, by extension, a variety of 
genres.  
George (1966, 350) notes that Encolpius frequently mirrors the speech of 
whomever he is with, and arguably that is one of the ways that Encolpius migrates 
from episode to episode, and genre to genre. The controlling character shifts – 
Quartilla, Trimalchio, Eumolpus – and Encolpius shifts with them. This lack of a real 
sense of self is a feature of the masochistic persona broadly. As Charme (1983, 222) 
argues: ‘The masochist regards the other person as an ideal self (ego-ideal). He lacks 
any sense of his own self’s independence and autonomy.’ While Charme argues this 
specifically in relation to masochism as a distortion of love, I believe that in the case 
of Encolpius we can apply this more generally. As Encolpius is a character who so 
easily and repeatedly surrenders control, it is arguable that he frequently loses any 
sense of self as he ricochets from moment to moment. 
Knight (1989, 343) recognises this lack of a sense of self in both Encolpius 
and Trimalchio: ‘There is no real self because the ostentatious self never ends. 
Trimalchio is entrapped by a language which he has generated but can no longer 
control… Like Trimalchio, Encolpius is the extreme embodiment of existential man, 
for whom reality is the product of day-by-day, moment-by-moment creation.’ Though 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 George (1966, 358) comments that: ‘Encolpius and Giton are propelled from one crisis to the next, 
not because they are pursuing some quest like the conventional romance hero, but because they are 
totally vulnerable to the scheming of others.’ I would argue that for the same reason that they are easily 
propelled between crises also makes them the ideal characters to shift between different generic 
structures. 
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Knight’s point about the ‘ostentatious self’ refers specifically to Trimalchio, it could 
also easily be applied to Encolpius, a character who exists predominantly through 
histrionics, and in whom it is difficult to identify any kind of constancy or character 
beyond his ostentatious and melodramatic speech and action (Konstan 1994, 117). 
Examining the interrelation between Encolpius’ masochism and his unreliable 
narration is useful for appreciating the episodic structure of the text, and informs our 
examination of Encolpius’ masochism at work within the Cena. I return here to 
Phelan and Martin’s six types of unreliable narration – misreporting, misreading, 
misevaluating, underreporting, underreading, and underregarding –  which I examined 
in part in the previous Sadean chapter. Encolpius exemplifies all six of these types of 
unreliable narration, to greater or less degrees, which are borne out by his masochistic 
nature. It is useful to bear these in mind as we move through the remainder of this 
chapter.   
We can now look at more specific examples of Encolpius’ masochistic 
unreliability throughout the Cena, which in turn will show how his behaviour enables 
the narrative to unfold as it does. Predominantly, speech in the Cena is reported 
directly by Encolpius, which gives the reader relatively unhindered access to 
Trimalchio and the other diners (Laird 1999, 217), rather than the information being 
interpreted and filtered through Encolpius. It also reveals Encolpius’ unreliability, 
because it highlights the stark difference between pretence and reality, and how taken 
in by it Encolpius is (Bartsch 1994, 198), making him susceptible to misreporting and 
underreporting.  
 Particularly, there is a difference between how Encolpius perceives what is 
happening around him, compared to the other diners: while Encolpius initially takes 
Trimalchio at his word, the more seasoned diners are more circumspect, and know to 
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be on the lookout for tricks (Knight 1989, 342). For example, when the wooden hen is 
brought out, Trimalchio states:  
 
Amici… pavonis ova gallinae iussi supponi. Et mehercules timeo ne 
iam concepti sint; temptemus tamen, si adhuc sorbilia sunt. (33) 
 
Friends, I ordered the bird to sit on some hens’ eggs. And damnit I’m 
worried they’re about to hatch. But let’s give it a go, and see if we can 
suck them up. 
 
Encolpius, believing Trimalchio’s anxiety about the state of the food, observes that he 
nearly threw his away, because it seemed to be already formed, but then hears a vetus 
conviva observe that there should be something good hiding inside (hic nescio quid 
boni debet esse), at which point he digs around and finds the figpecker within (33). At 
this early point in the meal, we could give Encolpius the benefit of the doubt and 
argue that he has not had the exposure to Trimalchio to appreciate his tricks, at least 
not in the way that the more experienced diners have (Bodel 1999, 86).118 However, at 
a much later point in the dinner, a dish is set down that Trimalchio explains is made 
entirely from one thing (uno corpore est factum, 69). Encolpius, curiously styling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Bodel observes that: ‘Trimalchio has perfected his tricks at feast after feast, so that the veteran 
guests know to look beyond the outward appearance of things, to find the treats or tricks they hold.’ 
Encolpius’ gullibility, and his tendency to react without thinking, make this kind of investigation a 
difficult task for him.  
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himself as prudentissimus,119 begins to comment to Agamemnon that it is most likely 
imitation food, made from wax or even mud. Trimalchio then interrupts Encolpius’ 
musings to explain that the dish is made entirely from pork (70). Here is an example 
of Encolpius both misreading and underreading. He has partially adapted to the 
Trimalchian experience, to the point that he suspects something is at work here, but 
he lacks the ability to perceive fully what is happening (Slater 1990, 75). The reason 
that he suspects mud or wax is because he has seen it done before at Saturnalias in 
Rome (69). That is, Encolpius cannot use his own powers of deduction to speculate 
on what the dish might be made from, but rather plucks someone else’s idea from his 
memory and assumes that it must be correct.  
This inability to exercise powers of perception stems from the same roadblock 
to Encolpius’ role-playing ability: his masochistic persona. As section one explored, 
Encolpius’ masochism wreaks havoc with his ability to interpret and to think 
rationally, and, by extension of that, his ability to exercise judgment. While elsewhere 
in the Satyricon Encolpius fails to make emotional and moral judgments – about 
Giton, Eumolpus, and the like – in the Cena Encolpius is predominantly required to 
make judgments about his environment and the people in it, and he does not have the 
intuitive capabilities or temperament not only to interpret what is happening, but to 
exercise those skills fully (Knight 1989, 347). 
That is, as the previous example shows, even when Encolpius tries to interpret 
what is happening around him, he cannot fully appreciate it. This is a central facet of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 I would argue that the appellation Encolpius gives to himself here comes under the umbrella of the 
‘mythomania’ that I explored in the earlier Satyricon chapter, where Encolpius sees himself in these 
roles, which enables him to attach a greater sense of importance to his own existence. Conte (1996, 130) 
believes that Encolpius and company enter this dinner with the plan of flaunting their intellectual 
superiority, in the same vein as Horace’s satire about Nasideinus’ dinner party (2.8): ‘But unfortunately 
for them, Petronius has not allowed Encolpius and his companions to be like Fundanius, Varius and 
Viscus. He has made them feeble, enclosed in their pretentious but ineffectual scholasticism; he has 
made them victims of the overwhelming vulgarity of Trimalchio’s world.’ I agree with this point, and I 
think that here prudentissimus is Encolpius’ attempt to try and gain the higher ground, but once again 
failing.  
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reading an episodic structure within the Satyricon, that Encolpius’ masochistic 
gullibility, incredulity, and irrationality extends scenes longer than a more balanced or 
assertive narrator arguably would.120 Trimalchio could reveal dish after dish, and 
Encolpius would continually be surprised and dazzled. 121  Even as he becomes 
increasingly less comfortable, and starts to resent the events around him, or to feel 
stifled by Trimalchio’s contrivances, Encolpius remains, held in a kind of 
overwhelmed stasis, and the narrative continues on.  
Before examining the final point concerning the collection of smaller narrative 
episodes that Encolpius’ passivity enables within the Cena, there is one final instance 
of unreliable narration to consider, which is Encolpius’ failure to recognise the vast 
differences in intellect and class between himself and Trimalchio and company. This 
is predominantly a combination of misevaluating, underreading, and underregarding. 
Encolpius theoretically has all the tools at his disposal to recognise that the people he 
dines amongst are not educated men, but boorish freedmen.122 However, he is so 
overwhelmed by his environment, and so susceptible to Trimalchio’s control, that he 
fails to make this ethical judgment, and, when he does make minor observations, he is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Knight (1989, 336) addresses this point: ‘Encolpius is an inconsistent and unreliable narrator, but it 
is hard to imagine how a trustworthy one could relate such diverse and disjointed matter.’ Taking this 
point with Rimell’s below, Encolpius’ incompetence is critical to both the style, longevity, and 
substance of the episode.  
121 Rimell (2002, 44) states that: ‘We laugh at Encolpius’ failure to learn the language of Trimalchio’s 
culinary representations because the alternative, his successful interpretation of each scene, would 
seem as inappropriate and unfunny as giving the correct answer to a joke. The comedy of the Satyricon 
relies on this fictional limitation of perspective.’ I agree with Rimell’s point here; not only is Encolpius’ 
gullibility (and masochism) key to the comedy of the Cena, but also to its longevity: were Encolpius to 
react cynically and snidely to every moment Trimalchio creates, the interplay between buffoonish 
idiocy (Trimalchio) and gullible confusion (Encolpius) could not repeatedly occur, and one imagines 
that the cynical Encolpius, fed up, would simply get up and leave.  
122 Bodel (1994, 243) reads the Cena as a catabasis, framing Trimalchio’s home as a mausoleum. He 
argues that: ‘As uninvited guests, Encolpius and his companions come to the banquet as umbrae…’ and 
(p. 251) ‘…posing as freeborn scholastici, declamation buffs (10.6), or, in Giton’s case, a slave, are 
outsiders to this cultural milieu. That is why Petronius can represent their visit to Trimalchio’s home as 
a catabasis: the underworld into which they have stumbled is an underworld defined by civil status, an 
underworld of freedmen.’ I find the idea of Encolpius as an umbra particularly intriguing, particularly 
when considered in the context of his lack of animation or awareness shown throughout this scene.   
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unable to cumulatively consider these and pursue them to their logical conclusion.123 
In this way, the colloquial Latin of the freedmen is extremely useful to the reader, 
because it enables us to bypass Encolpius’ failings and consider the diners in their 
own right.  
As the opening of the Satyricon illustrates, along with his speech throughout 
the text, Encolpius is an educated man (Rankin, 1971, 19). He stands on the steps 
outside the colonnade, railing against the vacuous natures of schools and the ‘bloated’ 
language of orators, complaining about the role of teachers, who have allowed such 
language to become rife; yet even as he complains about this, he mimics the language 
of those he complains against, which is an immediate introduction to Encolpius’ 
contradictory nature (Rimell 2002, 19-20). Thus, there is one thing that we should be 
able to assume Encolpius will know and appreciate when he walks into Trimalchio’s 
dining room, and that is that the people he dines amongst – including, of course, 
Trimalchio – are not educated, aristocratic people (Schraidt 1939, 156-157). 
However, as he enters the dining room in such a state of agitation following the caue 
canem incident (24), and as he is so taken in by the many sights and spectacles within 
Trimalchio’s dining room, Encolpius’ already limited judgment is further impeded. 
Trimalchio’s dining room is garish, vociferous, dazzling, creating a cacophony of 
experiences and atmospheres that are bound to agitate somebody like Encolpius, who 
has difficulty separating even banal sensory experiences, let alone extravagant ones 
such as this (Slater 1990, 84).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Conte (1996, 125-126) discusses the intentions of Encolpius and company going into the dinner, as I 
have touched on earlier: ‘…they went to dinner confident of their assumed superiority (10.6 tamquam 
scholastici ad cenam promisimus)… caught in the dense net of money and food which Trimalchio and 
his cronies threw around them, the scholastici seem at first embarrassed, then downright terrified; the 
tyranny of the host keeps them passive.’ Encolpius may have gone into the dinner under the impression 
that he could steal the limelight, as he is want to try to do elsewhere in the text, but he never has the 
opportunity or ability to take that spotlight from Trimalchio and the other diners. In fact, he becomes so 
overwhelmed that he often seems to forget that he even is intellectually superior to the men around him.  
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If we return to Jones’ point concerning masochistic agency (2000, 204), and 
that a masochist must have a certain amount of agency that can be surrendered, the 
focal point for Encolpius’ agency arguably is his education. This is particularly 
pertinent to reading the Cena, which should be where Encolpius’ superior intellect 
shines through, compared with the freedmen that he dines with. Instead, he surrenders 
his agency to the experience, and in some ways shows himself to be less intelligent 
than some of the other diners, given how often he misunderstands (and in turn 
misreports) what is happening around him. 
As the meal continues, Encolpius finds himself continually unable to make 
sense of what he sees. He uses his neighbour almost as an interpreter, asking him 
about the meaning behind Trimalchio’s repeated cries of “Carpe, Carpe”, the carver 
whose name is also Carpus (36); and about the identity of Fortunata, whom he has 
noticed running around the place; and, finally, asks his neighbour why the pig was 
wearing a freedman’s cap (41). After his neighbour scornfully explains the 
freedman’s cap, Encolpius curses his own stupidity and decides not to ask anything 
further, lest he look like someone who had never dined in decent company (inter 
honestos), once again failing to recognise that he is not amongst decent company. For 
Encolpius, his neighbour takes on the role of a sage advisor, and appears to illustrate 
greater intelligence than Encolpius himself, and the distinction between knowledge 
and experience becomes unclear.  
At a very early stage Encolpius observes, ‘…pantomimi chorum, non patris 
familiae triclinium crederes’ (31); what Encolpius fails to realise then, and seemingly 
continues to fail to realise throughout the dinner, is that it is more akin to a 
pantomime, a confection of sounds, sights, and experiences designed by a uneducated 
and bumptious man, for the purpose of showing off his immense wealth, and preening 
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in front of his guests (Saylor 1987, 595). Encolpius is entirely taken in by Trimalchio, 
and in some ways that may be not only because of Encolpius’ susceptibility, but 
because Trimalchio represents what Encolpius would like to be – not necessarily due 
to his wealth, which does not seem to capture Encolpius’ attention in the same way 
that it would, say, Eumolpus – but rather the ability and the power to command the 
attention of the entire room, to impress and astonish them, and to be able to make a 
scene whenever he wants, and about whatever he wants (Häag 1983, 168).  
More specifically than the tenor of the room as a whole, in Trimalchio’s 
speech there are a myriad of errors that Encolpius narrates, but does not comment on. 
This is an instance of underregarding, where Encolpius has all the information to 
make an ethical judgment, but cannot quite synthesise the facts in front of him to their 
logical conclusion, in order to make a judgment. This stems from Encolpius 
surrendering his intellectual agency to the communal experience. Encolpius largely 
fails to notice or comment when Trimalchio mentions that Cassandra killed her sons, 
and that Daedalus shut Niobe in the Trojan horse (52).124 Shortly after that, when 
Encolpius sees Fortunata whispering to Trimalchio, he assumes she is telling him not 
to dance, as such low fooling does not suit his dignity (52); a curious assumption, 
given that neither Fortunata or Trimalchio had behaved with much dignity up to this 
point, nor indeed do they beyond it. Trimalchio’s language is also peppered with 
errors and clichés, for example, fatus instead of fatum, caelus instead of caelum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Walsh (1970, 125-128) discusses the myriad of errors that Trimalchio makes: ‘The egregious errors 
are only part of the point. Petronius makes much play also with Trimalchio’s baffling changes of 
conversational direction.’ These sharp and often apparently unrelated shifts are facilitated by Encolpius, 
who does not interrupt his report of Trimalchio’s speech to comment on, or even observe, Trimalchio’s 
collection of errors.  
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(Slater 1990, 148);125 Courtney (2001, 94) notes that Trimalchio’s speech is full of 
Grecisms and hyperurbanisms, which Encolpius does not appear to notice.126   
 Encolpius’ unreliable narration coalesces with his masochism when he makes 
a conscious decision to disengage, to stop asking questions, and to submit to the 
experience of being at Trimalchio’s table. Encolpius’ passivity enables the narrative 
of this episode to be controlled essentially by others: when Encolpius makes his 
decision to be quiet he stops even passing much comment on what happens around 
him, and instead just narrates the words and actions of others. Laird (1999, 217) 
defines the difference between Encolpius as an observer, and Encolpius as a 
participant, as a ‘transparent narrator’ and an ‘agent narrator’; that is, when Encolpius 
simply relates the details of others, he is acting transparently, and when acting as an 
agent he is actively participating. Thus, it in his role as an agent narrator that 
Encolpius is at his most unreliable, as we have seen, and primarily it is when he is 
being a transparent narrator that we are able to analyse the other characters, 
predominantly without Encolpius’ intervention.  
This transparent narration allows a series of anecdotes to be related, and the 
Cena becomes almost a series of mini-episodes within the one over-arching episode, 
which is representative of the Satyricon’s structure as a whole. Various stories are 
exchanged, and while often they seem to have little immediate relevance to what is 
happening at the time, they are told to increase the entertainment experience that 
Trimalchio seeks to create. Niceros’ werewolf tale, for example, is told because 
Trimalchio asks him to do him a favour, in order to make Trimalchio happy (61). And 
as far as Trimalchio is concerned, if he is pleased and entertained, then his guests will 
be similarly pleased and entertained. In turn, Trimalchio answers Niceros’ story with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Slater observes that these illustrate the infrequent use of the neuter in colloquial Latin.  
126 See Boyce (1991, 99-102) for specific discussion of Trimalchio’s use of hypercorrections.  
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his own tale (self-described as asinus in tegulis) about midnight hags (63), which 
Encolpius globally declares a resounding success, ‘miramur nos et pariter credimus’ 
(64).  
Reading the Satyricon involves repositioning the markers by which texts are 
commonly read. The narrative does not push the plot forward so much as it expands 
sideways: the episodes introduce new characters, we learn more about them and can 
perhaps add to our knowledge base as to what has happened to Encolpius in the past, 
but they do not necessarily push the story towards reconciliation or closure. The 
Satyricon lacks narrative milestones, such as moments of adversity from which the 
character can learn and grow; no opportunities to show their mettle or to prove 
themselves and grow as characters; and there are no points where a moral is offered 
which may reflect on the character or the story as a whole. Rather, the Satyricon 
offers us a series of memorable anecdotes by which to understand the world of the 
text and its inhabitants; stories are told for enjoyment or to illustrate wit and 
intelligence, such as Habinnas’ werewolf story or Eumolpus’ story of the Wife of 
Ephesus; the text delights in the transmission of itself, in exploring what happens 
between A and B, rather than the purpose for getting there at all.  
Thus, we can see that there are several ways in which Encolpius’ masochism 
impacts on the transmission of the Cena to the reader. Firstly, Encolpius, as the 
susceptible and overly emotional masochist, misinterprets, misreads and 
misunderstands what is happening around him. He conveys the atmosphere of the 
room and experiences of the diners as a communal experience, when in fact they are 
more appropriately the individual reactions of Encolpius himself. The second way in 
which Encolpius’ masochism affects our reading of the Cena is when Encolpius 
submits to the Trimalchian experience, becoming silent and almost akin to a third-
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person narrator.127 The reader’s access to Trimalchio and company opens up at this 
point, as we are granted relatively unhindered and unfiltered access to their speech. 
An episodic reading of the text embraces Encolpius’ unreliability, and shows that it is 
Encolpius’ masochistic persona that enables the meandering path of the narrative as a 
whole.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 George (1966, 358) notes that: ‘The passivity of Encolpius is also useful to Petronius, in that it 
means that Encolpius can be a spectator when required (e.g., during the greater part of Trimalchio’s 
dinner) without disrupting the course of events or forcing his view of them upon the reader.’ When 
Encolpius laps into reported speech in this way, it is almost as though he ceases to be a first-person 
narrator, and instead allows other characters to control the narrative. 
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Catullus: the masochistic contract 
 
 The previous Catullus chapter explored how Catullus’ masochistic persona is 
integral to the world that Catullus created for himself and Lesbia; this chapter will 
examine the power structure embedded within that construct via the scheme of the 
masochistic contract. While the masochistic contract requires a physical document to 
be drawn up and signed by both parties, as is the case in Venus in Furs, and no such 
document exists in Catullus, the lens of the masochistic contract – the mechanics and 
foundations behind it – offers a useful reflection on the tautological nature of 
Catullus’ perception of his own suffering. The masochistic contract works on two 
levels: the perspective of the masochist, and what Nacht (1995, 19) calls the ‘eyes of 
the beholder’, that is the exterior perspective. Smirnoff (1995, 65) argues that while 
notionally the dynamic between a masochist and a dominant partner (whom he calls 
the executioner) places all the power with the executioner, who causes the suffering 
of the masochist, in reality all the power lies (unconsciously) with the masochist, who 
demands suffering from the executioner, and sets the parameters of that suffering. The 
masochist sees only their side of the contract, that is that they are powerless and are 
being tortured by the executioner. The exterior perspective shows the pressure that the 
masochist places on the executioner, and how ultimately this renders the executioner 
the powerless employee of the masochist. In this chapter I outline the masochist’s 
perception of the contract, apply this to Catullus, and examine how this manifests in 
his perception of his relationship with Lesbia. Then I will outline the exterior 
perspective of the contract, and how ultimately the incompatibility between the two 
perspectives reveals Catullus as a biased narrator. Read from the exterior perspective, 
Catullus unknowingly but deliberately places Lesbia as the agent of his suffering, and 
perpetuates that suffering by holding her to a standard that she cannot meet. 
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Consequently, because Catullus tells his story only from the masochist’s perspective, 
he relates their story in a way that is coloured by his masochistic perception, and by 
his biased view of his relationship with Lesbia. That is, Catullus’ masochistic 
victimisation of himself creates and directs the narrative. He notionally presents a 
narrative that explains his predicament, and seeks to be rid of it, but which in fact 
perpetuates it. Catullus presents his genuine perception of his relationship with 
Lesbia, but because of his masochistic nature, that perception is biased. This chapter 
examines how Catullus pushes the reader towards a particular reading of Lesbia, one 
that encourages the reader to sympathise with Catullus, and to spurn Lesbia’s attempts 
to ingratiate herself to Catullus, and in turn the reader. 
I begin by outlining my strategy for reading narration within Catullus’ poetry. 
Once again, as in the previous chapter, I focus my reading on the Catullan persona as 
a character, and read the Lesbia poems as a narrative arc. In this regard, I adopt 
Fludernik’s experience-based view of narrativity (1996, 26), which proposes a 
narrative that does not necessarily move sequentially, but is united by emotion and 
experience: ‘narrativity is a function of narrative texts and centres on experientiality 
of an anthromorphic nature.’128 The story of the Catullan persona invites the reader to 
identify with the emotions that Lesbia causes him. These feelings are vividly exposed, 
and are designed to lead the reader towards a sympathetic response to Catullus’ 
narrative. In this regard, Pedrick (1986, 187-88) argues that Catullan poetry is 
‘striking in its eagerness not simply to engage readers but actually to control their 
reactions to the text and hence, their understanding of it.’ I point this out because it is 
central to my masochistic reading of Catullus’ poetry. “Catullus” wants the reader to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Fludernik (1996, 354) notes elsewhere that: ‘some poems describe a poetic persona’s perceptions… 
thus rendering the text equivalent to an in nuce first-person narrative… Poems can also depict a 
situation involving specific characters at a specific point in time, and they may additionally employ a 
great deal of descriptive realism.’ Arguably, this is why Catullus’ Lesbia poems of themselves 
constitute a narrative arc, and the Catullan persona’s telling of their story constitutes narration.  
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see his victimisation, and to recognise the pain that Lesbia has caused him. I do not 
suggest that a reader must believe everything that “Catullus” says about himself or 
Lesbia. Both Skinner (2003, xxxiii) and Hinds (1998, 46-47) point out that no single 
reader will interpret textual and intertextual information in exactly the same way, and 
I adopt this point. My analysis will focus on how the dynamic Catullus constructs 
lends itself to a masochistic reading, without presuming this as the only reading. 
My central goal here is to identify the impact that Catullus’ masochism has on 
the narrative, by interrogating the biased perspective that his masochism has in 
creating it. As Fludernik (1996, 29) observes: ‘Human experience typically embraces 
goal-oriented behaviour and activity, with its reaction to obstacles encountered on the 
way… All experience is therefore stored as emotionally charged remembrance, and it 
is reproduced in narrative form because it was memorable, funny, scary, or exciting.’ 
Because Catullus’ narrative is emotionally charged, and much of that emotion stems 
from his masochistic persona, his narrative is skewed, justified as it is by the 
emotional tropes stemming from his masochism. I explore how that bias manifests 
through the masochistic contract, particularly the expectations that it puts on Lesbia.  
The masochistic contract represents the premise behind the masochistic 
relationship, and is built on the relationship between a masochist and a love object 
(Smirnoff 1995, 70), rather than more broadly within all masochistic interactions. A 
clear example of the contract appears in Sacher-Masoch’s Venus in Furs, where 
Severin and Wanda sign a document that stipulates the terms of their sadomasochistic 
relationship: “She had drawn up a contract according to which I gave my word of 
honour and agree under oath to be slave, as long as she wishes…” (53) Though they 
do not sign the contract, its content and significance influences much of what happens 
subsequently within the text. From Severin’s perspective, he is entirely beholden to 
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Wanda, and powerless to alter her behaviour (Wilke 1998, 250). Wanda, conversely, 
is compelled to live up to the expectations that Severin puts on her. 
It is the premise behind the contract that is particularly relevant to reading 
Catullus. Deleuze (1989, 126) argues that by means of the masochistic contract, ‘the 
woman is like the absolute prince who retains and multiplies his rights, while the 
masochist is like her subject who effectively loses his own.’ That is, the masochist 
perceives their power to have been given over to the executioner. 129  This is 
comparable to Catullus purposefully surrendering his patriarchal powers to Lesbia, 
which I explored in the earlier Catullus chapter. Catullus moves himself and Lesbia 
out of the traditional Roman social structure, effectively creating a power structure 
with Lesbia at its apex. As we have seen, there are consequences for this action as the 
relationship between Catullus and Lesbia continues. He has removed their 
relationship from Rome, and its associated social rules and mores, but in doing so he 
has taken away his own powers as a Roman man. That is why in poems 11 and 58, for 
example, we see Catullus trying to recoup some of what he has lost. Catullus here is 
trying to recoup the power that he thinks that he has lost by means of sacrificing his 
patriarchal rights to Lesbia. Ultimately, his attempts to reintroduce Roman values 
fails, because he still feels that he is powerless, and that he is unable to reclaim that 
power back for himself. Later in this chapter I will explore how this comes through 
clearly in poem 76, where Catullus begs for someone to take away his love for Lesbia, 
believing that it is beyond his powers alone. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Jones (2000, 204), building on Deleuze’s point, points out that the critical question in this 
construction becomes ‘not whether one occupies a passive relationship to disciplinary authority [here 
Lesbia], but how own came to occupy that position. Masochism demands, as a precondition, a certain 
amount of agency that can be relinquished… It does mean that the masochistic subject must have some 
power – gender, racial or social position… which can be sacrificed.’ The masochist willingly hands 
over power to the executioner, effectively making them wield that power against the masochist. 
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Kazarian (2010, 98) points out that the consequence of the masochistic 
contract is that ‘this contractual liquidation of the patriarchal structure of authority 
will displace the hero and his beloved in relation to the principles according to which 
their subjectivity and their agency have heretofore been constituted, leaving them 
with no structuring instance in these regards except for the fantasy itself.’ Catullus 
rejects the Roman patriarchal structure in poems 5 and 7, when he urges Lesbia to 
disregard the senes and to keep their love as their exclusive secret. From the exterior 
perspective, this gesture is symbolic, but for Catullus it is genuine: he has handed 
over that power to Lesbia. Likewise, we saw some of the ramifications of this 
‘liquidation of the patriarchal structure’ in poems 11 and 58, when Lesbia does not fit 
into Catullus’ idealised fantasy, and Catullus feels emasculated (11.12-24) by Lesbia, 
and in 58 when he lashes out at her infidelity (58.4-5).  
If we return briefly to poems 5 and 7, the poems in which Catullus defines his 
love for Lesbia, the only time Lesbia’s voice is heard in these two poems is her 
reported question of quot basiationes at the very beginning of poem 7.130 Even in this, 
of course, Lesbia’s words are really Catullus’, and the reader can believe or disbelieve 
that they come directly from her. For the purposes of this chapter, I treat Lesbia’s 
words as her words, to analyse the picture of Lesbia that Catullus seeks to convey. 
Elsewhere, Lesbia’s thoughts and feelings are valued and mediated by Catullus. When 
she is allowed “speech” – that is, when Catullus attributes speech to her indirectly – it 
is so he can consider her words and find them wanting. In doing this, Catullus can 
present an image to the reader that shows Lesbia as mendacious and cruel. This is the 
masochistic perspective at work: Catullus seeks to show the reader that he is tortured 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 This is the only time that Lesbia’s “voice” is heard in these defining poems, and as Adler (1981, 134) 
has observed, the act of asking the question at all appears to be an attempt to dampen the passions of 
Catullus. It also arguably indicates a desire to quantify a limit to their relationship, and arguably is an 
indication that Lesbia did not agree to this limitless love that Catullus proposes, through which he 
seeks to bind her.  
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by Lesbia. It is not that he is deliberately portraying Lesbia in a negative way; it is 
that he is presenting to the reader his perception of what Lesbia does to him. He 
believes that this perception of her is correct, and that by illustrating it as such, the 
reader will rightly empathise with him, and with the pain that Lesbia has caused him. 
I now turn to the exterior perspective of the masochistic contract; that is, what 
is happening beyond the narrowed and biased perspective of the masochist alone. This 
is particularly revealing in terms of the power dynamic between the masochist and the 
executioner, and how the executioner is subsequently painted by the masochist. To 
return once more to Smirnoff (1995, 69): ‘the masochist is not seeking to be killed or 
destroyed, but to be branded. Not by the absolute power of the other, but by the 
fictitious power that he himself has bestowed on the executioner: a power that the 
victim has, by way of contract, forced on the executioner, who can exercise it only at 
the victim’s order.’ That is, Catullus may see Lesbia as the cause and root of all his 
suffering, but that power to cause suffering comes ultimately from Catullus. The 
evidence that he gives to the reader of his suffering comes entirely from his own 
construction, and the power that Lesbia notionally wields against him comes from 
Catullus himself. As with his negative portrayal of Lesbia more generally, this 
awareness of the ‘fictitious power’ that he has bestowed on Lesbia is subconscious or 
unconscious: Catullus remains firmly of the opinion that Lesbia is the one that holds 
all the power. It is for this reason that Catullus’ narrative is biased: he turns the 
narrative against Lesbia, without knowing or believing that this is what he is doing. 
Thus, this chapter will read the poems in two ways: from the perspective of Catullus’ 
victimisation, his attempts to garner the reader’s sympathy, and to prove that his 
reading of Lesbia is the correct one; and from the exterior perspective, which will 
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show how Catullus’ fictitious victimisation is entirely his own doing, and how 
ultimately Lesbia is the real victim.  
Catullus has designed his relationship with Lesbia in such a way that her task 
is limitless. She must love him as he loves her, or she is not meeting her side of the 
bargain. When she fails to live up to these limitless expectations, he can turn the 
narrative against her, making her task even more difficult to fulfil. Even when she 
tries to say the right thing (for example, poem 70 and 72), Catullus will step in to 
assure the reader that her words do not meet the standards that he requires, and are 
thus dispositive of her love for him. He creates a narrative that will always be against 
Lesbia, and in favour of himself.131  
 To pursue this idea further, I will now move through several of the Lesbia 
poems, to show how Catullus tries to position the reader to believe his interpretation 
of Lesbia, so that when he tells the reader about the ways that Lesbia mistreats him, 
the reader will sympathise with him, and believe his negative portrayal of Lesbia. 
Catullus needs the reader to believe that his victimisation is real, because that is how 
Catullus himself feels. He, convinced as he is by the dynamic of their relationship, 
wholeheartedly believes that he is her victim. This means that Catullus genuinely 
believes that his understanding of Lesbia is correct, and that he conveys his 
perception of her accurately to the reader. I start with poems 92 and 83, which 
encourage the reader to believe that Catullus understands exactly why Lesbia behaves 
the way that she does.132 If the reader believes what Catullus says in these poems, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Fitzgerald (1995, 135) notes [speaking of poem 109] that ‘the poem does allude to what lies outside 
it, and defines its own discourse against the putative speech of another. Lesbia, fickle and false, plays a 
strategic role in these poems in relation to Catullus the poet, whose extravagances of language we are 
expected to accept just as much as we suspect Lesbia’s.’ Arguably, this reading extends beyond poem 
109, and is true of many of the later Lesbia poems, where she is used to facilitate the image that 
Catullus seeks to build, where his word is far more valuable and dependable than Lesbia’s.  
132 Holoka (1975, 119) points out within these poems ‘we are witnessing a mental event: an act of 
therapeutic self-deception.’ This is certainly right, but the intimate nature of personal poetry means that 
even as he seeks to deceive himself, Catullus tries to draw the reader in with him.  
	   172	  
then arguably the reader is more likely to believe Catullus when he invites the reader 
to disbelieve Lesbia in other poems – 72, for example. Poem 92 is a clear example of 
Catullus trying to convince the reader of the trustworthiness of his version of events, 
passing off his reading of Lesbia to the reader as psychological insight: 
 
Lesbia mi dicit semper male nec tacet unquam 
de me: Lesbia me dispeream nisi amat. 
quo signo? quia sunt totidem mea: deprecor illam 
adsidue, verum dispeream amo. (92) 
 
Lesbia never stops her constant slandering of me,  
but I’ll be damned if Lesbia doesn’t love me.  
How do I know? Because I do it too: I abuse her,  
but I’m damned if I don’t love her. 
 
Feeney (2009, 34-35) identifies this poem as a paradox epigram, which presents the 
paradox in the first couplet, and the question and answer to the paradox in the second 
couplet. Here Catullus attempts to explain away any conflict between him and Lesbia 
by justifying his own behaviour and hers, thus passing on his interpretation of Lesbia 
to the reader. He makes a value judgment about her behaviour, by interrogating his 
own. The mirroring of dispeream nisi amat in line 2, and dispeream nisi amo in line 4 
creates a clear parallel between Catullus and Lesbia, and by extension of that a sense 
of equality between them. Reading this poem in combination with poem 83, wherein 
Catullus mocks Lesbia’s husband for taking delight in her mockery of Catullus, 
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illustrates that Catullus’ reflection in 92 is not a spontaneous rationalisation, but an 
opinion that Catullus has formulated over some period of time:  
 
Lesbia mi praesente viro mala plurima dicit: 
haec illi fatuo maxima laetitia est. 
mule, nihil sentis. si nostri oblita taceret, 
sana esset: nunc quod gannit et obloquitur, 
non solum meminit, sed, quae multa acrior est res, 
irata est: hoc est, uritur et loquitur. (83) 
 
In her husband’s presence, Lesbia says so many  
bad things about me: this gives the fool the greatest joy.  
Mule, you understand nothing! 
If she forgot me and were silent, she would be sound: 
now, because she growls and rails, not only does she remember,  
but, what is far more to the point, she is angry: 
that is, she burns and she speaks. 
 
Here, Catullus explains away Lesbia’s vitriol, and simultaneously casts himself as 
superior to Lesbia’s husband, suggesting that Catullus understands Lesbia as no one 
else does, comparable to the nulla potest mulier tantum se dicere amatam vere, 
quantum a me Lesbia amata mea es (no woman can say truly that she has been loved 
as much as Lesbia has been loved by me) that opens poem 87. Brady (1977, 50) 
argues that the narrator can present distorted information in order to deceive 
themselves, rather than to deliberately misrepresent information: ‘an emotional 
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involvement with another (which we call love) or with oneself (which we call 
narcissism) may produce a distorted view of, and therefore a distorted presentation of, 
reality, thus increasing the unreliability of the narrator, this time not through 
conscious deceit but through unconscious deceit.’ Unconscious deceit is a useful way 
to understand the masochistic psyche as a whole, because the masochist is unaware of 
the limited nature of their perception of the masochistic relationship. Catullus uses 
poems 83 and 92 as a type of self-assurance: he tries to convince himself, and his 
audience, of Lesbia’s attachment to him by reading her behaviour in a positive light, 
and seeing it as a reflection of his own behaviour and feelings. Holoka (1975, 120) 
points out that hoc est particularly speaks to this kind of self-assurance ‘… [it] has the 
ring of nervous assertion… “that’s it” = “that must be it” (“I will not allow myself to 
believe it is otherwise”).’ In a masochistic sense, it is important for Catullus to frame 
Lesbia’s behaviour in a positive light. He cannot fall victim to someone who was not 
convincing to begin with: that is, he – and the reader – must try to see some 
credibility in Lesbia’s behaviour, and in his reception of it.133 Then, when her words 
and actions lose their credibility, Catullus’ victimisation is both believable and 
painful. 
I refer back at this point to Bright’s assessment of Catullus’ myopia, wherein 
Lesbia is held to one standard and he to another (1976, 110). Bright’s point refers to 
Catullus’ characterisation of Lesbia as moecha in poem 11, and indeed Catullus’ 
attacks on Lesbia throughout the poems are predominantly against her infidelity (e.g. 
cum suis moechis, 11.17; glubit magnanimi Remi nepotes, 58.4). As I have mentioned 
earlier, qualities like fides, foedus, and amicitia are given great weight by Catullus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Dettmer (1997, 194) argues that 92 appears to be an intensification of the message that Catullus 
seeks to convey in poem 83, because ‘Catullus claims here that Lesbia is always disparaging him.’ This 
intensification serves to support Catullus’ claims elsewhere to be victimised by Lesbia: she has drawn 
him in by a pattern of increasing and intensifying behaviour, which leads him to believe her love for 
him. 
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and are particularly prominent within the Lesbia poems (Nelis 2012, 10-11).134 
Catullus often responds to perceived breaches of these qualities through invective. 
Lateiner (1977, 25) argues that ‘obscenity is therapeutic because it clarifies Catullus’ 
feelings and grants relief from acute discomfort.’ This is a compelling idea, 
particularly when considered in the context of Catullus using invective to explore and 
elucidate his feelings. In poem 16, for example, Catullus attacks Furius and Aurelius 
(pedicabo vos et irrumabo, 16.1) because they have called him soft. Read in the wake 
of poems 5, 7, and 11, Catullus goes on the offensive and ‘by threatening vigorous 
sexual action he repudiates the suggestion that the slighter amorous action of kissing 
shows his effeminacy’ (Hutchinson 2012, 74). Catullus uses invective as a defensive 
mechanism; he perceives that Furius and Aurelius have abrogated their social 
contract, and he has ‘turned the tables on them’ (Sandy 1971, 52). 
Arguably, in poems 83 and 92 Catullus takes this process of invective 
rationalisation a step further: not only does he attempt to persuade himself, and in turn 
the reader, that Lesbia still loves him, but he seeks to show definite proof of this by 
citing Lesbia’s use of invective, which he then relates back to his own behaviour, and, 
by extension, that Lesbia similarly uses invective as a defence mechanism. Thus, like 
Catullus, Lesbia lashes out defensively; she feels things so deeply (cf. uritur, 83.6) 
that love and hate can become synonymous. Catullus’ susceptibility to buying into his 
own reading of Lesbia is important to the way that he buys into the fictitious power 
that he feels Lesbia possesses, as per the masochistic contract. If Catullus is right that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Nelis notes: ‘Catullus speaks of his erotic relationship with Lesbia as foedus and employs the 
vocabulary of amicitia and urbanitas in describing its course and the social milieu in which it evolves. 
In doing so he is exploiting in highly insightful and complex ways the language and ideology of social 
performance employed by the Roman… Overall, the erotic strain in Catullus’ work should be seen as 
subservient to his broader social and political concerns and the vision of the Roman world he 
constructs.’ I am going to return to how ultimately the notion of foedus fails later in this chapter, in 
examining poem 76, but at this point it is useful to note that it is important for Catullus to lend 
legitimacy to these social concepts within the Lesbia poems, before he can show Lesbia being the 
cause of them falling apart. Poems 83 and 92 in part seek to do that, by notionally showing the 
mirroring or the equality within their relationship. 
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Lesbia uses invective defensively, then he must be right when he believes that she is 
lying to him, and thus is right when he believes she does not love him, and that she 
betrays him.  
Poem 72 is a fruitful starting point for how Catullus’ ‘understanding’ of 
Lesbia influences his narrative, portraying Lesbia as his torturer, and himself as her 
innocent victim. In this poem, and others, Lesbia has breached Catullus’ trust, and 
breached the tenets upon which their relationship is built. In order to show how 
Lesbia has done this, Catullus once again contrasts the two of them, but this time in 
order to show his constancy against Lesbia’s inconstancy.135  
 
Dicebas quondam solum te nosse Catullum, 
Lesbia, nec prae me velle tenere Iovem. 
Dilexi tum te non tantum ut vulgus amicam, 
sed pater ut gnatos diligit et generos. 
nunc te cognovi: quare etsi impensius uror, 
multo mi tamen es vilior et levior. 
qui potis est? inquis. quod amantem iniuria talis 
cogit amare magis, sed bene velle minus. (72) 
 
Once you said that you knew Catullus alone, Lesbia, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 At times Catullus broadens his comparison of the two of them, by bringing into his comparison the 
men that Lesbia seems to prefer to him, to show how he is better than them as well. Poem 83 is an 
example of that, where Catullus positions himself as the man who knows and understands Lesbia, and 
not her husband. Minkova (2002, 260) observes that poems 69 and 71 are intertwined with poems 70 
and 72, and through them Catullus disparages his love rivals: Rufus in 69 and an unnamed man in 71. 
Richlin (1992, 153) notes that through these poems Catullus seeks to victimize the men: ‘Some of the 
victims… are attacked in such a primitive invective that they and their crimes fade into the 
background… The content of these poems amounts to a stream of vituperation and primary obscenities, 
beautifully structured.’ This arguably forms part of the masochistic displacement of responsibility: 
helplessly victimised by Lesbia and unable to escape her, Catullus seeks solace in placing blame on not 
only her, but her lovers, whom he does have the power to lash out at verbally. 
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and that you would not embrace even Jove before me. 
I loved you then, not just as a commoner loves his wife, 
but as a father loves his sons and sons-in-law. 
Now, I know you: so although I burn more,  
for all that, for me you are much cheaper and lighter. 
How is that possible, you ask?  
Because such an injury drives a lover to love more, but to like less. 
.  
Here we have Lesbia’s voice notionally appearing, as Catullus explains to the 
reader what Lesbia has said to him, in an attempt to prove her love. But Catullus 
knows better, and seeks to show this to the reader. ‘Nunc te cognovi’ is critical in this 
regard, because through it Catullus once again asserts his perceptive abilities. 
Arguably, he admits some fallibility, in the sense of the notion of a realisation that is 
built into the expression, but assures the reader that now he understands Lesbia, and 
understands exactly what she is doing to him. The merely carnal nature of Lesbia’s 
love for Catullus is contrasted with the deeper and more binding love that Catullus 
states that he possesses in lines 3 and 4. This juxtaposition is sheeted home by nunc te 
cognovi, where Catullus’ apparent understanding of Lesbia is laid bare: he has 
surrendered everything for her, and this is the best that she can offer, and it is this 
carnal token of affection that makes him realise her fickleness, in comparison to his 
own verisimilitude.  
Catullus’ use of uror in line five is noteworthy: firstly, it carries the sense of 
not only burning with passion, but being entirely consumed by it, once again invoking 
this idea of vesanus Catullus that we saw in poem 7, and thus tapping once again into 
this idea of Catullus’ limitless love for Lesbia, and the masochistic consequences that 
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go along with that. Catullus is being consumed by his love for Lesbia, and by his 
inability to escape that love. Secondly, urere is the same verb that Catullus uses to 
characterise Lesbia in poem 83 (uritur et loquitur, 83.6). There, Lesbia, so consumed 
with her love for Catullus, expressed that love through angry, burning passion; here, 
Catullus uses urere to express how his all-consuming love for Lesbia is becoming 
increasingly more destructive.  
Catullus wants the reader to see Lesbia in the same way that he does: she is 
both vilior and levior, not only because she has betrayed Catullus, but because she is 
inferior to Catullus, which in turn solidifies the notion of being betrayed by Lesbia.136 
She could not commit to the same degree as Catullus, she could not promise him 
truthfully, as he promised her, and thus she is lower and lesser than he (Wray 2001, 
111). Catullus then brings this together in the final line, where he recognises that – 
entirely through Lesbia’s faults, of course – he may not love her less, but he certainly 
likes her less.  
This splitting of amor and amicitia between Catullus and Lesbia creates what 
Miller (2003, 58) calls a ‘schizophrenic text’, identifiable by the impossibility of 
reconciling amor with social obligations such as pietas, officium, amicitia, and fides, 
which I in part discussed in the earlier Catullus chapter in relation to poem 109. As I 
mentioned previously, these are all customs to which Catullus gives primacy, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Gutzwiller (2012, 82) notes that: ‘Catullus, casting himself as the betrayed in both 70 and the 
similar 72 where he names Lesbia as the betrayer… identifies the pathetic first-person voice… as the 
starting point for his self-representation as lover.’ In poem 70, of course, Catullus urges the reader to 
treat Lesbia’s words as worthless, just as he does in poem 72: sed mulier cupido quod dicit amanti in 
vento et rapida scribere oportet aqua (that which a woman says to a desiring lover should be written in 
the wind and fast-running water, 70.3-4). Catullus urges two central points on the reader through this 
appraisal of her words: she betrays him by lying, and she betrays him through adultery. The ‘pathetic 
first-person voice’ that Gutzwiller identifies assists Catullus to portray himself as the helpless victim of 
her betrayal. In this regard Dettmer (1997, 177) notes that in these two poems: ‘Catullus makes quite 
clear that Lesbia’s commitment to him was essentially verbal. Lesbia said what she thought her lover 
wanted to hear.’ Catullus does not leave room to entertain the notion that Lesbia’s words may have had 
some sincerity, because it is only ever Catullus’ words that carry sincerity. When he says that she is 
lying, he should always be preferred. 
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thus, because of their importance to him, he expects them from others and becomes 
easily incensed when he perceives that someone has abrogated their moral 
obligations. This is particularly evident in poems directed towards his friends, such as 
16, 21 and 23. This expectation of reciprocal benefacta is reminiscent of what we saw 
with Justine, who was unable to separate the reality of the libertines from her 
expectation that they would behave with the same Catholic virtues as she did, despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Catullus expects people to behave as he 
wants them to, and as he perceives that he himself does, and is angered and 
disappointed when this does not happen.  
I conclude by examining poem 76, as this is the poem that represents the 
culmination of the various elements of Catullus’ masochistic persona. It is also in this 
poem that the split between Catullus’ perception of his suffering, and the exterior 
perspective of the masochistic contract, becomes clear. Skinner (2003, 74) notes that 
‘the controlling moral term is now pietas’, which is essential to the way the poem is 
framed, encouraging the reader to focus on Catullus’ pietas, as opposed to Lesbia’s 
culpae: 
 
Si qua recordanti benefacta priora voluptas 
est homini, cum se cogitat esse pium, 
nec sanctam violasse fidem, nec foedere in ullo 
divum ad fallendos numine abusum homines, 
multa parata manent in longa aetate, Catulle, 
ex hoc ingrato gaudia amore tibi. (76.1-6)  
 
If there is any pleasure for a man, in recalling former good deeds,  
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when he thinks he has been pious, has not broken a sacred promise, 
nor in any contract abused the gods to fool men,  
then many pleasures wait for you, in this long lifetime,  
Catullus, from this ungrateful love. 
 
Miller (1994, 131-132) argues that it is within poem 76 that Catullus’ attempts 
to recoup public values into a private setting fails: ‘the public meaning of foedus re-
emerges and betrays Catullus’ claim to ethical purity.’ That is, in the process of trying 
to carry over the ethical connotations of foedus into an erotic scenario that does not 
support it, Catullus reveals his own failure. Conte (1994, 40) points out that this 
process of what he calls ‘transmogrification’ does not necessarily fail because the 
public meaning does not carry over, ‘since values – ideas and words – can return only 
if they are susceptible to transformation.’ In poem 109, for example, Catullus tries to 
carry over social and political concepts intrinsic in sanctae foedus amicitiae (109.6). 
Foedus fails in 76 not necessarily because the concepts cannot be transformed, but 
because Catullus fails, because ultimately Catullus is the agent of his own suffering, 
and were he not to fail, he would not be a masochist. Poem 76 is a clear example of 
Catullus’ masochistic passivity at work, compounded by his masochistic displacement 
of responsibility.  
Catullus expresses hope, in the opening lines, that there is some pleasure in 
reviewing past good actions. He points out the various good things that he has done, 
even though Lesbia, seemingly, does not appreciate them (ingrato amore). This is 
Catullan manipulation hard at work: reminding the reader once again of his good 
qualities, compared with Lesbia’s negative qualities, and highlighting his 
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victimisation.137 The reader is invited to empathise with Catullus’ misery, caused 
exclusively by Lesbia. Foedus here fails because the notion of equity or balance that 
is arguably implicit within it does not exist.138 Catullus’ misery is at the expense of 
Lesbia, and she is offered no defence, instead being dismissed as ungrateful and 
unrequited. This is the same kind of masochistic displacement of responsibility that 
we have seen elsewhere: an outright refusal to engage in introspection, and instead 
foisting the blame onto another. Catullus would have the reader believe that the 
equality does not exist because Lesbia has all the power, but the reality is that it is 
Catullus alone who has the power.139 
It is this refusal to take responsibility and to self-interrogate that negates the 
notion of fides that Catullus tries to put forward. Adler (1981, 36) observes that pietas 
fails here because ‘past pietas evidently does not bring present pleasure, for Catullus 
was pius in the past and has no pleasure now.’ I do not disagree with this idea, but I 
do think it can be taken further. Past actions aside, here Catullus outwardly ‘engages’ 
in a reflective process, but that reflective process is constrained to what Lesbia has 
done to him. His consideration of his own behaviour is limited to his admirable past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Dettmer (1997, 179) observes the link between poem 76 and the ‘omnia sunt ingrata’ of 73.3, 
commenting: ‘In both poems, benevolence, again with regard to Lesbia, suffers a fate similar to 
gratitude: all Catullus’ efforts have gone unrewarded.’ This is indeed the message that Catullus tries 
hard to convey, in order to see poem 76 as the poem where Catullus gives up all hope that Lesbia will 
change. Fitzgerald (1995, 127) also comments that: ‘The poem’s audience finds its position defined in 
relation on the one hand to the thankless Lesbia and on the other to the powerful gods.’ In the midst of 
this, Catullus presents himself as the powerless one, trapped between two opposing forces. 
138 Ross (1969, 90) notes that Catullus ‘has portrayed his affair with Lesbia in the terminology of a 
political alliance: it is to be an amicitia, a foedus, based on fides, the concrete expressions of which are 
the mutual benevolentia and benefacta of the two parties… When this relationship is broken, the 
metaphor is shattered by reality.’ While I do not disagree with Ross’ point, I would particularly like to 
focus on the notion of mutual benevolentia and benefacta for the remainder of this chapter, because 
this idea of mutuality is intrinsic to Catullus’ perception of what went wrong with Lesbia, specifically 
that Lesbia did not offer or show it to him. The reader is asked to accept this, despite having no proof 
of either parties’ benefacta or fides, only the words of Catullus himself, which urges us to accept that – 
at its most simplistic level – is good and Lesbia is bad. I reiterate here Fitzgerald’s point (1995, 135) 
that we are supposed to accept Catullus’ ‘extravagances of language’, even as we reject Lesbia’s. 
139 In this regard, Fromm (1941, 161) reflects on the masochistic relationship in this way: ‘Love is 
based on equality and freedom. If it is based on subordination and loss of integrity of one partner, it is 
masochistic dependence, regardless of how the relationship is rationalised.’  
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behaviour (haec a te dictaque factaque sunt). Combining word and action also 
gestures towards the disunity in Lesbia’s behaviour: she may say the right things (e.g. 
70.1-2), but she is lying, because when given the opportunity she will betray him (e.g. 
58.4-5). Catullus, on the other hand, so he would have us believe, both says and does 
the right thing. He is the constant victim of his executioner. 
In the middle of the poem, Catullus tries to exhort himself to give upon Lesbia 
(difficile est longum subito deponere amorem; difficile est, verum hoc qua libet 
efficias, 76.13-14). Ultimately, this is a self-indulgent form of renuntiatio amoris, 
because it is not something that Catullus is actively willing to do for himself,140 
because it is not something that he really wants to do. Successfully giving up on 
Lesbia would end his suffering, and his identity with Lesbia is constructed around his 
suffering. He claims shortly after that he must give up on Lesbia, whether it is 
possible or not (hoc facias, sive id non pote sive pote, 76.16). From the exterior 
perspective of the masochistic contract, it is patently possible, because Catullus’ 
suffering is of his own doing, and comes from himself, not from Lesbia; for Catullus 
himself, he believes it is not possible because Lesbia has rendered him ineffective, 
unable to change the course of his own story. 
Despite his remonstrations, he goes on to ask to be saved, rather than to do it 
himself: 
 
o di, si vestrum est misereri, aut si quibus unquam 
extremam iam ipsa in morte tulistis opem, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Fitzgerald (1995, 126) comments that: ‘Catullus… has not been able to take control of the struggle 
in which he is engaged; he seems to be speaking for his own benefit, summoning up words in the vain 
hope that with them will come, paradoxically, the willpower to stop.’ There are parallels here with the 
same kind of passivity that Catullus showed in poem 8, where he urged himself to forget about Lesbia, 
but ultimately did not have the control or the power to follow through on his self-remonstrations. Poem 
76 is almost an intensified form of this wish to be rid of Lesbia, but Catullus’ apparent powerlessness is 
highlighted even more powerfully, as are the consequences of what Lesbia has done to him.  
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me miserum adspicite et, si vitam puriter egi, 
eripite hanc pestem perniciemque mihi! 
hei mihi subrepens imos ut torpor in artus 
expulit ex omni pectore laetitias. 
non iam illud quaero, contra ut me diligat illa, 
aut, quod non potis est, esse pudica velit: 
ipse valere opto et taetrum hunc deponere morbum. 
o di, reddite mi hoc pro pietate mea. 
 
Oh gods, if you are able to have pity,  
or if at any time you have brought help, finally,  
to one at the point of death, look on my misery, 
and if I have had a pure life,  
tear out of me this disease and calamity! 
Alas, like a torpor it creeps into my joints, 
and expels all joy from my heart.  
Now, I do not ask that she love me as I love her,  
or, what is impossible, that she be chaste:  
I wish to be strong and to put aside this foul illness. 
Oh gods, give me this for my piety. 
 
 There are similarities here with the kind of passivity Encolpius showed during 
the Quartilla episode. He too could only think of being rescued, rather than rescuing 
himself. Through this passivity, Catullus keeps a firm hand on his depiction of 
himself and Lesbia. Skinner (2003, 78) observes that ‘epithets like morbus and, 
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especially, pestis are attached both to behaviour that threatens the social order and to 
individuals perpetrating it… we may infer that what has been destroyed in the 
speaker’s mind is not just one private compact but an entire system of social 
interchange based upon mutual obligation.’ Through this language, Catullus seeks to 
keep Lesbia’s faults in the forefront of the reader’s mind. Compounding this is the 
juxtaposition of Lesbia’s chastity and the idea of impossibility: quod non potis est, 
esse pudica velit.  
 The framing of the poem also reinforces this delineation between the two. By 
opening and closing the poem by reference to his own pietas, Catullus ‘reminds’ the 
reader that even after all Lesbia has put him through, he remains loyal and morally 
upright. This juxtaposition of pietas and culpa is similar to the strategy that Catullus 
employed in poem 75.141 Catullus opens that poem by focusing on what Lesbia’s 
actions have reduced him to (huc est mens deducta tua mea, Lesbia, culpa, 75.1/ my 
mind has been reduced to this, Lesbia, through your fault), before addressing the role 
that he has played in what has occurred between them. This role, of course, is a 
blameless one: 
 
…atque ita se officio perdidit ipsa suo,  
ut iam nec bene velle queat tibi, si optuma fias,  
nec desistere amare, omnia si facias. (75.2-4) 
 
…and has so destroyed itself by my own kindness, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Wray (2001, 112) reads the Lesbia epigrams as being ‘petulantly self-righteous and hyperbolically 
self-aggrandising.’ Further, he argues that: ‘A male audience is implicitly but palpably present in the 
epigrams to Lesbia. Their speaker even seems often to turn away from her to address his claims of all-
surpassing amatory excellence to them.’ Arguably, this is consistent with my point that Catullus seeks 
to push home a negative comparison between himself and Lesbia. I do not necessarily think the 
epigrams have to be aimed towards a male audience, perhaps more generally just an audience that will 
buy into the image Catullus is propounding.  
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that it could not wish you well, if you were good, 
and could not stop loving you, if you were everything. 
 
Here Lesbia’s culpa is contrasted with Catullus’ officium, to illustrate once again 
Catullus’ virtue (McGushin 1967, 90). The final two lines highlight Catullus’ 
masochistic passivity: he may be so disenchanted that he is unable to like her (and, 
arguably, by extension, to respect her), but he does not have the power to stop loving 
her. Here, as in 76, Catullus positions himself as the powerless one, and Lesbia as the 
person wielding the power; in reality, the powerlessness is illusory: Catullus gives it 
to Lesbia and ensures his own victimisation.  
 Narration in Catullus is a carefully constructed picture of the power dynamic 
within Catullus and Lesbia’s relationship. Notionally, Catullus has handed over all 
power to Lesbia, which he believes she mercilessly wields against him, causing him 
great suffering and misery. However, reading Catullus’ narrative through the lens of 
the masochistic contract shows that the power Lesbia wields is an illusion: all the 
power ultimately lies with Catullus, who makes himself Lesbia’s victim. At the same 
time as he focuses on his own misery, he paints Lesbia as a Dorian Gray-type figure, 
whom Catullus urges the reader to see as increasingly cruel and cold, while the real 
“Lesbia” is hidden entirely from the reader’s view, concealed behind Catullus’ 
rendering of her. His narrative is both biased and intrinsically masochistic: he is 
passive, refusing to do anything to alter his own situation, and he displaces 
responsibility, instead placing it upon Lesbia and her various lovers. Understanding 
masochistic narration in Catullus means appreciating the masochistic bias Catullus 
injects into the narrative, and how ultimately all responsibility for what Catullus 
expresses lies with him, rather than with his representation of Lesbia. 
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Thyestes: mimesis and masochism 
 
This chapter approaches unreliability in a different way to the previous 
chapters. Here I argue that while the masochistic Thyestes possesses the same 
unreliable traits that we have seen so far, the nature and structure of the text means 
that Thyestes does not have enough control over the action to become an unreliable 
narrator. Narrative is cumulative in drama: the viewer has access to multiple voices 
and has greater licence to evaluate characters through their appearance, speech, and 
how they interact with other characters. In Thyestes, multiple factors have determined 
Thyestes’ fate before he walks on stage: firstly, mythical precedent, which guarantees 
the outcome of the play, though not necessarily the route by which it is arrived at; 
and, secondly, the prologue, in which the Fury has set in motion the events that are to 
come. This means that no matter what Thyestes himself says, the reader/viewer 
knows that he will return home, and he will fall prey to Atreus’ plan and consume his 
children. However, Thyestes’ behaviour in this intervening period is integral to how 
he is perceived, particularly in contrast to Atreus. Thyestes’ masochism makes him a 
difficult character to understand or to believe; conversely, Atreus is consistent and 
persuasive: his actions mirror his speech. This chapter examines Thyestes’ 
masochistic behaviour, and how this exhibits inconstancy and thus pseudo-
unreliability, before examining the nature of narrative in drama, and how Atreus 
possesses greater narrative power than Thyestes, akin to the stage manager-type role 
of the Fury in the prologue. 
Thyestes’ vacillating, passive, and at times paradoxical behaviour, does not 
have the same impact on the narrative as Encolpius’ and Justine’s masochistic 
unreliability has on their respective narratives. There are several reasons for this, most 
of which stem from the nature of narrative itself. Chatman (1990, 117-118) 
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acknowledges that reading drama as narrative requires an abstracted or broad reading: 
‘If we adopt an appropriately broad sense of the term, mimetic forms – dramas, films, 
ballets – are just as much “narrated” as short stories and novels.’ One of the key 
differences is the exposure to different voices, and the levels of narrative immersion 
that the reader or viewer experiences. As Rosenmeyer (2002, 98) notes: ‘The 
character of written narrative fiction speaks to the individual reader who, if engaged, 
is readily induced to reflect on what he reads; the character of drama speaks to a 
collective listenership which, though engaged, is allowed little time to reflect.’ In a 
novel like Justine or the Satyricon we have sustained exposure to a single voice, and 
it is easier to identify any flaws or difficulties inherent in that single voice; but in 
drama we have a myriad of characters to assess, and a far shorter time to recognise 
inconsistencies or strengths within those characters.142  
Chatman’s argument for the presence of narrative in drama is the points of 
commonality between it and more traditional narrative forms (1990, 117): ‘Plays and 
novels share the common features of a chrono-logic of events, a set of characters, and 
a setting. Therefore, at a fundamental level they are all stories. The fact that one kind 
of story is told (diegesis) and the other shown (mimesis) is secondary. By 
“secondary” I do not mean that the difference is inconsequential. It is just that it is 
lower in the hierarchy of text distinctions than the difference between Narrative and 
the other text-types.’143 It is the distinct features of diegesis and mimesis that I turn to 
now, in order to illustrate why Thyestes, although he shares the same unreliable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Nünning and Sommer (2008, 339) observe that: ‘…diegetic narrativity foregrounds the act of 
narration rather than the narrated storyworld… Mimetic narrativity foregrounds “the story frame” 
rather than “the telling frame”. For further discussion of this point, see Fludernik (1996, 340 ff.).  
143 Nünning and Sommer (2008, 332) similarly point out that: ‘narrative elements in drama including, 
e.g. audience address, messenger reports, and metalepsis… support the view that drama by no means 
lacks a communicative level of narrative transmission.’ 
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characteristics as our other narrators, does not himself have the power to disrupt the 
narrative.  
Dobrov (2001, 5) observes that: ‘The chief currency of tragic composition is 
what we call myth, the traditional legends handed down orally, in art, and in the 
various genres of pre-dramatic poetry. Tragedy regularly transforms this material 
from a more-or-less linear narrative into a three-dimensional play whose metafictional 
qualities are inevitable…’144 This three-dimensionality gives the reader/viewer a 
greater point of privilege than what they may receive in a novel, where our 
perspective is restricted to what the narrator sees, and what he or she chooses to 
divulge that they see. As Goffman (1974, 135) notes: ‘…members of the audience in 
their capacity as onlookers, as official eavesdroppers, are accorded by the playwright 
a specific information state relative to the inner events of the drama, and this state 
necessarily is different from the playwright’s and in all likelihood from that of various 
characters in the play…’ In the case of Thyestes, both Dobrov’s and Goffman’s points 
aid in our understanding of what is unfolding. Mythologically speaking, we have an 
exterior knowledge of what will happen within the story; and, perspective-wise, we 
have the benefit of what both the Fury and Atreus have hold us, and from that we 
know that Thyestes is right to worry. 
 Nünning and Sommer (2008, 337) examine the intersection of diegetic and 
mimetic narrativity in drama: ‘…plays do not just represent narratives (i.e. a series of 
events), they also stage narratives in that, more often than not, they make storytelling, 
i.e. the act of telling narratives, theatrical. In other words, plays not only represent 
series of events, they also represent “acts of narration”, with characters serving as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Dobrov here speaks specifically of the development of fifth-century Greek tragedy, but arguably the 
same applies to Roman tragic theatre. 
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intradiegetic storytellers.’ Considering Thyestes and Atreus as intradiegetic 
storytellers is a useful indicator of the power that they wield.  
Much of Atreus’ power as a storyteller comes from his continuity of character, 
and his apparent awareness of his own potential. As Schiesaro (2003, 49) points out, 
there is a quasi-authorial element to Atreus’ character, as he plots out how to take 
revenge on Thyestes, and then assumes the necessary role in order to carry this out. 
Atreus moves seamlessly from each role: architect of the plan, “loving” brother, 
executioner, and finally victor. As he moves through each stage of the drama, Atreus 
makes it clear to the reader/viewer what he is doing. Returning to the scene where 
Thyestes and Atreus are reunited, Atreus’ transition from gleeful derision (491-506) 
to shamming the role of loving brother is marked clearly by ‘praestetur fides’, making 
it clear that he is assuming a role.145 He plays this role successfully, though not 
spectacularly. However, there is no need to do anything beyond what he does, 
because the person he seeks to trick is all too ready to accept what is offered. As 
Davis (2003, 46) has observed, the exchange between Thyestes and Atreus at 534-542 
covers much the same ground as the earlier conversation between Tantalus and 
Thyestes, where Thyestes had a negative retort to every statement Tantalus made, and 
yet this time Thyestes meekly bows to Atreus’ offer. Because Thyestes so desperately 
wants what is offered to him, Atreus does not have to work very hard in order to give 
it to him, a fact of which Atreus is no doubt well aware.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Boyle (2017, 274-275) observes that: ‘Atrean asides underscore the king’s control not only of the 
“events” of the drama, but of its very structure and pace, as he halts or delays the action at will. What is 
also displayed in Atreus’ long asides is the pleasure he derives from this power and his delight in 
sharing his pleasure with the audience… a breaking of the “fourth wall”…’ Asides like this are 
important for forging a persuasive connection between Atreus and the audience, unlike Thyestes, who 
does not have the control and power that his brother possesses. Most of Thyestes’ asides and soliloquys 
only serve to sure up what Atreus has already said about him.  
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In the next act, we see Atreus only through the words of the messenger, but 
the planning and organisation that has gone into this scene comes across clearly.146 In 
the earlier chapter I examined Thyestes’ repeated unwilling step, and his vacillating 
mindset. Atreus, on the other hand, does not allow his emotions to get the better of 
him, so that they do not impede his progress. Atreus’ pedantic, ritualised process of 
killing Thyestes’ children is a compelling example of this, because the method and 
order Atreus brings to this ceremony has both a comforting and alienating effect. As 
Hornby (1986, 64) argues, ceremonies ‘imply an order and permanence in the 
surrounding world’; they carry a consistency and rigidity of form which can be 
contextualised internally and externally of the text itself. A funeral, for example, with 
its associated emotions, both implicit and explicit, is a readily recognisable ceremony, 
and its structure provides order and continuity to the audience, who can recognise the 
next step to be taken and be comforted by its familiarity, meaning the ‘pattern or form 
is always of the highest importance’ (Hornby 1986, 51) for forging a connection 
between the participants, the audience, and their engagement with the plot.  
 Thus, the attention to detail which Atreus observes forms a ritualised 
connection with the audience, even as the act itself inspires horror. That the ritual is 
narrated by the nuntius adds a further level of order and control to the narrative; the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Tarrant (1985, 189) notes that: ‘Atreus directs the “sacrifice” with his customary energy, insisting 
on complete verisimilitude… the sacrificial slaughter is a ritual by which Atreus affirms (or perhaps 
establishes) his status as a god.’ This step in the plan is the essential one, the moment which will 
reestablish the power that Atreus feels that he has lost, and leads inevitably to the notion of ‘dimitto 
superos; summa votorum attigi’ in line 888. 
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messenger can unfold the story logically, mirroring Atreus’ own logical progression 
through the act itself, while emphasising the centrality of Atreus’ role:147  
 
Ipse est sacerdos; ipse funesta prece 
letale carmen ore violento canit,  
stat ipse ad aras, ipse devotos neci 
contrectat et componit et ferro admovet; 
attendit ipse – nulla pars sacri perit. (691-695) 
 
He himself is priest; he himself with violent speech sings the death 
song with fatal prayer, he himself stands at the altar,  
he himself handles those promised to death,  
brings them together and moves towards the knife;  
he himself attends – no part of the ritual is undone.  
 
This repeated and insistent use of ipse emphasises the crime that Atreus is 
perpetrating, the power that he wields, and the precision with which he carries out 
each specific task. This scene is the penultimate step in the culmination of Atreus’ 
plan; it is here that he moves from stage manager to performer,148 and the solemnity 
with which he carries out the role is indicative of the importance that this task holds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Boyle (2017, cix) observes: ‘Metatheatrical and metaliterary language and motifs punctuate the 
scene, in which the varied pace, pauses, and crescendo of the narrative are those of a tragic drama, and 
the paradoxical amalgam of revulsion and attraction, horror and pleasure experienced by the narrator-
poet-Messenger not only intimates the “Atreus” in every man, but mirrors, even prescribes, the 
audience’s response.’ Certainly, this scene reveals the true horror and extent of Atreus’ power, as he 
moves from the planning phase to the carrying out of his plan. The order and method of the 
messenger’s speech forces the reader/viewer to see what is happening. 
148  Boyle (2017, 336) comments: ‘Note the metatheatrical undercurrent of Atreus’ sacrificial 
preparations, as he arranges the props for the scene, and ‘costumes’ and positions the main actors 
(personae mutae). He is even responsible for the letale carmen itself.’ Atreus’ attention to detail speaks 
to his determination and conviction. 
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for executing his plan149. Atreus must depend on no one; every detail must be 
observed because it is essential that this plan is carried out without difficulty.  
As much as a ritual or ceremony within a play has a recognisable and 
stabilising effect on the audience, arguably so too does it have a steadying effect on 
Atreus, and then in turn a stabilising effect between the audience and Atreus. Here 
Atreus plays a role, much as he has previously played the role of affectionate brother, 
and this role gives further depth to his character. It is not necessarily that this role 
forges a link between Atreus and the audience, in that the act garners sympathy for 
Atreus, but that Atreus’ consistency of behaviour, and commitment to purpose, is 
clearly conveyed.  
Finally, I would like to return to the link between Atreus and Sadean sadists, 
which I have previously explored. The similarities between Atreus and the sadists 
offers much by way of understanding Atreus’ comparatively greater narrative powers. 
In reading Sade we appreciated that he inverts typical Catholic meaning in order to 
present a doctrine that wholeheartedly embraces this inversion. That which would 
stereotypically be considered a ‘virtue’ for a Catholic becomes a ‘vice’ in Sade, and 
similarly that which would be considered a Catholic ‘vice’ becomes a Sadean ‘virtue’. 
There is an unrelenting consistency to this inversion: the lines between Sadean vice 
and virtue do not blur, nor do Sade’s characters brook any unnecessary abandonment 
of their fundamental principles. This very clear understanding of their desires and 
principles makes them more reliable characters than Justine, because their clarity of 
purpose affords them a far greater awareness. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Schiesaro (2003, 88) argues that this is the moment where Atreus begins to quell his doubts about 
the paternity of his children: ‘The careful investigation of the boys’ entrails (755-8) is a mise en abyme 
of the only (impossible) “inspection” which could actually assuage Atreus’ doubts, that of his 
adulterous, even incestuous, wife.’ Arguably, this is another reason for Atreus’ precision: everything 
must be done correctly, given what he believes is at stake. 
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While Thyestes labours under his vacillating desires and conflicting thoughts, 
Atreus demonstrates control and awareness. Like Sadean sadists, Atreus suffers no 
apprehension about how to behave, whether to dissimulate in order to ‘play’ the role 
of a good king, one who exercises clementia. Atreus can play a role if necessary, but 
only for a particular purpose: to sure up the outward façade and strengthen the fortress 
within. That is, Atreus maintains tight control over his environment: his behaviour 
dictates how it operates; he effectively conceals his feelings and predilections, if 
necessary, in order to maintain a benign outward façade that protects his concealed 
motives. Likewise, Sade’s sadists often maintained an external façade of ‘normality’, 
which the sadists promulgated only to protect their private lifestyle. It creates an ease 
of functionality for the sadists to carry out their plans unhindered, but represents no 
regard whatsoever for the behaviours which they are shamming. Comparatively, 
Atreus has a far greater level of control over his behaviour and actions than Thyestes 
does, and in turn that makes him a more trustworthy and reliable character.  
For Atreus, gaining revenge on Thyestes is his motivating force, and thus this 
single-minded purpose becomes the constant modulating force for Atreus’ behaviour. 
It is his tight control over his ira, his constant awareness of it, which prevents him 
from making hasty and uninformed decisions, and which gives a twisted logic to his 
behaviour.150 Throughout the play Atreus does not waver from the philosophy that he 
outlines in his conversation with the satelles. In his mind, the course of action that he 
takes is patently right and rational, and thus for him it is morally right. Atreus’ goal is 
to take revenge on Thyestes, which will have the consequence of bringing him 
pleasure, and give him vindication for the wrongs that he feels he has suffered as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Braden (1985, 42): ‘Senecan drama reaches its heights not in a vision of ambient, impersonal evil, 
but in one of furor concentrated, triumphantly embodied in a single character.’ Atreus is a prime 
example of this kind of concentrated furor. He harnesses his anger to guarantee his triumph, rather than 
letting his emotions control him, as Thyestes does. 
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result of Thyestes’ actions. For Atreus, an action which has these consequences is 
patently rational; if he were not to take revenge on Thyestes, then he would remain in 
his current perpetual state of impotent rage, which would be irrational. This means 
that any further actions Atreus takes in order to achieve his goal are defined as 
rational and irrational, depending on their eventual impact on his ultimate goals.151 It 
is in this way that he can rationalise killing Thyestes’ children, his own nephews: if 
they did not die, his plan would fail, which would be a negative and hence irrational 
outcome. 
Returning to the metatheatricality of myth, this adds another layer of 
complexity to Atreus’ characterisation. Senecan characters often seem to have an 
awareness of their own mythological persona; as Rosenmeyer (1996, 508) observes: 
‘Senecan dramaturgy, where the character’s lines suggest, not that they act out 
privileged parts in a well-known tale, but that they have read the version by Sophocles 
or Astydamas and are trying to improve on it.’ Certainly Atreus displays this 
awareness of his own mythology; lines such as dignum est Thyeste facinus et dignum 
Atreo… uterque faciat (it is a deed worthy of Thyestes and worthy of Atreus…  let 
them each make it theirs, 271-272) seem to confirm this. Indeed, much of Atreus’ 
opening words are like a call to arms, setting the parameters for the character that he 
wants to become.152  
Conversely, Thyestes shows little awareness of his own mythology, or indeed 
little awareness of his own self, instead presenting this quasi-Stoic façade, which is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Star (2012, 65) notes that: ‘In the Senecan corpus, the performance of virtue and the performance of 
vice are set in the same linguistic and imperatival terms… His tragedies reveal how the passions are 
ultimately related to and based upon ideas of control and rationality.’ That is, Atreus embraces a kind 
of inverted Stoicism, where he achieves constantia through harnessing his ira and furor, directing it all 
into his plan to take revenge on Thyestes. His self-command of his passions and his mental consistency 
ultimately make him a far more successful “Stoic” than Thyestes pretends to be. See Davis (2003, 65-
66) for further discussion on how Atreus embodies Stoic values.  
152 In this respect, Braden (1985, 42) points out that Atreus’ opening words, particularly identifying 
himself as a mere iratus Atreus, is a ‘confrontation with a self image to live up to.’ 
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scarcely credible. An explanation for Thyestes’ pseudo-Stoicism is his masochistic 
character. The earlier chapter explored the concept of masochistic delusion, and how 
Thyestes has fooled himself into returning home by quelling his paranoia and 
rejecting rational thought. Arguably, this delusion manifests in several aspects of his 
behaviour, including his Stoic façade. In attempting to embrace a Stoic disposition, 
Thyestes can assure himself that his motives for returning home are pure, rather than 
being motivated by greed or a lust for power. He returns again and again to reiterating 
his desire for simpler things, in an attempt to convince himself that he no longer 
desires the throne and its attached advantages. This persona then forms part of his 
delusion, a defence against the danger that he tries so hard to deny. I will explore 
Thyestes’ “Stoic” persona further in a moment. 
 The other element of Thyestes’ masochistic persona that is integral to the way 
the drama unfolds is his use of masochism as a defensive measure. This also coalesces 
with Thyestes’ masochistic delusion, and serves to suppress Thyestes’ doubts. 
Loewenstein (1995, 36) discusses the intersection of passivity and anxiety in the 
masochistic persona, observing that: ‘…the masochist uses a mechanism generally 
designed to deal with anxiety… namely, to anticipate actively what might be feared to 
occur to one passively. By imagining or producing scenes of torture or punishment 
which he himself devises, the masochist excludes the possibility of being tortured or 
punished in an unexpected or uncontrollable way.’ This is arguably akin to a worst-
case scenario defence, where the masochist tries to quash their fears by imagining that 
things could not possibly be as bad as what they anticipate. In Thyestes’ case, he is 
filled with trepidation at returning to Atreus, and tries to prepare himself by 
anticipating what may await him. Unfortunately for Thyestes, he does not have the 
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cognitive abilities that Atreus has, and his imagination conjures up amorphous 
worries, without any specific notions against which to defend himself.  
 Thyestes is astute enough, initially, to recognise that there is most likely a 
trick at work (errat hic aliquis dolus, 473), but when Tantalus presses him to explain 
what kind of trick he fears, Thyestes can only answer ‘omnem… tantum potest 
quantum odit’ (everything… his power is as great as his hate, 483-484). This 
discussion frames the apocalyptic statement, which I explored in the previous chapter, 
where Thyestes points out that, amongst other things, fire would join with water 
before Atreus loved him (476-482). This statement shows not only the paradoxical 
nature of Thyestes’ decision to go home, but also an apparent attempt to anticipate the 
worst possible outcome: surely nothing that awaits him could be worse than what he 
fears Atreus is capable of enacting.  
Thyestes remains passive in his decision-making, ending his back and forth 
about staying and going by ceding control to Tantalus (ego vos sequor, non duco, 
489). He purposefully sacrifices control and awareness with this action, leaving the 
choice in Tantalus’ hand. This is in line with another masochistic defence mechanism, 
where the masochist makes a partial sacrifice in an attempt at self-preservation. As 
Nacht (1995, 19) explains: ‘…masochism, an apparently paradoxical reaction, is a 
means of defence, pathological self-defence… things proceed as if the masochist, 
faced with the danger of losing everything… consents to a partial sacrifice to save the 
rest.’ Thyestes surrenders control to Tantalus, in order to pass the responsibility to 
him. Rather than trying to unite thought and action himself, he can force his unwilling 
step (cf. nolentem gradum, 420) to follow Tantalus. In this way, he can also maintain 
his masochistic delusion that he does not desire the throne: rather than returning to 
take power, he simply follows his son.  
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Importantly, Nacht (1995, 19) also notes that this ‘sacrifice’ is not a conscious 
decision by the masochist, and is often more detrimental than an alternative course: 
‘[it is] a mug’s game, however, at least in the eyes of the beholder; for the sufferings 
and sacrifices which the masochist inflicts on himself are real, whereas the danger 
against which he struggles is only a fiction of the unconscious.’ Here, danger awaits 
by returning to Atreus, and that danger comes to fruition precisely because Thyestes 
allows himself to be led home, thus bringing the danger upon himself. Further, despite 
his stated concern that his sons are the reason for his fear (vos facitis mihi Atrea 
timendum, 485-486), he gives Tantalus the power to lead them all into danger. If 
Thyestes had taken control and decided not to go, the danger would not exist.  
This kind of self-sacrifice links Thyestes’ behaviour to similar patterns that we 
have seen before with Justine. Justine sacrificed her freedom in order to maintain her 
Catholic virtue, which was itself a ‘mug’s game’, given that her virtue got her 
nowhere. This sacrifice was likewise not seen as such by her, because she identified 
herself by her religion, and could not conceive of the possibility of abrogating her 
virtue. This also contributed to her unreliability, because her skewed and narrowed 
perspective left her incapable of fully understanding what was happening around her, 
and unable to conceive of a way to extricate herself effectively from the situation. 
Likewise, Thyestes’ decision to cede control to Tantalus is reminiscent of the way 
that Encolpius frequently allowed himself to be controlled by a multiplicity of other 
characters. This passivity often affected Encolpius’ narration, as he was unable to 
fully engage with what was happening around him, or to see his way clear of a 
situation. Thyestes has a greater awareness of what may await him, but he does not 
have the control to try to prevent it; his desire for power overrules his perceptive 
abilities.  
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I return now to Thyestes’ “Stoicism”, to illustrate why it is that Thyestes 
cannot mislead the reader through his narrative, and that therefore he is not an 
unreliable narrator in the same way that Justine, Encolpius, and Catullus are. 
Thyestes’ first appearance presents a confection of disparate statements, which in turn 
conflicts with his actions. While at first blush it may appear that Thyestes suffers 
under the same moral masochism as Justine, as the play continues it becomes 
apparent that Thyestes’ veneer of Stoicism exists perhaps only to make exile more 
bearable, and that beneath that he is desperate to reclaim his former power. In 
presenting himself as akin to a Stoic Sage, Thyestes tries to convince not only 
himself, but – unsuccessfully – the viewer. This is part of Thyestes’ masochistic 
delusion: if he convinces himself that he has no desire for power, he can manage his 
time in exile.  
We see elements of the Stoic sage when Thyestes first appears. His discussion 
of a yearning for simplicity, when he is travelling to meet Atreus, speaks to a 
character who has embraced nature and the rationality that stems from it, and uses 
‘living with nature’ to guide his decisions and actions:153 
 
repete silvestres fugas 
saltusque densos potius et mixtam feris 
similemque vitam… (412-414) 
 
Seek again your forest retreats and the dense woodlands,  
and the life shared with beasts and like to theirs. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 See Inwood (1985, 105) and Schofield (2003, 239-246) for further discussion on the early Stoic 
notions of living consistently with nature, and its meaning. 
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Pratt (1948, 5) observes that: ‘Seneca presents essentially the Stoic dogma that 
happiness consists in the development of a strong and upright spirit which conquers 
both internal and external evil.’154 Thyestes initially presents as a man who has found 
contentment in nature, and uses this to resist internal weakness and external attack. 
Thyestes appears to recognise that the greatest external threat to his humanitas is the 
crown, and the inherent dangers that power brings with it:155 
 
…clarus hic regni nitor 
fulgore non est quod oculos falso auferat; 
cum quod datur spectabis, et dantem aspice. (414-416) 
 
The bright splendour of kingship  
should not blind my eyes with its false glitter;  
when you look at a gift, look at the giver too. 
 
This shows that not only is Thyestes aware of the risks of returning home, but 
is specifically aware that Atreus is the danger. To some degree, Thyestes has the same 
awareness of Atreus’ inherent characteristics as Atreus has of Thyestes’, and uses this 
awareness to counsel himself against returning home. Thyestes here identifies that 
refusing to go would be the rational action, and that returning home to Atreus is 
irrational, given that ‘the Stoic Sage is free from passions (apatheia) and he is happy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Veyne (2003) provides thorough discussion on Seneca’s Stoicism.  
155 See Strange (2004, 32-51) for further discussion on the passions and decision-making in Stoicism. 
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because he is not manipulated and drawn by such irrational forces’ (Yu 2008, 14).156 
Arguably, the only way that Thyestes could continue on to Atreus would be if his 
motivation for returning home was one that was in line with Stoic values, that is, a 
morally right action. In this respect, Inwood (1986, 551) observes the difference 
between appropriate action and moral action for a Stoic Sage: 
 
When doing an appropriate action, the sage can fail – appropriate 
actions, it should be said, include actions like courageous behaviour, 
generous behaviour, etc., as well as actions like keeping healthy and 
taking care of one’s family. In all these things one may fail and still be 
a sage. But a morally right action is one that cannot fail; such actions 
are not, of course, a wholly distinct set of things; rather, a morally 
right action is an appropriate action done in such a manner that, under 
the description that counts the most of all, it cannot fail. 
 
 I will not examine the idea of morally right action in relation to Thyestes, as 
his resounding failure seems to preclude such a point, but I will return to the notion 
shortly in respect of Atreus’ behaviour. In terms of appropriate action, if there were 
an element of selfless necessity motivating Thyestes’ behaviour, his eventual failure 
could still see his Stoic nature remain intact – if, for example, he had returned home 
in order to achieve a positive outcome for others, like the people or his children. It 
would still be important for Thyestes to illustrate appropriate Stoic behaviour on his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Star (2012, 26-27) notes that Seneca frequently brings together Stoic self-command and Roman 
military ideals: ‘He describes the “battle within,” the battle for self-mastery and consistency against the 
passions and mental fluctuation… self-command, power over one’s self, takes precedence…’ Through 
this scene with Thyestes and Tantalus, we see the ‘battle within’ play out in Thyestes’ speech, but it is 
clear that he cannot overcome his fluctuating mindset, and thus cannot exercise command of the self. 
As a point of comparison, Atreus, on the other hand, exercises self-command, effectively overcoming 
his doubts, and harnessing his passions and directing them into single-minded purpose. 
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way home, in order for his behaviour to be understood as Stoic. Examining Thyestes’ 
behaviour and speech either side of the Stoic lines of 412-416 shows clearly how 
Thyestes’ masochist delusion gives the lie to these Stoic notions. 
 As Schiesaro (2003, 148) notes: ‘Stoic sages, notoriously, should avoid hopes 
and fears alike’, and that Thyestes’ statement of optata patriae tecta et Argolicas opes 
(the longed-for homes of my fatherland and Argive wealth, 404) shows immediately 
his hopes for a long-desired homecoming. Boyle (2017, 248-249) similarly notes: 
‘The bipartite structure – joy at returning home (404-11), fear of Atreus (412-30) – 
makes for easy comprehension by an audience.’ Indeed, this bipartite structure frames 
Thyestes’ “Stoic” musings. He tries to convince himself not to give into his hopes, 
taking refuge in the tenets of Stoic goodness and rationality, only to lapse into fear 
shortly after:157  
 
Modo inter illa, quae putant cuncti aspera 
fortis fui laetusque; nunc contra in metus 
revolvor; animus haeret ac retro cupit 
corpus referre, moveo nolentem gradum. (417-420) 
 
Recently, amongst such fortune, which all count as adverse, I was 
strong and joyful; now, in opposition, I am returning into fears;  
my spirit is stalled and, my body desiring to turn back,  
I move unwilling step along. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 See Lagrée (2004, 148-176) for further discussion of constantia in Stoicism, and Becker (2004, 250-
276) on Stoic emotion. 
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The exchange with Tantalus further illustrates Thyestes’ vacillating mindset, 
and makes clear that Thyestes understands that the rational course of action is to turn 
back (reflecte gressum, dum licet, teque eripe, 428). He tries to explain to Tantalus 
the dangers that his return presents, and the dangers that exist in kingship itself: 
 
dum excelsus steti,  
numquam pavere destiti atque ipsum mei 
ferrum timere lateris. o quantum bonum est 
obstare nulli, capere securas dapes 
humi iacentem! scelera non intrant casas 
tutusque mensa capitur angusta cibus; 
venenum in auro bibitur. (447-453) 
 
While I stood high, I never ceased to fear, 
even fearing the sword at my own side. 
Oh, how good it is to stand in no one’s way,  
to enjoy an untroubled meal lying on the ground. 
Crime does not come to lowly hovels, 
one is safe eating at a narrow table; 
poison is drunk in gold. 
 
As Tantalus probes Thyestes’ worries more, Thyestes reveals that his belief is 
that great kingship is the power to cope without kingship (immane regnum est posse 
sine regno pati, 470) and that his fear of Atreus stems specifically from a fear for his 
sons: pro me nihil iam metuo. vos facitis mihi Atrea timendum (I now no longer fear 
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for myself. You make me fear Atreus, 485-486). These fears – apparently selfless – 
themselves are not Stoic, as I have already mentioned, but they are also not 
persuasive. Despite the range of worries that Thyestes outlines, and the easy solution 
for avoiding such fears, they cannot outweigh his desire for the crown. By his own 
definition, Thyestes is no great king, and ‘he is no Stoic sage’ (Boyle 2017, 250).  
Thyestes is an inconstant character. He lacks the awareness and consistency to 
embody fully a Stoic disposition.158 Lines such as ‘occurret Argos, populus occurret 
frequens’ (411) betray Thyestes’ desire to regain the crown, and with it the admiration 
and attention of the people.159 In this respect, Boyle (1997, 50) points out a similarity 
between Tantalus’ hunger and Thyestes’ desire, ‘…like old Tantalus’ “ingrained 
hunger” (97), it lies within, able to be rekindled when the prospect of “wealth”, 
divitiae, draws near.’ Further, the ease with which he accepts Atreus’ offer of shared 
kingship gives the lie to his earlier words: 
 
T: …respuere certum est regna consilium mihi. 
 
A: Meam relinquam, nisi tuam partem accipis.  
 
T: Accipio; regni nomen impositi feram, 
sed iura et arma servient mecum tibi. (540 – 543) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Star (2012, 37) notes that: ‘In his description of the summum bonum [De vita beata, 8.6), Seneca 
states that an essential component of the ideal of psychological consistency is the mind (mens) doing 
all things by its own command.’ Thyestes instead chooses to hand control over to Tantalus, thus 
illustrating his psychological inconsistency. 
159 Braden (1985, 17) states: ‘Stoicism’s central strength is its calculus of adaptation to unchangeable 
realities. Surrendering the world’s goods, we find them false and learn how to want what we have 
instead of striving for what we want.’ This is precisely what Thyestes is unable to do, because he is not 
a true Stoic. His desire to regain the riches and luxuries associated with the throne overrides any 
appreciation for what he has in exile. 
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T: To refuse the throne is my certain plan.  
 
A: I shall abandon mine, unless you accept your part.  
 
T: I accept; I will bear the name of king placed on me,  
but laws and arms along with me shall be subservient to you.  
 
Thyestes requires little persuasion to accept the power and wealth that Atreus offers, 
similarly to how quickly Tantalus persuaded him to continue on to meet Atreus earlier 
(421 ff.). The ease with which Atreus is able to persuade Thyestes only serves to 
assure Atreus further that Thyestes is exactly what he perceives him to be: power 
hungry and greedy.  
Thus, Atreus’ engagement with his mythological self, along with his 
consistency and control, is why his narrative is more powerful and more persuasive 
than Thyestes’: Atreus assumes his identity, rather than being the unwilling and 
unknowing victim of mythology that Thyestes is. Atreus’ positive or aggressive 
characteristics in turn give greater weight to his storytelling ability. As we have seen, 
drama gives the audience a greater awareness of the entirety of the plot, and they can 
make value judgments according to the combined sum of what they see. 
Comparatively, Atreus’ words support and extend on the words of the Fury in 
prologue, which metatheatrically supports how the audience understands the myth, 
which further strengthens the audience’s trust in Atreus’ words. Thyestes, 
comparatively, seems ignorant of the role that he plays. His masochistic persona 
means that he submits readily to the will of others, and uses passivity and delusion as 
a means of defence. He tries to assume a Stoic persona, but ultimately this exposes his 
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own delusion. Nothing that Thyestes does proves Atreus wrong in his assessment of 
Thyestes (Davis 2003, 44). Where Atreus can play a role successfully, Thyestes is 
unable to sustain a persona; his desire for the crown ultimately controls him, revealing 
his inconsistency. His masochistic persona means that the audience can clearly see his 
inconstancy, and, as a cumulative result of the layers of dramatic narrative, knows 
that his words are not reliable.  
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Conclusion 
 
 ‘My manner of thinking, so you say, cannot be approved. 
Do you suppose I care? A poor fool indeed is he who adopts a 
manner of thinking for others! My manner of thinking… holds with 
my existence, and the way I am made. It is not in my power to alter 
it; and were it, I’d not do so.’ D.A.F. de Sade.160 
 
 A common theme of the masochistic persona is the masochist’s ineducable 
nature. Though they may be bent to the will of others, be led and misled, they do not 
learn, and they do not adapt. As we have seen, our characters did not change their 
behaviour to any extent over time, but remained suffering under the same masochistic 
symptoms. There are several reasons for this: a persona that is rooted in actively 
sacrificing agency is difficult to change, because one is not necessarily aware of what 
is happening, and that their agency is there to reclaim; secondly, the masochist may 
not want to reclaim that agency, because to do so would be to end their suffering, and 
the masochist does not necessarily want to do this. In this thesis, this was perhaps 
most obvious in the case of Catullus: it was he who possessed the most power, and yet 
refused to use that power, because to do so would end his suffering, and the story that 
he has to tell. Catullus can no longer suffer at Lesbia’s hands, if he asserts his 
patriarchal powers and removes himself from her. 
 This refusal to reclaim agency is critical to my reading of masochism in 
classical literature. I have shown that all these narratives are based around an essential 
refusal to change, to adapt, and to overcome. In failing to do these things, our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Sade writes this in a letter to his wife, which is quoted in Seaver & Wainhouse’s edition of Justine 
(1966, iv). 
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masochists bear out the narrative. Justine continues to be victimised by the libertines; 
she does not transform – as Barthes (1976, 143) ably points out she could do – and 
join their ranks, effectively ending her suffering; Encolpius does not learn self-
control, or to assert himself in any meaningful way, but continues to be the perennial 
stooge; Catullus loves Lesbia limitlessly, and is her constant victim; and Thyestes 
does not rationalise his thoughts and emotions, and returns to Atreus with no real plan 
as to how to handle it, beyond reclaiming the throne. Their masochistic natures allow 
them to be propelled along, to bring about the critical moments in the text, and to be 
unable to resolve them. 
 To bring these points together, let us recall the way that Justine’s masochism 
fulfils the premise of the novel. As we observed in the second Sadean chapter, Sade’s 
goal, as the implied author, is to give voice to the libertines and their philosophies. To 
give ample opportunity for this to happen, they need a victim who will not only listen, 
but who will endure. Justine’s body is almost indestructible. She survives through 
multiple brandings, rapes, dissections, and physical attacks, but her body remains 
virtually unmarked. Justine’s body becomes emblematic of the unchanged 
masochistic persona: her body, like her inherent masochism, cannot transform or be 
altered. As Dipiero (1994, 248) observes: ‘Justine undergoes a bizarre and ceaseless 
series of unthinkable tortures and abuses; what is more remarkable than the ordeals 
she undergoes, however, is the fact that her body never retains a trace of the violence 
done to her.’ This must be so, in order for Justine to move from libertine to libertine, 
and give them the opportunity to outline their philosophies. 
 Beyond her almost indestructible body (bearing in mind that it is eventually 
destroyed by an act of nature, when Sade has exhausted his libertine narrative), 
Justine’s masochism is intrinsic to highlighting the sadism of Sade’s libertines, and 
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allowing them to flourish. As the first section illustrated, Justine listens, but she does 
not hear. She remains unswayed by anything the libertines say, and remains 
committed to her religion. Justine’s Catholicism is the seat of her masochism, and her 
stubborn adherence to her virtue preserves and extends her suffering. It gives voice to 
the libertines, and that is the essential plot of the story. Justine – and Justine’s body – 
does not change, and so it is not a text that follows her misadventures to some 
eventual realisation, or to a noble rescue and salvation for Justine; the point of the text 
is the libertines themselves, and Justine’s unrelenting masochism facilitates this. 
 As we have seen, Encolpius’ masochism is also integral to the way that the 
text unfolds. He is passive, submissive, and frequently overwhelmed, and this does 
not change as the text progresses. The confusion that causes him to be led into a 
brothel at the beginning of the extant text (7) is still present at the end, when he seeks 
out a cure for his impotence from Oenothea (134-137). While Encolpius’ mood 
changes frequently, his underlying characteristics do not change. Encolpius’ 
masochism enables the episodic nature of the text. Because he is so susceptible to 
manipulation, Encolpius can be easily steered along from place to place. The 
comparison with Eumolpus that I explored in the first section illustrated the way that 
Encolpius surrenders control to other people. Where Eumolpus takes charge of a 
scenario, and, like a skilled conman, adapts to different scenarios and manipulates 
situations to take the fullest advantage of them, Encolpius could not exert his 
influence, and was unable to play a role for any length of time, as Eumolpus does on 
Croton, for example.  
 In the second section, we saw how Encolpius’ passivity facilitates the episodic 
structure of the text. Taking up Schmeling’s work on the nature and structure of the 
text, I illustrated how Encolpius’ masochism makes him the perfect character for a 
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narrative that is structured by scenario. His masochistic surrendering of agency means 
that he can extend the length of an episode, as he submits to the control of other 
characters. It also means that Petronius can employ a series of ‘guest stars’ in each 
episode, who can direct the course of the scene, and take centre stage at certain times, 
when Encolpius becomes too overwhelmed and retreats into direct speech. We saw 
this clearly in the Cena Trimalchionis, a travesty of a symposium, where Encolpius 
eventually stopped asking questions himself, and Trimalchio and his cohort took over 
the narrative. Encolpius does not learn or change as the text progresses, enabling the 
episodic structure, where it is as if Encolpius resets each time, forgetting all that he 
may have learned or observed, and throwing himself melodramatically into one 
incident after another. 
 Likewise, Catullus exhibits little change over the course of the Lesbia poems. 
His attitude towards Lesbia may change, but his own behaviour, and understanding of 
his own behaviour, does not vary in any meaningful way. It is because of his 
masochistic nature that he does not change, because he displaces all responsibility 
onto Lesbia, and he does not perceive that he is complicit in his suffering. As we have 
seen, Catullus’ masochism operates on several levels: firstly, he defines his 
relationship with Lesbia in a way that notionally gives her all the power. Through 
poems 5 and 7, Catullus seeks to cast aside his patriarchal powers, and to give control 
to Lesbia. When Catullus perceives that this is not working as successfully as he had 
intended it to do, he places the blame entirely on Lesbia, exhibiting masochistic 
displacement of blame. He also demonstrates masochistic passivity, because despite 
recognising that he is unhappy because of Lesbia, he cannot rouse himself to do 
anything about it directly. 
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 In the second Catullus chapter, we examined Catullus’ relationship with 
Lesbia through the lens of the masochistic contract. This brought together the 
elements of Catullus’ masochistic behaviour that the first chapter identified. Catullus’ 
innate desire to suffer meant that he victimised Lesbia, forcing her to be the agent of 
his suffering. Most importantly, however, this behaviour was subconscious: in 
Catullus’ mind, he was the victim of Lesbia’s coldness and cruelty. This reading of 
Catullus brings a new perspective to the Lesbia poems, that subconsciously Catullus 
wants to suffer, and that is why he defines his relationship with Lesbia in such a way, 
and why he will not actively do anything to change his situation.  
 Finally, Thyestes’ behaviour is perhaps more difficult to pinpoint than the 
other characters, because he so often hides behind his own delusions. Arguably, rather 
than saying that his behaviour does not change, his inherent nature does not change 
across the text. He is still the victim of Atreus’ psychological mind games, even after 
his punishment has been carried out and revealed. It is Atreus, the victor, who has the 
last word in the play, not Thyestes: te puniendum liberis trado tuis (1112). As we 
have seen, Thyestes’ masochism manifests in two central ways: as a suppressive 
mechanism to quell his paranoia, resulting in Stoic delusion and passivity, and as 
unconscious, repressed guilt, with the two masochistic elements cumulatively causing 
his vacillating mindset.  
 In the second section, we saw that Thyestes’ masochism ultimately means that 
his voice lacks impact or persuasiveness. Alongside Atreus, whose power is virtually 
limitless, the reader is unlikely to buy into what Thyestes says. His masochism affects 
his self-awareness, his rationality, and his perspicacity. He suspects a trick, but cannot 
imagine what it could be; he claims to be alert, but takes the crown straightaway from 
Atreus, and sits down to glut himself with food and wine. His masochism causes his 
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downfall. The central point I have illustrated with Thyestes is not only that the play 
glorifies Atreus’ victory, but it places Thyestes as the victim of his weakness. All 
Atreus’ careful scheming and planning would have been for nought, if Thyestes had 
not returned home. Thyestes’ masochism enables the plot to unfold; it brings about 
the mythological inevitability. The Fury instigates the drama, but it is Thyestes’ 
masochism that seals his fate.  
 Masochism is a useful and variegated literary device. It has a direct and 
pervasive impact on textual narratives, and can do so across a variety of genres. It can 
suspend and prolong narratives, bring about plot resolutions, and facilitate generic 
exploration. Reading classical texts through a masochistic lens, as I have shown, 
reveals different interpretive angles. Encolpius’ masochism makes him chameleon-
like, moving from genre to genre, never quite adapting himself, but facilitating the 
adaptation of others; Catullus is not Lesbia’s victim, but the deliberate agent of his 
own suffering; and Thyestes is not only Atreus’ victim, but the victim of his own 
masochistic delusion, a delusion that sends him home and into the midst of Atreus’ 
machinations. The Marquis de Sade’s use of masochism, obvious and deliberate as it 
is, allowed me to identify masochistic elements in my classical characters, and to 
demonstrate how these elements are crucial in shaping the texts that contain them.  
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